Linux Cryptomining Operation Uses Rootkit and Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity

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Summary

Elastic Security Labs described REF3364, a Linux cryptomining operation observed in late October 2026. Its SANSAR toolkit, kernel rootkit, modified NVML wrapper and netns backdoor conceal mining activity and maintain access.

Key points

  • Elastic Security Labs reported that REF3364 used an exposed Ray job agent for initial access, then ran a Python reverse shell job and added an SSH key for persistence.
  • SANSAR, a Rust-based toolkit, communicates through TOR using Arti, collects host and GPU information, and manages CPU or GPU miners.
  • The acpi_thermal_mgr kernel rootkit uses ftrace to hide selected processes, files and socket entries; a DKMS-built module and initramfs loader support loading at boot.
  • A modified NVIDIA Management Library wrapper reportedly filters process information and falsifies telemetry, including reporting GPU utilization as 0%.
  • The netns backdoor retrieves a controller address from an Ethereum smart contract and opens a reverse-shell connection over TCP port 8080.
  • The operator is unidentified. Elastic found Turkish-language comments in the rootkit source and advised checking job-submission access and GPU monitoring libraries.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Initial access was reportedly achieved through an exposed Ray job agent, which allowed command execution.
  • The attacker submitted a Python reverse-shell job that connected to a remote listener, then added an SSH key to the account's authorized_keys file for persistent access.
  • After obtaining root access, the attacker staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module using DKMS, and added an initramfs loader.
  • A modified NVML wrapper altered GPU telemetry and filtered process information to conceal cryptomining activity.
  • The netns backdoor retrieved a controller IPv4 address using an embedded Ethereum contract, then connected over TCP port 8080 to open a reverse shell.
  • SANSAR communicated with an onion service over Tor to receive commands, collect host and GPU information, and manage CPU or GPU miners.
Defensive Notes
  • Review which users and services can submit jobs to Ray job agents.
  • Check whether GPU monitoring libraries, including NVML, have been modified.
  • Monitor GPU utilization, temperature, and power readings for inconsistencies that could indicate falsified telemetry.

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