Dragos 2026 OT Security Report Details Threat Groups Mapping Industrial Control Loops
Report discovered via Awesome Annual Security Reports.

Summary
Dragos's 2026 OT/ICS report identifies three new threat groups and describes adversaries mapping industrial control loops. Its 2025 findings highlight access handoffs, operational data theft, ransomware disruption, and widespread monitoring gaps.
Key points
- Dragos identified AZURITE, PYROXENE, and SYLVANITE in 2025, bringing its tracked OT-focused threat groups to 26; eleven were active during the year.
- AZURITE stole operational data from engineering workstations, including project files and alarm information. Dragos has not observed it manipulating, stopping, or modifying OT-specific software.
- PYROXENE used recruitment-themed social engineering, watering holes, and credential harvesting. Dragos observed wiper deployments against Israeli organizations and assesses with moderate confidence that the group is positioning for future ICS-impacting operations.
- SYLVANITE exploited internet-facing systems, harvested credentials and tokens, and handed access to VOLTZITE. VOLTZITE compromised Sierra Wireless AirLink gateways and manipulated engineering workstation software to extract configuration and alarm data.
- KAMACITE scanned exposed U.S. industrial devices from March through July 2025 in a pattern Dragos interprets as control-loop mapping; Dragos found no evidence of successful exploitation during that period.
- Dragos tracked 119 ransomware groups affecting 3,300 industrial organizations in 2025, with manufacturing accounting for more than two-thirds of observed victims. All its OT ransomware response cases that year involved significant operational disruption.
- Dragos estimates fewer than 10 percent of OT networks worldwide have visibility and monitoring, limiting the report's coverage. It recommends ICS-aware monitoring, strict IT/OT segmentation, governed remote access, and timely patching of exposed systems.
Article Details
- Publisher
- Dragos
- Report Period
- 2025-01-01 to 2025-12-31
- Scope
- Global OT/ICS threats, industrial ransomware, ICS-relevant vulnerabilities, and findings from Dragos security engagements.
- Key Statistics
- Dragos tracked 26 OT-focused threat groups; 11 were active in 2025, including three newly designated groups.
- Dragos tracked 119 ransomware groups impacting approximately 3,300 industrial organizations in 2025; actual incidence is likely higher because of unreported or undetected incidents.
- Dragos estimates that fewer than 10 percent of OT networks worldwide have visibility and monitoring; the report represents a minimum view of observed activity.
- Four percent of ICS-relevant vulnerabilities had a public proof of concept and were actively exploited in 2025.
- Dragos Architecture Reviews identified substantial OT/ICS visibility and monitoring deficiencies in 46 percent of 2025 assessments.
- Recommendations
- Eliminate direct internet exposure of OT devices and management interfaces; enforce IT/OT segmentation, monitored DMZs, and explicitly permitted communication paths.
- Maintain accurate asset inventories and collect centralized network and device telemetry, including ICS-aware monitoring, remote-access audit trails, and PowerShell execution logs.
- Require MFA and least-privilege access across remote-access pathways; govern vendor access, remove shared or default credentials, and review privileged sessions.
- Prioritize remediation using exploitability, external exposure, operational consequences, and observed targeting rather than CVSS alone; apply compensating controls where patching is impractical.
- Exercise ICS incident-response plans covering loss of view, control, and availability, including manual-operation decisions, controller integrity validation, safe isolation, and coordinated engineering, operations, safety, and cybersecurity response.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolAZURITE accesses engineering workstations through RDP using compromised credentials.T1021.006 · Windows Remote ManagementSYLVANITE uses WinRM to execute commands remotely and move laterally.T1046 · Network Service DiscoverySYLVANITE uses fscan to discover internal network services and identify exploitable systems.T1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationSYLVANITE uses WMIExec for remote execution during lateral movement.T1074.001 · Local Data StagingAZURITE stages collected OT operational data outside the OT network before exfiltration.T1078 · Valid AccountsAZURITE uses compromised or reused credentials, while SYLVANITE replays stolen credentials across internal systems.T1090 · ProxyAZURITE uses compromised SOHO devices and SOCKS/SOCKS5 communications; SYLVANITE uses tunneling and proxy tools to maintain connectivity.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAZURITE and SYLVANITE exploit internet-facing appliances and applications for initial access.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactRansomware affiliates encrypted OT-support virtualization infrastructure and SCADA-supporting virtual machines, disrupting operator visibility and control.T1505.003 · Web ShellSYLVANITE deploys web shells including Godzilla, LIGHTWIRE, and WIREFIRE for persistence.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesSYLVANITE retrieves hardcoded database credentials stored in /mi/files/system/.mifpp.T1561.002 · Disk Structure WipePathWiper overwrites critical filesystem structures, including the MBR and NTFS metadata.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsSYLVANITE disabled logging and modified appliance components to evade integrity checks during Ivanti Connect Secure compromises.T1566 · PhishingKAMACITE used highly tailored spear-phishing against engineering, operations, and vendor personnel in its industrial supply-chain targeting.T1595 · Active ScanningKAMACITE conducted sustained reconnaissance scanning of internet-exposed United States industrial devices between March and July 2025; successful exploitation was not observed.
