Suspected AI-Assisted PowerShell Toolkit Targeted African Stock Exchange

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Summary

Symantec found 41 suspected AI-assisted PowerShell modules run via a web shell on an African exchange’s IIS server, hunting secrets and testing financial API credentials. DNS results went to an unseen collector; credential success and toolkit attribution are unknown.

Key points

  • On September 20, 2026, 41 PowerShell modules ran under a web shell on an IIS server in just over three minutes; the earliest evidence of malicious activity dated to April 2026.
  • The modules searched shared folders and application directories for credentials and secrets, mapped cloud and database infrastructure, and enumerated SharePoint, SCCM and TFS.
  • Four modules tested guessed credentials, a reused bearer token and API keys against the exchange’s investment API and a securities depository gateway.
  • Modules hex-encoded their output and sent it in DNS queries to unique subdomains of oast[.]pro; the collector was not visible to researchers.
  • Researchers found no evidence that credentials or keys worked or that data was stolen; the results and the attackers’ intent remain unknown.
  • Shared code scaffolding, a DNS exfiltration loop duplicated across all 41 scripts, and other uniform coding traits support suspected AI assistance, but do not prove it.
  • Six persistence implants were attributed with high confidence to Witchetty; researchers did not attribute the toolkit to Witchetty or any other group.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A 41-module PowerShell toolkit ran under a web shell on an IIS server and searched shared policy folders and application directories for credentials, cloud keys, and database connection strings. The article does not attribute this toolkit to a specific group.
  • The modules tested a guessed password, a reused bearer token, and API keys against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway. The article says it could not determine whether any credentials worked.
  • Each module hex-encoded output, split it into chunks, and sent it as DNS lookups to a unique subdomain under a public out-of-band testing service.
  • Six persistence implants on the server are attributed to Witchetty with high confidence; the article treats those implants separately from the unattributed toolkit.
Defensive Notes
  • Look for the common script scaffold and byte-for-byte repeated DNS exfiltration loop described in the article.
  • Symantec says its Endpoint products will detect and block an IOC if it is malicious and the file is available to them.
  • The article directs readers to the Symantec Protection Bulletin for the latest protection updates.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINdanoam334iqjo0ap2scg6ofosjxfgqhsa[.]oast[.]proUnique token subdomain used in the toolkit's DNS exfiltration queries; the output was intended for whoever controlled the token.
SHA256002ce0d28ec990aadbbc89df457189de37d8adaadc9c084b78eb7be9a9820c81File indicator identified as vsperfcmd.exe.
SHA2560ad7e39ce6b9b7637a002c352637089f6ccf8ae39206a7d895266b21ca26ff0fFile indicator identified as an RC4-encrypted loader.
SHA2560f2c40d31887418de304ca182afb4f4fecfe95937068f11fc798778c2ca95e3fFile indicator identified as mfeann.exe.
SHA2561363534d205ad60f6700d81f2af2c0ce6d959b73fd405adbb598072395bd26e5File indicator identified as a persistence implant (ShellcodeLoader).
SHA256152c125eacdacc69406b120afd95994eef0f7a0cd638c2d8723e64f79344a336File indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon.
SHA2561c1704d789332c4d6ce57139d27194ac64c27bfbb1368f1006ffc3c96f3bcb80File indicator for a Nim-compiled DLL loader impersonating VSPMsg.dll.
SHA256242c411cd415d55e67aae75759e5c07720fcdddc0378b5e35d4c1e4ab2b01eb8File indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe.
SHA25626dc22c99e5e88363818e56dc5883258f048e426c9aa515887bf5d06872782f9File indicator listed as unavailable for analysis.
SHA2562e223e3c6dc7a130f0281a6c608cd58c153ec026c020c8a661b60a1e285140bfFile indicator for a utility that encodes beacon.bin and writes Default.xml.
SHA25630dc80cb4c791d80eb21597232fb2f5a4111bf3dfad32c736b789d77127310efFile indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon.
SHA2563ca9d65046420592e726776bb26b08719721d108f6947fd22af1d5e7cac33edcFile indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon.
SHA25653ddb6c51aca4bd6b00ed83a8019ee1440351f8eeb95a7b6c74a2b75210d85b2File indicator listed as unavailable for analysis.
SHA2565a2f093f7ae25c5e381647549496acf375e18dd95263b921518e340ee78e5377File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts WindowsUpdate.xml and maps its payload in memory.
SHA2565c4f6e21877dfd71e3e95254c6193457e9aab10aca7459ddaeb6d711997190deFile indicator identified as a loader.
SHA2565fd9a352d1bec4a11134ee140aa278d07d720b45493a7f01a548293f412972ceFile indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe.
