Mandiant Details COLD RELIC’s Cross-Cloud Espionage and Impersonation Tactics

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Summary

Mandiant links two US-organization intrusions to Russian group COLD RELIC, detailing stolen-pretext phishing, cloud identity abuse, MFA persistence and data theft, with detection and hardening guidance.

Key points

  • Mandiant investigated intrusions at two US-based organizations in late 2025 and 2026; phishing parameters and impersonation pretexts indicated the later targeting likely drew on data from the earlier compromise.
  • In the 2025 intrusion, COLD RELIC used stolen Super Admin credentials and MFA push fatigue, then enrolled passkeys and rogue MFA devices to retain access.
  • The group downloaded cloud files, shared data externally, initiated a tenant-wide Customer Takeout export, and queried or deleted security alerts.
  • In the 2026 intrusion, COLD RELIC allegedly impersonated an employee from the earlier victim over a secure messaging app and sent phishing links targeting Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens.
  • The group used stolen rosters, contact lists and other organizational data to create credible pretexts for targeting people in victims’ professional networks.
  • GTIG recommends phishing-resistant MFA, monitoring new passkey and device enrollments, detecting residential-proxy logons and bulk downloads, and revoking sessions and OAuth access during remediation.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • COLD RELIC used phishing links and impersonated employees or professional contacts to establish trusted pretexts and steal credentials and authentication tokens.
  • Operators used stolen credentials with MFA push-notification fatigue; after a user approved a request, they registered new MFA devices and passkeys to maintain access.
  • Residential proxies located near victims were used for authentication, helping the activity blend with expected locations.
  • Compromised accounts were used for OAuth email synchronization, bulk cloud-drive downloads, mass external file sharing, and tenant-wide data export.
  • Operators queried security and audit logs and modified or deleted alert notifications to reduce visibility and remove forensic evidence.
Defensive Notes
  • Use phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2/WebAuthn security keys; monitor and restrict passkey and MFA-device registrations, especially for administrative accounts.
  • When responding to suspected compromise, reset passwords and revoke active sessions, refresh tokens, OAuth grants, unauthorized passkeys, backup codes, and MFA devices.
  • Monitor for MFA fatigue patterns, residential-proxy logons, unusual privileged-account ASN changes, and unexpected OAuth grants to email clients.
  • Alert on tenant-wide exports, unusual bulk downloads or external file sharing, directory exports, audit-log queries, and modification or deletion of security alerts.
  • Apply cloud-storage DLP policies to detect or restrict sensitive files and mass external sharing; avoid storing credentials and other secrets in cloud storage.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1078.004 · Cloud AccountsCOLD RELIC authenticated with stolen cloud-account credentials and used MFA backup codes for continued access.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryOperators queried administrative security, access, and audit logs to assess defensive visibility.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryCOLD RELIC searched cloud-drive files and directories for credentials, archives, personnel information, and other collection targets.T1087.004 · Cloud AccountCOLD RELIC exported full employee lists from the compromised organization's cloud tenant.T1098.005 · Device RegistrationOperators registered rogue MFA devices and passkeys to retain access to compromised accounts.T1114.002 · Remote Email CollectionCOLD RELIC synchronized victim email to external email clients using OAuth.T1119 · Automated CollectionCOLD RELIC initiated a domain-wide Customer Takeout export and collected large volumes of organizational data.T1528 · Steal Application Access TokenThe phishing links were designed to steal authentication tokens for Entra ID.T1530 · Data from Cloud StorageOperators downloaded files in bulk from compromised users' cloud drives and the victim organization's cloud storage.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesOperators searched for credentials and accessed documents containing credentials stored in cloud files.T1562.008 · Disable or Modify Cloud LogsOperators viewed, modified, and deleted Alert Center notifications and queried security logs to impair visibility and remove evidence.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageCOLD RELIC exfiltrated files by mass-sharing them to an attacker-operated email account.T1621 · Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationThe article reports MFA push-notification fatigue, with repeated requests preceding a victim's approval.

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