CVE
CVE-2023-46747Fortinet FortiOS SSL-VPN flaws (CVE-2024-21762, CVE-2023-27997), F5 BIG-IP TMUI/iControl (CVE-2023-46747, CVE-2022-1388), Cisco ASA/FTD web services (CVE-2020-3452), and Zyxel firewalls/NAS (CVE-2023-28771,CVE-2023-46805In December 2023, SYLVANITE exploited Ivanti Connect Secure VPN vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887), deploying web shells such as GLASSTOKEN, disabling logging, and modifying appliance components to evadeCVE-2024-1709communication. Later campaigns included F5 BIG-IP (CVE-2023-46747) and ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1709), where custom tooling and the Supershell C2 framework were used to establish access.CVE-2024-21762High-profile examples include Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2023-3519), Fortinet FortiOS SSL-VPN flaws (CVE-2024-21762, CVE-2023-27997), F5 BIG-IP TMUI/iControl (CVE-2023-46747, CVE-2022-1388), Cisco ASA/FTD web servicesCVE-2024-21887In December 2023, SYLVANITE exploited Ivanti Connect Secure VPN vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887), deploying web shells such as GLASSTOKEN, disabling logging, and modifying appliance components to evadeCVE-2024-559562024-50623 and CVE-2024-55956) and claimed to have targeted more than 300 victims acrossCVE-2025-0282Secure vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-0283), which enable remote code executionCVE-2025-0994Exploited Trimble In early 2025, TAT25-09 exploited a RCE vulnerability (CVE-2025-0994) in Trimble CityworksCVE-2025-31161in 2025: CVE-2025-31161 in March and CVE-2025-54309 in July, enabling attackers to bypassCVE-2025-31324In April 2025, SYLVANITE exploited a SAP NetWeaver zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-31324), deploying the KrustyLoader malware loader to deliver Sliver C2 and the SNOWLIGHT malware downloader, followed by the VSHELLCVE-2025-4427an Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) instance of a United States utility by exploiting CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428. Dragos designated the set of activities perpetrated by this adversary as TAT25-43,CVE-2025-4428Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) instance of a United States utility by exploiting CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428. Dragos designated the set of activities perpetrated by this adversary as TAT25-43, and additionalCVE-2025-54309in 2025: CVE-2025-31161 in March and CVE-2025-54309 in July, enabling attackers to bypass
Threat Actors
AZURITENewly designated Stage 2 group targeting engineering workstations and exfiltrating OT operational information. Dragos had not observed manipulation of OT-specific software and assessed with moderate confidence that the group lacked purpose-built OT malware.BAUXITEOT-focused group with significant technical overlap with CyberAv3ngers. Dragos assessed with high confidence that it deployed two wiper variants against unspecified Israeli targets in June 2025.Cl0pExploited Cleo MFT vulnerabilities and claimed more than 300 victims across Transportation, Manufacturing, and Food sectors; the victim count is an attacker claim.DevManPublished claims of ICS-aware ransomware that Dragos found unsupported, with no evidence of access to or interaction with ICS equipment.ELECTRUMConducted destructive operations against Ukrainian ISPs and targeted Polish energy infrastructure. Dragos reports technical overlaps with Sandworm and links PathWiper to ELECTRUM with moderate confidence.KAMACITEDevelops persistent access for ELECTRUM, targeted the European industrial supply chain, and scanned exposed United States ICS devices. Dragos assessed with moderate confidence that UAC-0212 represents the same activity.PARISITEDragos assessed with high confidence that it acted as an initial-access provider handing compromised critical-infrastructure access to PYROXENE in early 2024.PYROXENETargets industrial and critical-infrastructure supply chains, conducts credential harvesting and watering-hole attacks, and deployed wipers against Israeli organizations. Dragos assessed intentional OT surveying for future effects operations with low confidence.Scattered Lapsus$ HuntersIdentified in the report as TAT25-84; abused help-desk workflows, password resets, and MFA enrollment to compromise enterprise systems, causing downstream industrial disruption without observed ICS access.SYLVANITEStage 1 initial-access group exploiting internet-facing systems and stealing credentials. Dragos directly observed access handoffs to VOLTZITE and attributed the activity designated TAT25-43 to SYLVANITE.TAT25-74Compromised an India-based metals manufacturer and stole HMI data from at least two steel and ferroalloy manufacturing plants.TAT25-95Compromised a Pakistani state-owned power transmission company, used Metasploit and Impacket for privilege escalation and lateral movement, and exfiltrated credentials and operational files.Volt TyphoonCompromised Sierra Wireless Airlink gateways and pivoted to engineering workstations, manipulating software to extract configuration and alarm data. Dragos designated it a Stage 2 group.
