Octagon Android Malware Uses Fake Bahrain Alert App to Capture Lock-Screen Credentials

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Summary

K7 researchers analyzed Octagon, an Android threat impersonating Bahrain’s BH Alert app. It decrypts and dynamically loads payloads, abuses VPN and Accessibility services, and uses fake accounts for persistence; the child app captures lock-screen credentials.

Key points

  • The campaign targeted users in Bahrain with a fake BH Alert app distributed through phishing links.
  • K7 researchers used Frida to observe an encrypted asset being RC4-decrypted and loaded as DEX code with DexClassLoader.
  • The malware installs a child APK in memory; that APK generates and dynamically loads a JAR payload.
  • The malware abuses Android VPN permissions to intercept and redirect traffic, while excluding selected apps from the VPN tunnel.
  • The child APK uses Accessibility Service to capture lock-screen PINs, passwords, and patterns, storing captured data locally.
  • A fake Android account and periodic sync activity help maintain persistence; the malware also stores its configuration and pending data locally.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The malware impersonates the BH Alert emergency application and uses phishing URLs to distribute a fake APK.
  • After installation, it extracts an encrypted asset, decrypts it with an RC4-based routine, and loads the resulting DEX using DexClassLoader.
  • The malware requests VPN permission and uses a VPN tunnel to intercept and redirect device traffic, while excluding selected applications.
  • It installs an embedded child APK through a PackageInstaller session; the child APK dynamically loads a JAR payload.
  • The child APK abuses Accessibility Service to capture lock-screen PINs, passwords, and unlock patterns, and stores collected information locally.
  • It registers a fake AccountManager account and uses periodic synchronization and saved configuration to maintain persistence and reconnect to its C2 server.
Defensive Notes
  • Scan mobile devices with a reputable security product and keep it active and updated.
  • Patch devices for known vulnerabilities.
  • Download software only from reputable platforms such as Google Play and the App Store.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4209[.]99[.]184[.]50C2 server address configured by the malware; the article gives port 4444.
MD558330aaf1f533e9fe03b6355c60347b4Malware/package hash listed for the com.kisa.octagonpanel child APK.
MD59694294addbe58be93ddbb6cabc499ceMalware/package hash listed for the com.kit.kitty package.
URLhxxps[:]//bh-alert[.]com/assets/BH-Alert.apkURL listed as a phishing and distribution link for the fake app.
URLhxxps[:]//download[.]alertbh[.]info/BH-Alert.apkPhishing and distribution URL for the fake BH Alert APK.
URLhxxps[:]//playgoogle[.]bh-alert[.]comURL listed as part of the fake app's phishing and distribution infrastructure.

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