Suspected AI-Assisted PowerShell Toolkit Targeted African Stock Exchange

Summary
Symantec found 41 suspected AI-assisted PowerShell modules run via a web shell on an African exchange’s IIS server, hunting secrets and testing financial API credentials. DNS results went to an unseen collector; credential success and toolkit attribution are unknown.
Key points
- On September 20, 2026, 41 PowerShell modules ran under a web shell on an IIS server in just over three minutes; the earliest evidence of malicious activity dated to April 2026.
- The modules searched shared folders and application directories for credentials and secrets, mapped cloud and database infrastructure, and enumerated SharePoint, SCCM and TFS.
- Four modules tested guessed credentials, a reused bearer token and API keys against the exchange’s investment API and a securities depository gateway.
- Modules hex-encoded their output and sent it in DNS queries to unique subdomains of oast[.]pro; the collector was not visible to researchers.
- Researchers found no evidence that credentials or keys worked or that data was stolen; the results and the attackers’ intent remain unknown.
- Shared code scaffolding, a DNS exfiltration loop duplicated across all 41 scripts, and other uniform coding traits support suspected AI assistance, but do not prove it.
- Six persistence implants were attributed with high confidence to Witchetty; researchers did not attribute the toolkit to Witchetty or any other group.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- A 41-module PowerShell toolkit ran under a web shell on an IIS server and searched shared policy folders and application directories for credentials, cloud keys, and database connection strings. The article does not attribute this toolkit to a specific group.
- The modules tested a guessed password, a reused bearer token, and API keys against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway. The article says it could not determine whether any credentials worked.
- Each module hex-encoded output, split it into chunks, and sent it as DNS lookups to a unique subdomain under a public out-of-band testing service.
- Six persistence implants on the server are attributed to Witchetty with high confidence; the article treats those implants separately from the unattributed toolkit.
- Defensive Notes
- Look for the common script scaffold and byte-for-byte repeated DNS exfiltration loop described in the article.
- Symantec says its Endpoint products will detect and block an IOC if it is malicious and the file is available to them.
- The article directs readers to the Symantec Protection Bulletin for the latest protection updates.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | danoam334iqjo0ap2scg6ofosjxfgqhsa[.]oast[.]pro | Unique token subdomain used in the toolkit's DNS exfiltration queries; the output was intended for whoever controlled the token. |
| SHA256 | 002ce0d28ec990aadbbc89df457189de37d8adaadc9c084b78eb7be9a9820c81 | File indicator identified as vsperfcmd.exe. |
| SHA256 | 0ad7e39ce6b9b7637a002c352637089f6ccf8ae39206a7d895266b21ca26ff0f | File indicator identified as an RC4-encrypted loader. |
| SHA256 | 0f2c40d31887418de304ca182afb4f4fecfe95937068f11fc798778c2ca95e3f | File indicator identified as mfeann.exe. |
| SHA256 | 1363534d205ad60f6700d81f2af2c0ce6d959b73fd405adbb598072395bd26e5 | File indicator identified as a persistence implant (ShellcodeLoader). |
| SHA256 | 152c125eacdacc69406b120afd95994eef0f7a0cd638c2d8723e64f79344a336 | File indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon. |
| SHA256 | 1c1704d789332c4d6ce57139d27194ac64c27bfbb1368f1006ffc3c96f3bcb80 | File indicator for a Nim-compiled DLL loader impersonating VSPMsg.dll. |
| SHA256 | 242c411cd415d55e67aae75759e5c07720fcdddc0378b5e35d4c1e4ab2b01eb8 | File indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe. |
| SHA256 | 26dc22c99e5e88363818e56dc5883258f048e426c9aa515887bf5d06872782f9 | File indicator listed as unavailable for analysis. |
| SHA256 | 2e223e3c6dc7a130f0281a6c608cd58c153ec026c020c8a661b60a1e285140bf | File indicator for a utility that encodes beacon.bin and writes Default.xml. |
| SHA256 | 30dc80cb4c791d80eb21597232fb2f5a4111bf3dfad32c736b789d77127310ef | File indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon. |
| SHA256 | 3ca9d65046420592e726776bb26b08719721d108f6947fd22af1d5e7cac33edc | File indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon. |
| SHA256 | 53ddb6c51aca4bd6b00ed83a8019ee1440351f8eeb95a7b6c74a2b75210d85b2 | File indicator listed as unavailable for analysis. |
| SHA256 | 5a2f093f7ae25c5e381647549496acf375e18dd95263b921518e340ee78e5377 | File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts WindowsUpdate.xml and maps its payload in memory. |
| SHA256 | 5c4f6e21877dfd71e3e95254c6193457e9aab10aca7459ddaeb6d711997190de | File indicator identified as a loader. |
| SHA256 | 5fd9a352d1bec4a11134ee140aa278d07d720b45493a7f01a548293f412972ce | File indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe. |
| SHA256 | 6b3061d6e042744bb484b725031e7916b31ad224318a8c0441b9ead14ab853d5 | File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts setting.dat and maps its payload in memory. |
| SHA256 | 8129e103509f00f40a6a2740b76bc3f9449ac09cd9222ba289e52e86f31f616e | File indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon. |