Malware
GLASSTOKENConnect Secure VPN vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887), deploying web shells such as GLASSTOKEN, disabling logging, and modifying appliance components to evade integrity checks. They also alteredGodzilla- Use of multiple web shells - Chopper, AntSword, SuperShell, devilszshell, and GodzillaIOCONTROL2023-January 2024), Sophos Firewall Attacks (April 2024-May 2024) and IOControl CampaignJoJoLoaderarbitrary code without authentication. Attackers deployed JoJoLoader, an open-source Rust-KrustyLoaderApril 2025, SYLVANITE exploited a SAP NetWeaver zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-31324), deploying the KrustyLoader malware loader to deliver Sliver C2 and the SNOWLIGHT malware downloader, followed by the VSHELLLIGHTWIRE- Godzilla, LIGHTWIRE, THINSPOOL, WIREFIREPathWiperJune 2025: In parallel with the ISP attacks, Cisco Talos identified PathWiper, which Dragos has previouslySNOWLIGHT- WARPWIRE, ZIPLINE, SNOWLIGHT, GOREVERSE, GOHEAVYVshell- Cobalt Strike C2, Silver C2, Supershell C2, Fast Reverse Proxy (frp), Fscan, Vshell backdoorWIREFIRE- Godzilla, LIGHTWIRE, THINSPOOL, WIREFIRE
Vendors
ConnectWise- N-day exploitation of internet-facing products from F5, Ivanti, SAP, ConnectWiseF5- Exploitation of internet-facing Ivanti, Fortinet, Cisco, and F5 assetsFortinet- Exploitation of internet-facing Ivanti, Fortinet, Cisco, and F5 assetsIvanti- Exploitation of internet-facing Ivanti, Fortinet, Cisco, and F5 assetsNuvationmanagement system (BMS) products. This led to an internal research project to evaluate the security of Nuvation BMS andSAP- N-day exploitation of internet-facing products from F5, Ivanti, SAP, ConnectWiseSchneider ElectricSchneider Electric Altivar variable-frequency drives, Smart HMIs, Accuenergy AXM modules,Siemensrequests to force older Siemens S7 PLC models into “STOP” mode. The availability andSierra Wirelessand Sierra Wireless Airlink gateways. These technologies underpin routine industrial operationsTrimbleExploited Trimble In early 2025, TAT25-09 exploited a RCE vulnerability (CVE-2025-0994) in Trimble Cityworks
Products
Cleo MFTContinue to Target including Cleo MFT, CrushFTP, and Wing FTP. These flaws allow adversaries to gainConnectWise ScreenConnectcommand-and-control communication. Later campaigns included F5 BIG-IP (CVE-2023-46747) and ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1709), where custom tooling and the Supershell C2 framework were used to establishCrushFTPMFT, CrushFTP, and later Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) demonstrated how a single vulnerabilityF5 BIG-IPCitrix NetScaler (CVE-2023-3519), Fortinet FortiOS SSL-VPN flaws (CVE-2024-21762, CVE-2023-27997), F5 BIG-IP TMUI/iControl (CVE-2023-46747, CVE-2022-1388), Cisco ASA/FTD web services (CVE-2020-3452), and ZyxelIvanti Connect SecureIn December 2023, SYLVANITE exploited Ivanti Connect Secure VPN vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887), deploying web shells such as GLASSTOKEN, disabling logging, and modifying appliance components to evadeIvanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM)#### Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) CompromiseMulti-Stack ControllersMulti-Stack Controllers (MSCs), which are manufactured in the United States and Canada and distributed globally.Nuvation BMSmanagement system (BMS) products. This led to an internal research project to evaluate the security of Nuvation BMS andRV55Airlink Targeting impactful campaign involved compromising Sierra Wireless Airlink RV50 and RV55 cellularSAP NetWeaverIn April 2025, SYLVANITE exploited a SAP NetWeaver zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-31324), deploying the KrustyLoader malware loader to deliver Sliver C2 and the SNOWLIGHT malware downloader, followed by the VSHELLSierra Wireless Airlink RV50Airlink Targeting impactful campaign involved compromising Sierra Wireless Airlink RV50 and RV55 cellularTrimble CityworksExploited Trimble In early 2025, TAT25-09 exploited a RCE vulnerability (CVE-2025-0994) in Trimble CityworksVMware ESXileveraged RDP, SMB/PsExec, WinRM, WMI, and SSH to move laterally toward VMware ESXiWing FTPContinue to Target including Cleo MFT, CrushFTP, and Wing FTP. These flaws allow adversaries to gain
