Signed WindowsDefender.msi Installers Deliver a Rust Remote-Shell Agent

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Summary

Analysis found signed WindowsDefender.msi and DefenderUpdate.msi installers deploying a Rust remote-shell agent. It executes attacker commands over HTTPS, and later builds used a new server; sandbox runs received no real orders.

Key points

  • The MSI installers, signed by SOPHISTICATED SOFTWARES (PTY) LTD, install a Rust program named c2_agent as %LOCALAPPDATA%\App\file_*.exe and launch it without requiring administrator rights.
  • The agent checks in with a server, polls for orders every three seconds by default, runs commands through cmd.exe or PowerShell, and returns encrypted results.
  • Orders and results use AES-256 with a hard-coded key; the HTTPS client disables certificate checking.
  • The first build contacted 136.0.96.24:443. Two later builds used 212.18.104.242:443 and differed mainly in server address and build metadata.
  • Sandbox testing demonstrated command execution against a researcher-controlled fake server. The public sandboxes observed no real orders, and the later server began disconnecting from them.
  • The researchers found no persistence mechanism or evidence of what the operator ran; attribution and malware-family identification remain unknown.
  • The article advises removing the installed App and its executable if encountered, changing passwords from a clean device, and hunting for the MSI-to-file_*.exe-to-shell process chain and the signing certificate.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Malicious MSI installers named WindowsDefender.msi and DefenderUpdate.msi used Microsoft Defender branding and valid code-signing signatures to appear legitimate.
  • The installers copied a Rust payload into %LOCALAPPDATA%\App\ and started it through an installer custom action without requiring administrator rights.
  • The payload connected over HTTPS to attacker C2 IP addresses, polled for encrypted commands, and executed them through cmd.exe or PowerShell.
  • The payload reported command output to the C2 server using AES-256 encryption. The article reports that no real command was observed being sent to a sandbox.
Defensive Notes
  • Check that a file’s signer matches the product it claims to be; Microsoft Defender is not distributed to home PCs as a downloaded WindowsDefender.msi installer.
  • If affected, terminate the relevant file_N.exe process, uninstall “App” (publisher “App”), verify %LOCALAPPDATA%\App\ is removed, and change passwords from a separate clean device.
  • Hunt for msiexec.exe launching executables from %LOCALAPPDATA%\App\, file_*.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, and the MSI upgrade code {CE318F29-2311-4B71-B208-8123456789AB}.
  • Monitor HTTPS to bare IP addresses on port 443 without SNI or ALPN, regular roughly three-second polling, and reconnect attempts 60 seconds apart.
  • With TLS inspection, look for POST requests to /reg containing type=p and no User-Agent header; the article says the agent ignores certificate errors.
  • Block or alert on certificate serial 473d28e38b9bc50abe922c40c214810c, and detect the payload using stable characteristics such as c2_agent.pdb and the VALID command word rather than relying only on changeable C2 addresses.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4136[.]0[.]96[.]24C2 server used by the initial payload build over HTTPS on port 443.
IPV4212[.]18[.]104[.]242C2 server used by later payload builds over HTTPS on port 443.
SHA2560329c3dcb71f6ed5eed1d17f1e945612aeba5d67cc80699d734a2df64bba1cdfSHA-256 hash of the second malicious WindowsDefender.msi installer.
SHA2562548b7c1bda26e55dca101f8cfc781dbc6b5dba7eb7f3fafc5f968d468570502SHA-256 hash of the malicious file_1.exe payload.
SHA2565a60e00493e747b9bac53e965966a3dad0fbec740a221af0d371ec8fac5fb0f2SHA-256 hash of the malicious file_3.exe payload.
SHA256e3711177a50d16f873a478bc3de05b078eb176af8a69c47d4c7f25a8360a69c5SHA-256 hash of the malicious file_5.exe payload.
SHA256ebd865e5901bd5881f6a932d5f7a58e69ef54d25a58df50547e1b1fc8612789dSHA-256 hash of the malicious DefenderUpdate.msi installer.
SHA256fb6b0467ce17ed027f3e6eade7dc298b7ffece59c6f0150b57ada60259dde797SHA-256 hash of the malicious WindowsDefender.msi installer.
URLhxxps[:]//136[.]0[.]96[.]24/regC2 registration endpoint used by the initial payload build.
URLhxxps[:]//212[.]18[.]104[.]242/regC2 registration endpoint used by later payload builds.

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