Operation ShadowCloud’s GraphDoor Backdoor Uses SharePoint and Ably for C2

Summary
Kaspersky analyzes GraphDoor’s modular plug-ins and cloud C2 using SharePoint/Microsoft Graph and Ably, including keylogging, screenshots, process collection and proxying. Staging overlaps suggest Chinese-speaking groups may be involved, but attribution is unconfirmed.
Key points
- GraphDoor collects host and network details, encrypts the data, and uploads it to a SharePoint document library through Microsoft Graph, disguising it as a JavaScript source-map file.
- The backdoor retrieves commands and plug-ins for keylogging, screenshots and process enumeration; it can also execute commands and load shellcode or executables into memory.
- The plug-ins use a COFF loader, while the keylogger records keystrokes and mouse activity in an encrypted log.
- Proxy plug-ins use Erfrp and Ably messaging to provide reverse-proxy and SOCKS5 capabilities; GraphDoor obtains C2 details dynamically rather than embedding a fixed C2 domain.
- Shared staging directories and deployment timing overlap with activity attributed to FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, but the researchers say there is insufficient evidence to definitively attribute Operation ShadowCloud.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- GraphDoor authenticates as a malicious application using client credentials, then uses Microsoft Graph to upload encrypted victim information to a SharePoint document library and retrieve plug-ins and commands.
- GraphDoor downloads plug-ins and victim-specific command files from SharePoint lists, then executes commands including shell commands and injected shellcode.
- The backdoor collects system and network details; its plug-ins capture keystrokes and screenshots and enumerate running processes.
- The Ably plug-ins use messaging channels to relay data and tunnel TCP traffic, including through a SOCKS5 proxy.
- In activity described as a FamousSparrow campaign, excint.exe side-loaded the malicious wtsapi32.dll. The report says this overlaps with GitDoor staging but does not establish direct attribution.
- Defensive Notes
- The report advises treating the introduction of MeshCentral Agent into an environment as suspicious, while recognizing that it has legitimate uses.
- The report warns that cloud-based C2 using Microsoft Graph, SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably can blend in with normal enterprise traffic and evade many network-based detections.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | buildersemp[.]sharepoint[.]com | Attacker-used SharePoint site for GraphDoor data uploads, plug-in retrieval, and command retrieval. |
| DOMAIN | cskautogo[.]sharepoint[.]com | SharePoint site listed as an IOC for GraphDoor activity. |
| DOMAIN | ekmt[.]tw | Domain resolving from a listed proxy server address and reported as a Cobalt Strike beacon C2 domain. |
| DOMAIN | ms[.]twnic[.]top | Domain resolving from a listed proxy server address and reported as a Cobalt Strike beacon C2 domain. |
| DOMAIN | twnic[.]top | Reported as a domain used for Cobalt Strike beacon C2. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]106[.]230[.]33 | Listed as a proxy server address; the report says it resolves to ms[.]twnic[.]top, also used as a Cobalt Strike beacon C2. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]137[.]63[.]39 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]214[.]68[.]20 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]227[.]224[.]189 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 104[.]194[.]152[.]173 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 104[.]194[.]153[.]161 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 104[.]194[.]154[.]28 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 122[.]147[.]252[.]16 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 123[.]58[.]205[.]105 | Listed as a proxy server address; the report says it resolves to ekmt[.]tw, also used as a Cobalt Strike beacon C2. |
| IPV4 | 153[.]75[.]94[.]148 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 153[.]75[.]95[.]27 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 154[.]205[.]154[.]209 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 172[.]86[.]66[.]19 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 216[.]146[.]25[.]173 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 216[.]73[.]158[.]117 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 216[.]73[.]158[.]72 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 223[.]165[.]4[.]203 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]52[.]17[.]113 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]54[.]17[.]113 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 43[.]134[.]62[.]111 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]59[.]124[.]164 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 66[.]42[.]52[.]137 | Listed as a proxy server address associated with the GraphDoor infrastructure. |