Tools
Cobalt Strike- AZURITE uses NPS, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, and other offensive security capabilities to conduct command and control with non-application layer protocols, especially SOCKS/SOCKS5 protocol. Conduct regular threat huntsexploit.ps1Suspicious In November 2025, Dragos discovered and analyzed a PowerShell script named exploit.ps1 thatFast Reverse Proxy- Cobalt Strike C2, Silver C2, Supershell C2, Fast Reverse Proxy (frp), Fscan, Vshell backdoorfscan- Cobalt Strike C2, Silver C2, Supershell C2, Fast Reverse Proxy (frp), Fscan, Vshell backdoorImpacketMetasploit and Impacket to abuse the Active Directory environment for privilege escalationMetasploit Framework- Use of open-source offensive security tooling, e.g. Mimikatz, Metasploit, JuicyPotatoMimikatz- Use of open-source offensive security tooling, e.g. Mimikatz, Metasploit, JuicyPotatoNPS- AZURITE uses NPS, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, and other offensive security capabilities to conduct command and control with non-application layer protocols, especially SOCKS/SOCKS5 protocol. Conduct regular threat huntsPLC_Controller.exePLC_Controller.exe In July 2025, Dragos discovered an attack tool named PLC_Controller.exe, a compiled Python-Sliver- AZURITE uses NPS, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, and other offensive security capabilities to conduct command and control with non-application layer protocols, especially SOCKS/SOCKS5 protocol. Conduct regular threat hunts
Countries
Australia- Targets Taiwan, United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, AustraliaIndiaICS Data OT threats relevant to Stage 2 capabilities. TAT25-74 compromised an India-based metalsIsraeltargeting aviation, aerospace, defense, and maritime sectors across the United States, Western Europe, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. In early 2025, Dragos identified an intrusion collaboration betweenJapan- Targets Taiwan, United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, AustraliaPolandexperienced infrastructure-attack group Dragos is aware of, expanded its targeting beyond Ukraine into Poland in late December 2025.South Korea- Targets Taiwan, United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, AustraliaTaiwan- Targets Taiwan, United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, AustraliaUkraineoperationally experienced infrastructure-attack group Dragos is aware of, expanded its targeting beyond Ukraine into Poland in late December 2025.United Arab Emiratesaerospace, defense, and maritime sectors across the United States, Western Europe, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. In early 2025, Dragos identified an intrusion collaboration between PYROXENE and PARISITE. DragosUnited Statessupply chain and conducted sustained reconnaissance of internet-exposed industrial devices across the United States between March and July 2025.
Industries
Aerospace- Focus on transportation and logistics, defense, government, technology, aerospace, and aviationAviation- Focus on transportation and logistics, defense, government, technology, aerospace, and aviationDefense> OT Security Fundamentals Remain the Most Effective Defense: The fundamentals of OT security — knowing what is in your environment, monitoring what is happening, controlling access, and being prepared to respond —Electric- Targets Manufacturing, Defense, Automotive, Electric, Government, Oil and GasGovernmentHowever, it is not a complete view, and no government, vendor, or other entity can have one.logistics- Focus on transportation and logistics, defense, government, technology, aerospace, and aviationManufacturing- Targets Manufacturing, Defense, Automotive, Electric, Government, Oil and GasOil and gas- Targets Manufacturing, Defense, Automotive, Electric, Government, Oil and GasTransportation- Focus on transportation and logistics, defense, government, technology, aerospace, and aviationWater and wastewaterSaudi Arabia. Targeted sectors include Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Water and Wastewater; Oil and Gas; Manufacturing; and Public Administration. According to the ICS Cyber Kill Chain,