Star Blizzard Expands Phishing Campaigns With RedFlick and CosmicPulse

· Original article ↗

Summary

Microsoft reported at least 13 Star Blizzard campaigns affecting more than 100 organizations in 2026. The activity used conversation-based phishing and password-protected archives to deliver RedFlick and, in at least one incident, the CosmicPulse backdoor.

Key points

  • Microsoft reported that campaigns observed from January to August 2026 targeted more than 100 organizations across at least 13 campaigns, primarily in the United States and United Kingdom.
  • Star Blizzard shifted toward broader initial-contact operations, using replies to establish conversations before sending password-protected RAR or ZIP archives.
  • Archives contained VHDX or LNK files disguised as PDFs, which launched scripts and legitimate Windows utilities to retrieve additional components.
  • From April, RedFlick installers created scheduled tasks, collected basic host information, enabled WebDAV access, and retrieved components used to install CosmicPulse.
  • In July, a ZIP containing a password-protected RAR added another delivery layer; a shortcut retrieved a PDF with encoded data that PowerShell used to obtain an MSI installer.
  • Microsoft observed RedFlick communicating with remote infrastructure, creating scheduled tasks, and deploying CosmicPulse in at least one incident.
  • The article recommends reviewing email threads and encrypted archives, monitoring extraction and execution activity, and isolating potentially affected systems for investigation.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Star Blizzard used phishing emails to establish conversations with recipients, then sent password-protected RAR or ZIP archives with the password embedded as an image.
  • Archives contained VHDX files or LNK files disguised as PDFs that initiated the RedFlick delivery chain.
  • In a July 2026 variant, a password-protected RAR archive was nested inside a ZIP file; a shortcut downloaded a PDF containing encoded data that PowerShell extracted and executed to retrieve an MSI installer.
  • RedFlick installers retrieved components from threat actor-controlled infrastructure, created scheduled tasks, enabled WebDAV access, and deployed the CosmicPulse backdoor.
Defensive Notes
  • Review email telemetry for password-protected archives sent after earlier attachment-free messages, especially where the sender provides a password during the conversation.
  • Monitor archive extraction followed by VHDX mounting, LNK execution, MSI installation, PowerShell activity, WebDAV use, scheduled-task creation, or connections to unfamiliar external infrastructure.
  • Use additional review processes for encrypted archives that cannot be inspected, where business requirements permit.
  • If execution may have occurred, isolate the affected system; preserve the email thread and archive; review scheduled tasks and persistence mechanisms; collect process and network telemetry; and investigate affected accounts, sessions, mailbox rules, and recent communications.

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