TASPEN-Impersonating Android Malware Targets Indonesian Pensioners

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Summary

A technical analysis describes an Android malware campaign impersonating Indonesia’s TASPEN pension fund to steal credentials, SMS OTPs, contacts and facial video. The malware uses phishing, encrypted C2 and anti-analysis techniques.

Key points

  • A phishing site impersonating TASPEN promoted a malicious Android APK, reportedly using SEO to attract pensioners and civil servants.
  • The app uses DPT-Shell packing to conceal its payload until runtime and detects Frida instrumentation to hinder analysis.
  • Its spyware capabilities include SMS interception, screen recording, facial video capture, and collection of contacts and call history.
  • The malware sends encrypted credentials to rpc[.]syids[.]top and uses a WebSocket channel for persistent command and control.
  • Chinese-language error messages and developer artifacts suggest Chinese-speaking operators; the article does not establish a specific group.
  • The report says the campaign’s financial losses have not been publicly quantified and recommends app-store-only downloads, customer warnings, and coordinated infrastructure takedowns.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A phishing website impersonating TASPEN distributed a malicious Android APK, with the download promoted by SEO.
  • The malicious app used DPT-Shell packing to conceal its executable code and extract a ZIP payload at runtime.
  • The malware intercepted SMS messages and credentials, recorded screens and facial video, collected contact data, and exfiltrated information through HTTP POST and WebSocket C2 channels.
Defensive Notes
  • Download applications only from official app stores and verify app authenticity through official channels.
  • Treat requests for broad or unnecessary permissions, especially SMS, Accessibility Services, or camera access, with suspicion.
  • Use reputable mobile security software and behavior-based fraud detection; consider device attestation to identify compromised devices.
  • The article recommends coordinated takedowns of malicious domains and C2 infrastructure, security standards for public apps, and digital-literacy outreach aimed at seniors.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINrpc[.]syids[.]topC2 domain used for credential exfiltration and WebSocket command communications.
DOMAINtaspen[.]ahngo[.]ccPhishing domain used to distribute the malicious TASPEN-impersonating APK.
IPV438[.]47[.]53[.]168C2 IP address identified as used for beaconing or backup C2 over TLS.
SHA2561963b78a98c24e106ba93168f69ad12914e339a155b797a4d6fb6e8ff88819eaSHA-256 hash of classes.dex from the malicious APK.
SHA2563ddefbacd77de58c226a388ad92125e1333a7211fc0b1d636dea778923190c4fSHA-256 hash of the malicious APK.
SHA2565b9bd063360912a57a1cde5c1980594703ab301161c9a91197bff76352410df0SHA-256 hash of classes3.dex from the malicious APK.
SHA256c4a4c485660abe8286c58d2f6c8bb7e2e698db305761e703987efc6653c2ec25SHA-256 hash of classes2.dex from the malicious APK.

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