Tengu Botnet Uses Hardware Watchdog to Reboot Linux Devices After Process Termination

· Original article ↗

Summary

Nozomi’s analysis describes Mirai-derived Tengu’s watchdog-triggered reboot and other persistence methods, Telnet brute-force delivery, and DDoS and payload capabilities. The article establishes no infection scale or real-world victims.

Key points

  • Nozomi observed Tengu’s dropper reaching honeypots through Telnet credential brute force; the analysis identifies no specific device models or infection scale.
  • A detached guardian checks the main malware process every 60 seconds and can relaunch its binary; other persistence methods include fake systemd services, init scripts, and shell startup files.
  • A watchdog worker stops sending keepalives when the main process is terminated, allowing the device to reboot and Tengu’s other persistence mechanisms to try to relaunch it.
  • Tengu supports 25 DDoS methods, SOCKS5 proxying, shell commands, system and network data collection, and retrieval of ELF or APK payloads.
  • The analyzed sample was configured to use a C2 server at 64[.]89.163.8 over TCP port 9931; registration, heartbeat traffic, and command output are plaintext, while commands and updates use a custom encryption scheme.
  • URLhaus recorded 17 malware URLs at the same IP, but did not identify them as Tengu; its listed hashes did not match Nozomi’s sample, so the telemetry supports only malicious Mirai-related hosting there.
  • Nozomi recommends removing unnecessary internet-facing services such as Telnet, replacing default credentials, updating firmware, segmenting IoT networks, and checking persistence locations.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The dropper reached Nozomi honeypots through Telnet credential brute force.
  • Tengu uses a device hardware watchdog to trigger a reboot if its main process is terminated, allowing other persistence mechanisms to relaunch it.
  • Tengu retrieves additional ELF or APK payloads through its C2 infrastructure, including an IPFS gateway on the same server.
Defensive Notes
  • Remove internet exposure for Telnet and other unnecessary administrative services, and replace default credentials.
  • Update firmware and segment IoT networks.
  • Before returning a suspected device to service, review systemd services, init scripts, shell startup files, and cron-related paths.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV464[.]89[.]163[.]8Configured Tengu C2 address; URLhaus separately recorded Mirai-related malware hosting at this address, but did not identify those files as Tengu.

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