SHA2566b3061d6e042744bb484b725031e7916b31ad224318a8c0441b9ead14ab853d5File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts setting.dat and maps its payload in memory.
SHA2568129e103509f00f40a6a2740b76bc3f9449ac09cd9222ba289e52e86f31f616eFile indicator identified as a Cobalt Strike beacon.
SHA25685e75e78a545d2fe11ac19385cc8c0789e1056a2cd4edfec32a6a6b113001e5aFile indicator for a loader that decodes mfeann.log and injects it as x64 shellcode.
SHA2568940de2ada979ad2c53ece0b5cb84100c4df0a024b4b363e96cb6a67469e30d5File indicator identified as Mimikatz.
SHA256982750f4f9edd2ef51b9972a1018a8777bd9d65e0d2e43977a522bdc73ddef5fFile indicator for a persistence implant that hijacks the Avast wsc_proxy component.
SHA2569b4dadaa55479727f7c0034ff9c07165597b9a9a9376b6e564634eeaf1c6b876File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts setting.dat and maps its payload in memory.
SHA256af295b5081ccdfd601a0aaecaa81fe1aa92125b548063863dbca2011cef658ceFile indicator listed as unavailable for analysis.
SHA256af3737ba032b8c5d3403064899ab6cc48610a397d9f67b626f99b2f0f5082202File indicator identified as a loader associated with VSPerfCmd.exe.
SHA256b1155f47910f032217352c3a302c01de4d15cabda34331d2866f5d7a52b3ecdeFile indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe.
SHA256b737eae170534f5965b90f4af807cb3f728498f3bccc9355a0afc0171e413230File indicator identified as a loader associated with svchost.exe.
SHA256d732660db5af253aacbc580d6114d59d233c48b3a5ead6dcfcb55246252abed2File indicator for a DLL loader that decrypts setting.dat and maps its payload in memory.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1018 · Remote System DiscoverySCCM and WMI queries identified the machine on which a specified user had last logged on.T1046 · Network Service DiscoveryModules attempted direct TCP connections to an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance and probed internal API and depository gateway endpoints.T1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolModules hex-encoded output, split it into chunks, and exfiltrated it through DNS lookups to unique subdomains.T1057 · Process DiscoveryA module collected running process trees, including parent processes and command-line arguments.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe toolkit consisted of PowerShell modules executed on the compromised IIS server.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryModules collected the machine name and queried SQL Server for system-user and version information.T1110.001 · Password GuessingA module attempted API login with a username and guessed password.T1213.002 · SharepointModules enumerated SharePoint sites and document libraries and searched their contents for sensitive keywords.T1505.003 · Web ShellThe modules ran under a web shell on an IIS server.T1518 · Software DiscoveryModules searched active processes for tools including Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, Jenkins, and GitLab.T1526 · Cloud Service DiscoveryThe toolkit checked cloud credentials and mapped cloud infrastructure while searching for cloud-related secrets.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesModules searched configuration files, shared folders, and application directories for hardcoded passwords, AWS keys, and database connection strings.T1552.006 · Group Policy PreferencesA module searched the domain SYSVOL share for Group Policy Preferences cpassword fields.

Threat Actors

Vendors

Products

AWS RDSDatabase Probing (rdsnet1, scq1): Attempts direct TCP connections to an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and uses integrated Windows authentication to query a Microsoft SQL Server for system user and versionIISpoint during the breach, 41 PowerShell modules ran under a webshell on an Internet Information Services (IIS) server in three minutes and twelve seconds, with a new module starting every few seconds. The modulesMicrosoft SharePointkeys and database connection strings. They also mapped cloud and database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) and Team Foundation Server (TFS) servers, and tested accessMicrosoft SQL Serveran AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and uses integrated Windows authentication to query a Microsoft SQL Server for system user and version data.PowerShellA 41-module PowerShell toolkit with all the hallmarks of AI authorship tested credentials and API keys against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway.System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM)strings. They also mapped cloud and database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) and Team Foundation Server (TFS) servers, and tested access to the exchange's ownTeam Foundation Server (TFS)database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) and Team Foundation Server (TFS) servers, and tested access to the exchange's own investment application programming interface

Tools

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