Dragon Boss PUP Disabled Antivirus and Exposed 23,565 Endpoints to Update Hijacking

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Summary

Huntress analyzed Dragon Boss Solutions software that silently disabled antivirus and persisted on Windows systems. It found an unregistered update domain could let an attacker deliver arbitrary payloads; sinkholed requests came from 23,565 unique IPs in 24 hours.

Key points

  • The software’s PowerShell payload ran with SYSTEM privileges, killed or removed security products, blocked antivirus update domains, and added Windows Defender exclusions.
  • WMI event subscriptions and scheduled tasks maintained persistence and repeatedly attempted to disable or remove security tools.
  • An unregistered primary update domain, chromsterabrowser[.]com, could have allowed anyone who registered it to deliver arbitrary payloads to systems running that software.
  • Huntress registered and sinkholed the domain; 23,565 unique IP addresses connected during a 24-hour period, representing systems attempting to contact the update infrastructure.
  • The observed infections spanned 124 countries. Huntress identified 324 infections in high-value networks, including educational, operational technology, government, and healthcare organizations.
  • Huntress advises checking for Dragon Boss Solutions-signed processes, MbRemoval or MbSetup WMI artifacts, ClockRemoval tasks, suspicious Defender exclusions, and antivirus-domain blocks in Windows hosts files.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Dragon Boss Solutions-signed PUP/updater software used its update mechanism to download and silently install MSI payloads, running with SYSTEM privileges.
  • The updater configuration included update domains, including an unregistered primary domain that infected hosts contacted; Huntress reported that registering it could allow arbitrary payload delivery to those hosts.
  • The MSI used PowerShell scripts to disable or remove antivirus products, block their update domains through hosts-file changes, and add Windows Defender exclusions.
  • The scripts established persistence through WMI event subscriptions and scheduled tasks, including boot, logon, and recurring tasks.
  • The installer checked for administrator privileges, virtual machines, internet connectivity, and installed security products before deploying its payload.
Defensive Notes
  • Hunt for WMI event subscriptions with consumer names containing “MbRemoval” or “MbSetup,” and scheduled tasks referencing WMILoad directories or ClockRemoval.
  • Alert on processes signed by Dragon Boss Solutions LLC.
  • Review Windows hosts files for entries blocking antivirus vendor domains.
  • Check Windows Defender exclusions for suspicious paths such as DGoogle, EMicrosoft, and DDapps.
  • Investigate endpoints running Dragon Boss Solutions software for the listed updater, payload, and persistence artifacts.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINartificialupdates[.]comListed as a network indicator associated with the Dragon Boss Solutions operation; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINchromsterabrowser[.]comUnregistered primary update domain in an updater configuration; infected hosts contacted it, and Huntress registered and sinkholed it.
DOMAINchromsteraupdates[.]comListed as a network indicator associated with the Dragon Boss Solutions operation; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINdragonstraffic[.]comListed as a network indicator associated with the Dragon Boss Solutions operation; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINupdaterituals[.]comListed as a network indicator associated with the Dragon Boss Solutions operation; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINworldwidewebframework2[.]comListed as a network indicator associated with the Dragon Boss Solutions operation; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINworldwidewebframework3[.]comDomain identified as C2 and sinkholed by Huntress.
DOMAINworldwidewebuniverse3[.]comDomain identified as the active C2/update domain for the updater.
SHA25626ddd0712a101b27b018658b4072ad56bb4083026c797b0345b2cce43862fc83SHA-256 of the MSI’s !_StringData payload containing installer instructions.
SHA25640ac30ce1e88c47f317700cc4b5aa0a510f98c89e11c32265971564930418372SHA-256 of the Setup.msi payload.
SHA256909539d3ef8dedc3be56381256713fa5545cc7fd3d3d0e0428f7efb94a7e71cbSHA-256 of RaceCarTwo.exe, identified as the initial loader/updater.
SHA256da6aba50f9908f5f29d877dfaaca1ef6e03d597bb7b52bd294b4ec644fe7e6c0SHA-256 of the ClockRemoval-WmiBoot.ps1 persistence script.
SHA256feb13087c43406da7f2cea26b003a9b93db0e6b544b10bd57342d5dbbb18ba02SHA-256 of the manually reconstructed ClockRemoval.ps1 AV-killer script.
URLhxxps[:]//dl[.]isready26[.]online/image/ldk4945jfds.gifURL from which the updater obtained a Setup.msi payload disguised with a .gif filename.

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