Analysis Finds Fake Zscaler Tunnel Is a Go Backdoor Signed With an Unrelated EV Certificate

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Summary

Analysis of ZSATunnel_x86.exe found a Go backdoor disguised as Zscaler Client Connector and signed with an unrelated valid EV certificate. It supports command execution, file transfer and SOCKS5 pivoting; its server address comes from URSPLUNK.

Key points

  • The sample uses Zscaler product names and version information but is signed with a valid EV certificate issued to MARQUEE AUDIO VISUAL LIMITED.
  • The backdoor obtains its server address from the URSPLUNK environment variable; the analyzed copy did not contact a real server during testing.
  • It moves itself to a Zscaler-looking per-user folder and periodically checks in using the path /v2/alive.
  • Its tasks include running commands through cmd or PowerShell, transferring files, and opening a SOCKS5 tunnel through the infected computer.
  • The analysis describes code-level behavior, but the researchers did not establish how the sample was delivered or what sets URSPLUNK on a victim’s system.
  • Defenders are advised to check for the sample’s install path, URSPLUNK, related proxy requests, leftover temporary files, and the signer.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The backdoor masquerades as Zscaler Client Connector using Zscaler names, version information, and a ZSATunnel-looking install path; it is signed with a valid EV certificate issued to an unrelated company.
  • The server address is supplied through the URSPLUNK environment variable; the analyzed sample otherwise defaults to https://localhost. The article says the component that sets the variable and the delivery method are unknown.
  • According to code analysis, the backdoor checks in at /v2/alive, accepts remote tasks, and can execute commands through cmd or PowerShell.
  • The backdoor can download files from its server and upload files or folders from the infected PC as chunked .tar.gz archives.
  • A SOCKS5 task can route attacker connections through the infected PC to other systems it can reach.
Defensive Notes
  • Check for ZSATunnel_x86.exe under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\ZSATunnel\ and investigate random .tmp files left in the same folder.
  • Check user and system settings, and running-process environments, for the URSPLUNK variable.
  • Hunt proxy logs for /v2/alive, /v2/hook, /v2/submit, /v2/export, and /v2/relay requests with user agent axios/1.7.2; the article also identifies Accept-Language: en-NZ,en;q=0.9 and a _session cookie as clues.
  • Block or alert on the signer MARQUEE AUDIO VISUAL LIMITED and the certificate associated with the sample.
  • Advise users to verify with company IT before running a Zscaler file received through email, chat, or a download link.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
MD51576a17f54c5b149139e6c8f1b2e6b20MD5 hash of the analyzed ZSATunnel_x86.exe backdoor.
SHA1eae2226416cdd4b72b68d1408e8a8a1ba1e28819SHA-1 hash of the analyzed ZSATunnel_x86.exe backdoor.
SHA256fe9829f1c102a79b4ca33c8c8bda8ef2236dc94c6d1de88249c89e82681adc8cSHA-256 hash of the analyzed ZSATunnel_x86.exe backdoor.

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