Anubis Ransomware Attack Used Lindnor Backdoor and BYOVD Tools, but Encryption Was Blocked

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Summary

In an October 2026 intrusion, Anubis operators used the newly identified Backdoor.Lindnor, 13 security-disabling executables, five vulnerable drivers and AnyDesk configured for Safe Mode. The encryption payload was blocked; no files were reported encrypted.

Key points

  • Attackers using Anubis targeted a U.S. organization in October 2026; the initial access method was not identified.
  • Backdoor.Lindnor was found on two affected Microsoft SQL Server machines, disguised as Chrome- and VMware-related files.
  • The backdoor sent host and user details to configured C2 servers over port 443.
  • Attackers dropped at least 13 executables intended to terminate security products and five signed, publicly known vulnerable drivers for BYOVD activity.
  • The attackers installed AnyDesk and configured it to run in Safe Mode, where security software may not fully operate.
  • The Anubis encryption payload was blocked, and investigators found no evidence that files were encrypted.
  • Backdoor.Lindnor was also seen on two unrelated organizations' networks, where no ransomware activity was identified.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers using Anubis deployed the Backdoor.Lindnor backdoor on two Microsoft SQL Server machines; the initial access method was not identified.
  • The attackers dropped multiple executables and five publicly known vulnerable drivers, apparently using the drivers to gain kernel-level access and terminate security products.
  • The attackers installed AnyDesk and configured it to run in Safe Mode with Networking, including registering it as a service through a Windows registry command.
  • The attackers created a local user account and added it to a local group.
  • The Anubis encryption payload was blocked before it could execute; the article reports no evidence that files were encrypted.
Defensive Notes
  • The Anubis encryption payload was blocked from execution in this incident.
  • Symantec stated that Symantec Endpoint products detect and block an IOC when the malicious file is available to them.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINcfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]comSpecific Azure-hosted hostname listed in the article's network indicators of compromise.
DOMAINmsrcontrib[.]comDomain listed in the article's network indicators of compromise.
SHA25628357d9666a9be36b2ea9ac6007bb8bfbe7e2438e095c1ec40720c4001f47c62Hash of rustr.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA2562fdfdd13a0c548bb68c9d5aa8599a9265d4659da3e237fe7a42ac6ac06b9a06aHash of fly.sys, one of five publicly known vulnerable drivers dropped for BYOVD activity.
SHA256467d1395b61d4b886329571b564fb21db01639acd2799439646c85b9aeaec175Hash of the AnyDesk executable that the attackers installed for remote access.
SHA25647a864736764112d7897c76e56d51111ce75b3e46fdbac6933df8a5b29507d17Hash of safemode.exe, the tool the attackers used to configure AnyDesk to run in Safe Mode.
SHA256588887e709459f1d1a8109b089cb3462c6f796d30b6297a1a0fdb3419a3ccbceHash of huntreagent.exe, an attacker-dropped executable that was not available for analysis; its exact purpose is unknown.
SHA2565a2082162852984ffe7e7c501faa6cf473129fcba29406ffb98d55198de4b3a5Hash of xs.scr, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA2565abe477517f51d81061d2e69a9adebdcda80d36667d0afabe103fda4802d33dbHash of havoc.sys, one of five publicly known vulnerable drivers dropped for BYOVD activity.
SHA2565d2dd9caf2ae4a5083dbec16e688040456cdbc31eaeecbab78188e322ed0415bHash of additional Backdoor.Lindnor files identified as powerhost.exe and eventwatcher.exe.
SHA2565fcd2c954764ac0888c8ba72fc1cf54db64e8f23f83aeb0786ae5b80438ba926Hash of gibfor.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA2566543ee9f89d80b2bcf08e98fb8e9e73a4b144a93c7b2a3f28e35de8f7e7a8a80Hash of bdr.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA25667dee1d52189460b88f8ce5ffa76a5c22f86ffd67f8e689118019fce0863c321Hash of g.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA25672d0b5615b996cbb01b1ca139e627079094f734da48a0435ffd8480a25d0a258Hash of monprocessex.sys, one of five publicly known vulnerable drivers dropped for BYOVD activity.
SHA25683eff3e51b69968a4ddd503b0b1dccfa8829d638f2dc00cc69640a29aea814f1Hash of hwaudioch.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA256854c3e76beb200243ccf6af260e9a2089c2fc545f8f1b34d34c6fe86f2d056c3Hash of symgooq.exe, an executable that masqueraded as Symantec software and was used to list and remove kernel callbacks.
SHA2569058388d05d984ca691a23ee70fcdbd3266c5cdc68ebc5aed95c67f1c502bc75Hash of bdapiutil64.sys, one of five publicly known vulnerable drivers dropped for BYOVD activity.
SHA256962be6983f3ed4f1dc4ce117e135cc0a5ab8fc6b5f5aa0284eff8a9def66e338Hash of s1.exe, an attacker-dropped executable that was not available for analysis; its exact purpose is unknown.
SHA256aa779d811e00a30dfb56b994bdd63424cbf97617af737a218b6aff9f7c3a50f5Hash of gbbsym.exe, an executable that masqueraded as Symantec software and was used to list and remove kernel callbacks.
SHA256ad9575a9ef2dcc9d2fd2a24376c418549d4b3db5564c22b20081d33cf7629e43Hash of a Backdoor.Lindnor file identified as volumeproxy.exe.
SHA256cd1e68583b8b984a9bb5b9f7067077c0e0d8f79da4455c326319e5e5fc6e9c5fHash of test.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA256cde8dbeaf15250337a03e07a7e257b12b03e5e951885cc69a578545f44425bddHash of backup.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA256e69b882218fa2a19fd351741874bfcd10a6ae91076e6a8483795e0e357f8d026Hash of the Anubis ransomware encryption payload, named iservice.exe; execution was blocked in the reported attack.
SHA256e727d0753d2cd0b2f6eeba4cea53aa10b3ff3ed2afeb78f545fcf6d840f85c3eHash of xhunter1.sys, one of five publicly known vulnerable drivers dropped for BYOVD activity.
SHA256f8d4142a94269b4258f370ef2292d22a49cd6dee8266a7122f4531e9cc5d9a2fHash of gibformin.exe, listed among executables dropped during the attack.
SHA256fc200686175559f4544a5de826905f09a68476d889690a3be40ac32356790cb8Hash of the Backdoor.Lindnor file identified as healthcontroller64.exe and svchelper.exe.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1033 · System Owner/User DiscoveryBackdoor.Lindnor sent the user name associated with the infected system to its command-and-control server.T1036 · MasqueradingBackdoor.Lindnor used filenames and folders resembling Chrome components and VMware files; gbbsym.exe and symgooq.exe masqueraded as Symantec software.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationThe attackers dropped signed but vulnerable drivers for BYOVD activity to gain kernel-level access.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryBackdoor.Lindnor sent the operating system version and computer name to its command-and-control server.T1098.007 · Additional Local or Domain GroupsThe attackers added the new local user account to a local group.T1112 · Modify RegistryThe attackers used reg.exe to modify the registry so AnyDesk could run as a service in Safe Mode with Networking.T1136.001 · Local AccountThe attackers created a new local user account.T1219 · Remote Access ToolsThe attackers installed AnyDesk as a remote access tool.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactThe Anubis payload was designed to encrypt files and append .anubis, but execution was blocked and the article reports no evidence of encryption.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceBackdoor.Lindnor appears to have run as a service, and the attackers registered AnyDesk as a service permitted to run in Safe Mode.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsThe attackers dropped executables to terminate security products and used vulnerable drivers to help stop security software.

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