Signed QuaTouchCtrl Loader Uses Mutual TLS to Reach Its Command Server

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Summary

Analysis identifies QuaTouchCtrl.exe as a signed loader with encrypted strings and an embedded client certificate for mutual TLS. It can run server-provided modules in memory; the observed server replied with no jobs.

Key points

  • QuaTouchCtrl.exe disguises itself as a Quartz touch-controller utility and carries a valid EV signature attributed to AirTiki ApS, which the article says is unrelated to the claimed product.
  • The loader decrypts 88 strings with ChaCha20, including its configuration, server details, and embedded client certificate and private key.
  • It uses a client certificate issued by private CA ca-arch for mutual TLS; the malware disables validation of the server certificate.
  • The loader checks in to gitihubusercomtent[.]com at 178[.]105[.]122[.]30 and can run server-provided modules in memory without writing them to disk.
  • In a sandbox capture, the live server accepted the client certificate and replied with a 60-second interval and no jobs; the researchers did not retrieve the unavailable modules.
  • The article reports testing job handling against a researcher-controlled fake server using junk payloads, so no real modules were loaded during those tests.
  • The analysis recommends hunting for the ca-arch and srv-arch.internal certificate identifiers, the listed domain and IP, and an unusual WinHTTP user-agent string.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • QuaTouchCtrl.exe disguises itself as the signed “Quartz Touch Controller” driver helper from “Quartz Devices”; the article does not establish how it reaches victims.
  • The loader checks in with its C2 server over HTTPS using a built-in client certificate for mutual TLS.
  • The loader can download server-assigned programs and map and run them from memory without writing them to disk.
  • Its strings are encrypted with ChaCha20 and decrypted at startup.
Defensive Notes
  • Block and hunt for gitihubusercomtent[.]com and 178[.]105[.]122[.]30.
  • Look for TLS servers presenting CN=srv-arch.internal with issuer CN=ca-arch; the article identifies these certificates as fingerprints of the operation.
  • Investigate unusual WinHTTP traffic using the truncated user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36.
  • On suspect hosts, investigate an unfamiliar driver process that created an orphaned crypto key container under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\<SID>\.
  • Do not treat a valid code-signing signature as proof that a program is safe; obtain drivers and device utilities from the PC or device maker.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINgitihubusercomtent[.]comC2 domain contacted by the loader.
IPV4178[.]105[.]122[.]30IP address of the loader's C2 server.
SHA256a967b46481f77ce9bdd6e57afe858943dd5c03e8810a95e3223c9b2ccec06ec6SHA-256 hash of the QuaTouchCtrl.exe loader.
SHA256bfe114ef9835d9d0ac996a19f25d2ae4c4d4e7d50185bd72e82d48ccea9db893SHA-256 fingerprint of the client certificate embedded in the loader and used for mutual TLS.
SHA256ef54a9c2cab7fbcc2cca17dd1e5ca6dc207b06e80bd44f44689af7bb3527de39SHA-256 fingerprint of the C2 server certificate.

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