Kaspersky Details Operation ShadowCloud’s GitDoor Backdoor and Infection Chain

Summary
Kaspersky analyzes Operation ShadowCloud, a campaign targeting government victims in Asia and Africa. It details MeshAgent-assisted infection, DLL-sideloaded loaders, and GitDoor’s GitHub and Ably C2 and modular shellcode.
Key points
- The initial entry point is unknown; investigators found MeshCentral Agent instances inside a Taiwanese organization, with evidence suggesting reuse of an existing infection.
- Attackers used legitimate executables to sideload malicious DLL loaders, which decrypted payloads and executed them in memory.
- GitDoor uses GitHub repositories and Ably cloud messaging for C2, exchanging commands, victim system information, and results.
- GitDoor can download plug-ins for screen capture and process enumeration, and supports commands for file management, keylogging, proxies, and shellcode loading.
- The campaign’s custom COFF and other shellcode modules support process injection, credential and cookie theft, file and system administration, and interactive command shells.
- Kaspersky reports victims primarily in the government sector in Asia and Africa, and says repository creation dates suggest the operation’s infrastructure was prepared from late 2024.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- The exact initial entry point is unknown; investigators say evidence points to reuse of a prior infection on the network.
- Attackers deployed MeshCentral Agent instances that connected to 27[.]102[.]66[.]162 and were used to drop a loader DLL and encrypted payload.
- Trusted executables were used to side-load malicious DLLs, including jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll, and libcef.dll.
- GitDoor used GitHub repositories and Ably messaging for command delivery, victim data uploads, and plugin downloads.
- The backdoor could load Base64-encoded COFF shellcode and other payloads directly into memory.
- Defensive Notes
- Review trusted executables loading unexpected DLLs, particularly the loaders identified in the report.
- Investigate MeshCentral Agent connections to the reported C2 address and unusual GitHub API activity involving issue creation, repository contents, or file uploads.
- Network-based detection may be less effective because the campaign routed C2 traffic through cloud services including GitHub and Ably.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 27[.]102[.]66[.]162 | MeshCentral Agent C2 address used by the campaign. |
| MD5 | 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952 | MD5 of the GraphDoor backdoor. |
| MD5 | 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3 | MD5 of a malicious Type 1 loader used to decrypt and execute a backdoor. |
| MD5 | 3896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a31 | MD5 of an encrypted payload file used with a malicious loader. |
| MD5 | 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035 | MD5 of the GitDoor backdoor. |
| MD5 | 6a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1 | MD5 of an encrypted payload file used by the Type 2 loader. |
| MD5 | 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b | MD5 of a MeshCentral Agent instance deployed in the campaign. |
| MD5 | b930fb3ab14fe45b378d5acfa6e0a763 | MD5 of an encrypted payload file that decrypts to bootstrap code and GraphDoor. |
| MD5 | e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3 | MD5 of the malicious Type 2 loader identified as SbieDll_st.dll. |
| MD5 | e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439 | MD5 of a malicious jli.dll loader variant described in the report. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/AlexandaJazzmynwC | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/aYulysseserinYtas | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/bvgarciajocelynxccZ | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/Eclemensadolph1n | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/FloraineSuvitC | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/JeneLeo | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/LatonyCharnleyaW | GitHub account associated with the Havo and Trix repositories used for GitDoor command delivery and data uploads. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/StevenDFournier | GitHub account associated with a repository reported as used in backdoor samples. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//github[.]com/VenoraKlanimU | GitHub account associated with repositories reported as used in backdoor samples. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1003.001 · LSASS MemoryThe credential-dumping module uses Mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords full to extract credentials from LSASS memory.T1003.002 · Security Account ManagerThe credential-dumping module uses Mimikatz lsadump::sam to extract local account hashes from the SAM database.T1055 · Process InjectionThe report describes shellcode modules for remote process injection and loaders that execute decrypted payload code from memory.T1055.003 · Thread Execution HijackingA custom shellcode module implements SetThreadContext injection, described as thread execution hijacking.T1055.004 · Asynchronous Procedure CallA custom shellcode module implements APC injection using NtQueueApcThread.T1056.001 · KeyloggingGitDoor supports keylogging, stores captured keystrokes, and can send the captured data to C2.T1057 · Process DiscoveryGitDoor downloads a process-enumeration plugin; the report also describes a shellcode module that lists processes.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellA custom shellcode module uses cmd.exe to execute commands and can provide an interactive WinPTY shell.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsGitDoor communicates with GitHub and Ably using HTTP requests, including GET, POST, and PUT operations.T1102.002 · Bidirectional CommunicationGitDoor uses GitHub repositories to retrieve commands and plugins and to exchange command results and victim information.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferGitDoor downloads plugins and command data from GitHub repositories and can retrieve shellcode and other payloads.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe backdoor downloads a screen-capture plugin, and a custom shellcode module captures the screen or a specified window.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieThe described CookieKatz module dumps browser cookies from Chrome, Edge, or Msedgewebview2 process memory.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageThe backdoor uploads collected victim information and command results to GitHub repositories and Ably cloud.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingAttackers used trusted executables such as javaw.exe, start.exe, pythonw.exe, and zoomit.exe to load malicious DLLs.
Malware
Vendors
Ablyhide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections.GitHubThese implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-basedMicrosoftThese implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based
Products
Ablyhide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections.GitHubThese implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-basedMeshCentralDuring our investigation, we uncovered two separate instances of the MeshCentral Agent (MD5: 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b), which were launched inside a Taiwanese organization.Microsoft SharePointThese implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-basedMicrosoft WindowsC:\windows\system32\start.exe: legitimate Sandboxie Start binaryOpenJDKwhich were dropped onto the host and then implicitly loaded by the respective legitimate binaries: the OpenJDK platform binary (javaw.exe, MD5: 8b78ef5609d942036e93721d75bd1f29), Sandboxie Start (start.exe, MD5:SandboxieC:\windows\system32\start.exe: legitimate Sandboxie Start binaryZoomIt(pythonw.exe, MD5: 84802caf2579cfe7a38f079a64a3cd22), and the Sysinternals Screen Magnifier tool (zoomit.exe, MD5: d955d03104f988582cbd2967177693d3), which the attackers started as a Windows service.
Tools
CookieKatzUses CookieKatz to dump cookies from Chrome, Edge, or Msedgewebview2 directly from the process memoryMeshAgentThe threat actor behind it is abusing the legitimate MeshAgent utility to drop two brand-new backdoors.MimikatzMimikatz: the tool is named imzimzgo 2.2.0 x64. It uses the following arguments:
