ClickFix Campaigns Target Ukrainian Sites With Psychedelic Stealer and Deliver RemotePanel, BoundSiphon

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers detail ClickFix campaigns using fake Cloudflare pages on Ukrainian business sites to deliver Psychedelic Stealer, and a separate chain deploying RemotePanel and BoundSiphon for persistent access and data theft.

Key points

  • A ClickFix campaign injected fake Ukrainian-language Cloudflare verification pages into compromised Ukrainian business websites to trick visitors into running a command.
  • The command fetched an MSI installer that delivered Psychedelic Stealer, which collects browser credentials, account tokens, cryptocurrency wallet data, and host information.
  • The stealer can establish scheduled-task persistence, modify browser profiles, and retrieve additional tasks from its C2 server.
  • Arctic Wolf identified a Rublevka TDS lure-management panel at uasputnik[.]com; its records showed 557 views and 426 clicks across 32 countries at the time of analysis.
  • Blackpoint Cyber reported a separate ClickFix chain delivering RemotePanel, a persistent remote-access tool, and BoundSiphon, which steals credentials, sessions, wallet data, and selected documents.
  • The second chain uses PowerShell, abuses a COM object to bypass UAC, configures Microsoft Defender exclusions, and installs RemotePanel as a service while loading BoundSiphon into memory.
  • The Ukrainian-site campaign was assessed as likely focused on Ukrainian users; the RemotePanel and BoundSiphon campaign was not attributed to a known actor.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ClickFix lures on compromised Ukrainian business websites imitate Cloudflare verification pages and instruct visitors to paste a copied command into the Windows Run dialog.
  • The Psychedelic Stealer chain uses msiexec.exe to retrieve an MSI installer, which downloads the executable payload.
  • A separate ClickFix chain uses PowerShell and a multi-stage sequence to deliver RemotePanel and BoundSiphon; an intermediate component abuses the CMSTPLUA COM object to bypass UAC.
  • The RemotePanel and BoundSiphon chain configures Microsoft Defender exclusions before fetching and executing the payloads.
Defensive Notes
  • The article describes malicious instructions to paste commands into the Windows Run dialog; users should not run commands copied from verification pages.
  • The described chain uses PowerShell, msiexec.exe, scheduled-task persistence, a service installation, and Microsoft Defender exclusions. These behaviors are relevant for detection and investigation.
  • The ClickFix lure's delayed interface progression does not verify that a visitor opened Run, pasted the command, or installed the payload.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINuasputnik[.]comDomain hosting the ClickFix MSI payload and the campaign's lure management panel.

MITRE ATT&CK

People

Malware

Vendors

Products

Countries

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