Kaspersky 2026 Report Highlights Exploited Applications, Trusted Access and SOC Detection Gaps

· Original Report (PDF) ↗

Report discovered via Awesome Annual Security Reports.

Summary

Kaspersky’s 2026 report finds public-facing application exploits accounted for 43.7% of investigated initial access vectors in 2025. It also highlights trusted-relationship compromises and gaps in SOC detection coverage.

Key points

  • The report draws on Kaspersky MDR, Incident Response, Compromise Assessment and SOC Consulting data. Its customer distribution is geographically uneven, with the largest share in the CIS.
  • Among investigated IR cases, public-facing application exploits accounted for 43.7% of initial access vectors, valid accounts for 25.4% and trusted relationships for 15.5%. Compromised service providers enabled downstream customer intrusions.
  • Data encryption was the most common resulting damage in IR investigations, accounting for 39.4%. Half of the vulnerabilities identified in IR engagements enabled remote code execution.
  • High-severity incidents represented 3.8% of MDR incidents in 2025, down from 14.3% in 2021. Average detection and reporting time for high-severity incidents fell from 53.9 minutes in 2024 to 42.1 minutes.
  • IR attack-duration groups ranged from a median of less than one day for rapid attacks to 108 days for long-lasting attacks; median response effort increased from 20 to 100 hours across those groups.
  • A SAP NetWeaver case involved malicious DLL sideloading through legitimate executables. The destructive payload truncated files larger than 5 MB, permanently destroying data beyond that threshold.
  • SOC assessments found mean detection-rule coverage of data sources was 43%, with network telemetry, databases and web servers commonly uncovered. Compromise Assessment statistics indicated 18.6% of detected incidents were found manually.

Article Details

Publisher
Kaspersky Security Services
Report Period
2025-01-01 to 2025-12-31
Scope
Worldwide incident statistics from Managed Detection and Response, Incident Response, Compromise Assessment, and SOC Consulting customers.
Sample Size
Approximately 21,000 MDR incidents reported to customers; total cross-service sample size not disclosed.
Key Statistics
  • High-severity incidents represented 3.8% of MDR incidents in 2025, compared with 4.7% in 2024.
  • Mean time to detect and report high-severity MDR incidents was 42.1 minutes in 2025, compared with 53.9 minutes in 2024.
  • Among IR-investigated cases, initial vectors included exploitation of public-facing applications (43.7%), valid accounts (25.4%), and trusted relationships (15.5%).
  • Mean correlation-rule coverage of event sources across SOC assessments was 43%.
  • In Compromise Assessment projects, approximately 18.6% of detected incidents were found through manual threat hunting.
Recommendations
  • Apply timely security patches, enforce effective password policies and multifactor authentication, and limit contractor access.
  • Implement configuration management together with formal change and access management procedures.
  • Regularly back up critical data and store backups securely.
  • Establish corporate security awareness programs addressing phishing and malicious user execution.
  • Combine continuous monitoring with regular Compromise Assessments, and tune SOC detection rules to the organization's infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
MD52dfef0c375933b725c047a7e25b27ceeMalicious MpClient.dll wiper sideloaded by a legitimate Microsoft Defender executable in the SAP NetWeaver attack case.
MD57c6f83f4aaa783ebaaa2d6f64930f597Malicious calibre-launcher.dll identified as an AdaptixC2 backdoor and sideloaded using Calibre.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1048.002 · Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolA web skimmer encrypted cardholder data using RSA and exfiltrated it through POST requests to an attacker-controlled domain.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskAttackers created scheduled tasks to maintain remote access and execute sideloaded backdoors.T1055 · Process InjectionAttackers injected shellcode and in-memory implants into Winlogon.exe and WerFault.exe on IIS servers.T1070.006 · TimestompAn intrusion targeting telecommunications systematically altered file creation, modification, and access timestamps to obstruct forensic analysis.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsBackdoors registered HTTP.sys URL prefixes and used HTTP/S listeners to blend command-and-control traffic with legitimate web services.T1078 · Valid AccountsAttackers used valid credentials for initial access and persistence; valid accounts represented 25.4% of IR initial vectors.T1090 · ProxyAn in-memory TCP tunneling implant relayed arbitrary TCP traffic through HTTP/S channels.T1098 · Account ManipulationAttackers activated disabled accounts and changed privileged group memberships; the report identifies account manipulation as the most frequently used MDR technique.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationExploitation of public-facing applications accounted for 43.7% of initial vectors in IR-investigated cases.T1204 · User ExecutionSuccessful social engineering incidents involved users clicking malicious links or launching attachments.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactMedusaLocker and BlackNevas cases involved encryption of victim data, including VMDK files in ESXi environments.T1550.002 · Pass the HashIn Brazil, attackers used Invoke-TheHash for pass-the-hash lateral movement after extracting password hashes with Mimikatz.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsAttackers exploited CVE-2025-7771 to disable antivirus protection before deploying MedusaLocker.T1566 · PhishingMDR detected phishing emails containing malicious attachments or links, including successful attacks that enabled further compromise.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingAttackers abused Microsoft Defender and Calibre executables to sideload malicious DLLs.

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