Signed Photo-Themed Executable Installs Python-Based Wraith Remote-Control Agent

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Summary

Analysis of a photo-themed Windows executable found it installs legitimate Python files and a Wraith agent that runs operator-supplied code, with DNS-based fallback and server-delivered persistence observed in a sandbox.

Key points

  • The photo-named executable checks for sandbox-like sleep timing and recent user input, then attempts a hidden Windows Installer deployment; a fallback displays a decoy while unpacking a junk-wrapped cabinet archive.
  • The payload places genuine Python 3.8 files in an AppData folder named OneDriveP and uses sitecustomize.py to launch the Wraith agent when the renamed interpreter starts.
  • The agent connects to olkm[.]org over WebSocket, identifies the computer and user, and runs Python modules sent by the operator; researchers could not inspect the encrypted module contents.
  • A DNS-based fallback checks TXT-record markers and generates candidate domains; none of the candidate domains were registered at the time of the analysis.
  • In one sandbox run, the server sent code that created Startup shortcuts and a Run key entry; these persistence entries did not appear in a second run.
  • Microsoft revoked the short-lived Trusted Signing certificate. Suggested hunting indicators include the OneDriveP folder, sitecustomize.py, the Wraith mutex, and Python processes using OneDrive-like names.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A Windows executable named and presented like a phone photo serves as the initial lure.
  • The executable attempts a hidden Windows Installer installation from msvcic[.]com; if that fails, it displays a decoy while downloading and unpacking a cabinet archive.
  • The installed Python agent connects to an operator-controlled server over WebSocket and executes Python modules sent by the server.
Defensive Notes
  • Treat affected computers as fully compromised because the operator can send and execute arbitrary Python code; disconnect them and change passwords from a different device.
  • Investigate %LOCALAPPDATA%\OneDriveP\, sitecustomize.py in an embeddable Python folder, and python38._pth files ending in import site.
  • Check the user Startup folder and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for OneDriveUpdate shortcuts or values.
  • Look for Python processes running from AppData under OneDrive-like names, the mutex Local\WraithClient_7f3a9c21, WebSocket connections to /socket.io/, and DNS TXT lookups of random-looking 16-character domains.
  • Do not open photo-like files delivered as .exe files.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINmsvcic[.]comPayload and decoy host used by the malicious executable.
DOMAINolkm[.]orgCommand server contacted by the wraith agent over WebSocket.
SHA25658376da37fb3877a138ee23d7f26dca4b3a039710dacf7068fd5ab4b9b532548SHA-256 hash of the junk-wrapped cabinet archive downloaded by the loader.
SHA256951f09debd9fe0f7d5ee0ff7230f568822e1f60ecd97a1824f8f98a0b52ae911SHA-256 hash of the decoy “Transfer details” PNG.
SHA256a4dc7f6ca11bd07162b43f6c6804927569c97c5640b4c3c6dde0c150402a63e1SHA-256 hash of the IMG_958742253131.exe loader.
SHA256acbd65cf8efa6e318b241bd62d52a7664c0ce107cebdc27542aaa0cab6afa122SHA-256 hash of the malicious “Photo Gallery Package” MSI.
SHA256b471b01310fa00aaf83b757407405d47c8a54930593c3ce105bd23c5bad2dc4fSHA-256 hash of the wraith DNS fallback component sfinder.py.
SHA256c2e01eb210673ea8c31249bfbd37c36856e8eaa808455d4e0def8c49727a4e96SHA-256 hash of sitecustomize.py, which loads the wraith agent when Python starts.
SHA256d0d7b8b2be9ba8a0f794ec2b67171d78c74616233c171f58eb06f75ef8493317SHA-256 hash of the wraith server-address component surl.py.
SHA256ee24ac09796a0d29e8f41a20d2cd2a41db8870a015821b7b5ee03b7d4a5942cbSHA-256 hash of the wraith agent file agent.py.
SHA256fcb8ef5a82486b5d42246d27166c26aed413c02d045ad04629159700da27d440SHA-256 hash of the unwrapped cabinet archive containing the installed files.
URLhxxps[:]//msvcic[.]com/cdn/Payload-delivery URL path on the host identified as serving the installer or changing payload downloads.
URLhxxps[:]//msvcic[.]com/media/IMG_958742253131[.]pngURL used to deliver the decoy image alongside the malicious payload.

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