KongTuke Continues ClickFix Attacks Through Compromised WordPress Sites to Deliver ModeloRAT

Summary
Trend Micro MDR analysis links KongTuke activity to compromised WordPress sites and fake CAPTCHA prompts delivering modeloRAT. The article details its execution, reconnaissance and persistence; user interaction with the lure in the investigated case was not conclusively
Key points
- Trend Micro MDR investigators found evidence consistent with a ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA lure on a compromised WordPress site; they could not conclusively confirm the user interacted with it.
- The site’s injected JavaScript could collect browser and system information and dynamically load content from a remote server.
- The reported execution chain abused PowerShell and a renamed Windows finger.exe to retrieve commands, then used obfuscated scripts and a portable Python environment to run modeloRAT.
- The malware checked for analysis tools, identified domain membership and installed antivirus products, and collected host and network information.
- Investigators observed likely command-and-control communications and persistence through a Run registry entry and a scheduled task.
- The article says VirusTotal submissions showed multiple WordPress sites with similar injections, suggesting the delivery method remained active; it also notes KongTuke’s separate CrashFix technique.
- Recommended defenses include updating WordPress and its plugins, monitoring suspicious PowerShell and process activity, and warning users not to run commands prompted by CAPTCHA pages.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- KongTuke injected JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites; the scripts could retrieve and inject remote content, leading to a fake CAPTCHA prompt that instructed users to run a PowerShell command.
- The reported CrashFix variant tricks users into installing a malicious Chrome extension that displays a fake security warning and prompts them to execute a PowerShell command. The article says this method was not observed in the MDR investigation described.
- The command copied the legitimate Windows finger.exe utility to a temporary file and used it to retrieve data from an external IP, piping the response into the command interpreter.
- On domain-joined systems, the malware downloaded a portable Python environment and additional scripts, then used Python to run modeloRAT.
- Defensive Notes
- Patch and maintain WordPress core files, themes, and plugins; disable unused plugins and enforce strong administrative controls.
- Configure endpoint detection and monitoring to alert on suspicious command lines, encoded PowerShell, unusual parent-child process relationships, and anomalous outbound connections.
- Train users not to copy and run commands in response to website prompts, including fake CAPTCHA or security-warning instructions.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 158[.]247[.]252[.]178 | External IP contacted by modeloRAT; the article assesses the outbound connection as likely command-and-control communication. |
| IPV4 | 162[.]33[.]178[.]171 | IP identified alongside the malicious foodgefy JavaScript URL as its external infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 170[.]168[.]103[.]208 | External IP contacted by modeloRAT; the article assesses the outbound connection as likely command-and-control communication. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]61[.]138[.]224 | External endpoint contacted by the renamed finger.exe utility; the response was piped to the command interpreter, enabling remote command execution. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//ainttby[.]com/6f54.js | Injected external JavaScript reference found on a compromised website and linked by an earlier report to KongTuke activity. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//ctpsih[.]com/2d5h.js | Injected external JavaScript reference found on a compromised website and linked by an earlier report to KongTuke activity. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//foodgefy[.]com/6o0jk.js | Malicious injected JavaScript URL on a compromised website; the script could receive and inject remote content. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/np4h0kexqq5r9vlpzwg4d/rp?rlkey=fwg1koexylntccobyxaliju7w&st=3wxzp44k&dl=1 | Specific Dropbox-hosted URL used to download the additional modeloRAT payload script extentions.py. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe article describes ROT-obfuscated PowerShell and multilayer-obfuscated Python code using encoding, encryption, and compression.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskThe malware creates a scheduled task named SoftwareProtection that runs the payload every five minutes.T1057 · Process DiscoveryThe script enumerates running processes and checks them against a list of security and analysis tools.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell commands retrieve and run scripts, enumerate the host, and download payloads.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellA hidden command prompt executes the command that copies finger.exe and pipes its response into the command interpreter.T1059.006 · PythonPython runs modeloRAT modules and scripts, including modes.py and extentions.py.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe script sends collected host and antivirus information through HTTP POST to the specified endpoint, and invokes web requests to obtain server responses.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe scripts collect system identity, domain membership, privilege context, services, storage, and other host details.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferPowerShell and modeloRAT download scripts and a ZIP archive containing a portable Python environment.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe malware decodes the ROT-obfuscated PowerShell in memory and the analysis recovered Python code through repeated decoding and decompression.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseThe reported delivery chain begins when users visit compromised WordPress sites containing injected JavaScript.T1204.004 · Malicious Copy and PasteThe fake CAPTCHA lure instructs users to copy and run a PowerShell command; the investigation found the user pasted clipboard contents into the Run dialog.T1497.001 · System ChecksThe script exits if it detects listed analysis or virtualization-related processes, which the article describes as anti-debugging and anti-VM behavior.T1518.001 · Security Software DiscoveryThe script queries the Windows SecurityCenter2 AntivirusProduct class to collect installed antivirus product names.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderThe malware creates a value under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to launch pythonw.exe with modes.py.
Threat Actors
Malware
Vendors
Products
Google ChromeIn this ClickFix variation, the users are tricked into installing a malicious Chrome extension that displays a fake security warning, stating that the browser has “stopped abnormally.” It then prompts the unsuspectingMicrosoft Windowscontents to explorer.exe then launched a hidden command prompt session that copied the built-in Windows tool, finger.exe, to a temporary file (ct.exe) and executed it.TrendAI Vision OneTrendAI Vision One™ Services — Managed Detection and Response (MDR) uncovered ongoing attacks linked to the KongTuke threat group, which continues to use compromised WordPress websites and fake CAPTCHA lures to deliverWordPressThrough the Lens of MDR: Analysis of KongTuke’s ClickFix Abuse of Compromised WordPress Sites