| MD5 | 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952 | MD5 hash identified for the GraphDoor backdoor. |
| MD5 | b4956b230d296cb4b015b42b11d80e32 | MD5 hash of the injected Ably messaging client used by a GraphDoor plug-in. |
| MD5 | d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700a6f8c | MD5 hash of the injected Erfrp-derived proxy client used by a GraphDoor plug-in. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1016 · System Network Configuration DiscoveryGraphDoor collects network adapter details and public and private IP addresses.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe backdoor encrypts victim data and embedded configuration, and encodes data and payloads with Base64.T1033 · System Owner/User DiscoveryGraphDoor collects the username and the process-listing plug-in records domain and user account names.T1055 · Process InjectionThe adsmload command injects executable payload bytes or shellcode into memory.T1056.001 · KeyloggingThe kl.ts plug-in installs keyboard hooks and records keystrokes.T1057 · Process DiscoveryThe pr.ts plug-in enumerates active processes and records their details.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellGraphDoor's shell command executes supplied commands with cmd.exe /C.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsGraphDoor communicates over HTTPS with Microsoft authentication and Graph endpoints.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryGraphDoor gathers the victim operating-system version and other host details.T1102.002 · Bidirectional CommunicationThe backdoor uses SharePoint and Ably messaging channels for two-way command, data, and proxy communications.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferGraphDoor downloads plug-ins and victim-specific command files from SharePoint.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe scr.ts plug-in captures screenshots of a matching process window or the full desktop.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageGraphDoor uploads encrypted victim information to a SharePoint document library.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingIn activity described as a FamousSparrow campaign, excint.exe side-loaded the malicious wtsapi32.dll; the report says this overlap does not prove a direct link to GitDoor.T1620 · Reflective Code LoadingThe proxy plug-ins reflectively load compiled Go programs into the current process's address space.
Threat Actors
BlackTechKaspersky reports overlap with CopperTurtle activity, including shared staging directories and implants deployed within a day of GitDoor. The report says this does not prove a direct link to GraphDoor or GitDoor.FamousSparrowKaspersky reports overlap with FamousSparrow activity, including shared staging directories and implants deployed within a day of GitDoor. It describes a FamousSparrow campaign involving DLL side-loading but says the overlap does not prove a direct link to GraphDoor or GitDoor.
Malware
GitDoorThe first part of the blog focused on the initial infection chain, examined the GitDoor backdoor’s command‑and‑control protocol, and cataloged the diverse shellcode families the actors drop onto compromised hosts.GraphDoorIn this part, we will walk through the GraphDoor backdoor and the suite of plug-ins loaded, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins, and highlight the attribution clues that tie the operation to Chinese‑speakingPLEAD RATIn the CopperTurtle case, the attacker launched the malicious executable C:\Program Files\PDF24\pdfset.exe (MD5: 45b3aa39bc33528650d9181cd946b2df), which injects the PLEAD RAT into memory.
Vendors
Ablywe will walk through the GraphDoor backdoor and the suite of plug-ins loaded, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins, and highlight the attribution clues that tie the operation to Chinese‑speaking threatMicrosoftThis call authenticates the malicious application – not a user – and returns an access token that the backdoor later uses to communicate with the Microsoft Graph API.
Products
Ablywe will walk through the GraphDoor backdoor and the suite of plug-ins loaded, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins, and highlight the attribution clues that tie the operation to Chinese‑speaking threatMicrosoft GraphThis call authenticates the malicious application – not a user – and returns an access token that the backdoor later uses to communicate with the Microsoft Graph API.Microsoft SharePointIt issues a Microsoft Graph PUT request that creates a file called main.%victim‑unique‑code%.js.map, masquerading as a JavaScript source map file, in a SharePoint document library.Microsoft WindowsIt resolves the needed Windows APIs at runtime by hashing DLL and function names with the DJB2 algorithm.
Tools
Cobalt StrikeBoth domains (twnic[.]top, ekmt[.]tw) were also used as Cobalt Strike beacon C2 servers.Erfrppart, we will walk through the GraphDoor backdoor and the suite of plug-ins loaded, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins, and highlight the attribution clues that tie the operation to Chinese‑speaking