| SHA256 | 85e75e78a545d2fe11ac19385cc8c0789e1056a2cd4edfec32a6a6b113001e5a | File indicator for a loader that decodes mfeann.log and injects it as x64 shellcode. |
| SHA256 | 8940de2ada979ad2c53ece0b5cb84100c4df0a024b4b363e96cb6a67469e30d5 | File indicator identified as Mimikatz. |
| SHA256 | 982750f4f9edd2ef51b9972a1018a8777bd9d65e0d2e43977a522bdc73ddef5f | File indicator for a persistence implant that hijacks the Avast wsc_proxy component. |
| SHA256 | 9b4dadaa55479727f7c0034ff9c07165597b9a9a9376b6e564634eeaf1c6b876 | File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts setting.dat and maps its payload in memory. |
| SHA256 | af295b5081ccdfd601a0aaecaa81fe1aa92125b548063863dbca2011cef658ce | File indicator listed as unavailable for analysis. |
| SHA256 | af3737ba032b8c5d3403064899ab6cc48610a397d9f67b626f99b2f0f5082202 | File indicator identified as a loader associated with VSPerfCmd.exe. |
| SHA256 | b1155f47910f032217352c3a302c01de4d15cabda34331d2866f5d7a52b3ecde | File indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe. |
| SHA256 | b737eae170534f5965b90f4af807cb3f728498f3bccc9355a0afc0171e413230 | File indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe. |
| SHA256 | d732660db5af253aacbc580d6114d59d233c48b3a5ead6dcfcb55246252abed2 | File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts setting.dat and maps its payload in memory. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1018 · Remote System DiscoverySCCM and WMI queries identified the machine on which a specified user had last logged on.T1046 · Network Service DiscoveryModules attempted direct TCP connections to an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance and probed internal API and depository gateway endpoints.T1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolModules hex-encoded output, split it into chunks, and exfiltrated it through DNS lookups to unique subdomains.T1057 · Process DiscoveryA module collected running process trees, including parent processes and command-line arguments.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe toolkit consisted of PowerShell modules executed on the compromised IIS server.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryModules collected the machine name and queried SQL Server for system-user and version information.T1110.001 · Password GuessingA module attempted API login with a username and guessed password.T1213.002 · SharepointModules enumerated SharePoint sites and document libraries and searched their contents for sensitive keywords.T1505.003 · Web ShellThe modules ran under a web shell on an IIS server.T1518 · Software DiscoveryModules searched active processes for tools including Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, Jenkins, and GitLab.T1526 · Cloud Service DiscoveryThe toolkit checked cloud credentials and mapped cloud infrastructure while searching for cloud-related secrets.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesModules searched configuration files, shared folders, and application directories for hardcoded passwords, AWS keys, and database connection strings.T1552.006 · Group Policy PreferencesA module searched the domain SYSVOL share for Group Policy Preferences cpassword fields.
Threat Actors
Vendors
Amazon Web Servicesconstrained timeframe. Individual modules stole Group Policy Preferences (GPP) passwords, searched for AWS keys and database connection strings in shared folders and application directories, checked the host forMicrosoftto an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and uses integrated Windows authentication to query a Microsoft SQL Server for system user and version data.SymantecSymantec's Threat Hunter Team found a toolkit on a stock exchange in an African country with multiple traits that suggest it was written, or at least assisted, by an AI model.
Products
AWS RDSDatabase Probing (rdsnet1, scq1): Attempts direct TCP connections to an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and uses integrated Windows authentication to query a Microsoft SQL Server for system user and versionIISpoint during the breach, 41 PowerShell modules ran under a webshell on an Internet Information Services (IIS) server in three minutes and twelve seconds, with a new module starting every few seconds. The modulesMicrosoft SharePointkeys and database connection strings. They also mapped cloud and database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) and Team Foundation Server (TFS) servers, and tested accessMicrosoft SQL Serveran AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and uses integrated Windows authentication to query a Microsoft SQL Server for system user and version data.PowerShellA 41-module PowerShell toolkit with all the hallmarks of AI authorship tested credentials and API keys against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway.System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM)strings. They also mapped cloud and database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) and Team Foundation Server (TFS) servers, and tested access to the exchange's ownTeam Foundation Server (TFS)database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) and Team Foundation Server (TFS) servers, and tested access to the exchange's own investment application programming interface
