MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol
- First Reported
- Sep 13, 2022
- Latest Reported
- Nov 16, 2026
Official Description
Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
In ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)
ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
In ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)
- Tactics
- Command And Control
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- MITRE Version
- 2.4
- Last Modified
- Sep 3, 2026
Reported Context (58)
- The netns backdoor opened a plain TCP connection to the controller address on port 8080 for a reverse shell. Linux Cryptomining Operation Uses Rootkit and Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity
- The driver communicates with its server using raw TCP with custom framing, not an application-layer web protocol. Windows Kernel Backdoor Hides Itself and Handles C2 Without a User-Mode Component
- BeCtrl communicates using its custom PRO1 protocol over UDP port 53 rather than DNS. BeCtrl Backdoor Uses DLL Sideloading in Policy-Themed Lures
- P.ps1 opened a raw TCP shell to the operator. CloudSEK Traces Exposed Server to Silent Lynx Espionage Cluster
- The payload and later program communicate with servers using custom non-TLS protocols on port 443. Fake Marvell RAID Utility Uses Signed MSBuild to Load Malware
CVE (24)
Malware (113)
People (14)
Threat Actors (54)
MITRE ATT&CK (186)
Vendors (54)
Products (153)
Tools (84)
Industries (34)
Countries (61)
Note: Related entities, including threat actors, malware, CVEs, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, vendors, products, tools, countries, and industries, are shown when they appear in the same reporting. Their presence does not necessarily mean they were targeted, compromised, vulnerable, responsible for the activity, or directly involved in the incident.
