Mandiant Details COLD RELIC’s Cross-Cloud Espionage and Impersonation Tactics

Summary
Mandiant links two US-organization intrusions to Russian group COLD RELIC, detailing stolen-pretext phishing, cloud identity abuse, MFA persistence and data theft, with detection and hardening guidance.
Key points
- Mandiant investigated intrusions at two US-based organizations in late 2025 and 2026; phishing parameters and impersonation pretexts indicated the later targeting likely drew on data from the earlier compromise.
- In the 2025 intrusion, COLD RELIC used stolen Super Admin credentials and MFA push fatigue, then enrolled passkeys and rogue MFA devices to retain access.
- The group downloaded cloud files, shared data externally, initiated a tenant-wide Customer Takeout export, and queried or deleted security alerts.
- In the 2026 intrusion, COLD RELIC allegedly impersonated an employee from the earlier victim over a secure messaging app and sent phishing links targeting Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens.
- The group used stolen rosters, contact lists and other organizational data to create credible pretexts for targeting people in victims’ professional networks.
- GTIG recommends phishing-resistant MFA, monitoring new passkey and device enrollments, detecting residential-proxy logons and bulk downloads, and revoking sessions and OAuth access during remediation.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- COLD RELIC used phishing links and impersonated employees or professional contacts to establish trusted pretexts and steal credentials and authentication tokens.
- Operators used stolen credentials with MFA push-notification fatigue; after a user approved a request, they registered new MFA devices and passkeys to maintain access.
- Residential proxies located near victims were used for authentication, helping the activity blend with expected locations.
- Compromised accounts were used for OAuth email synchronization, bulk cloud-drive downloads, mass external file sharing, and tenant-wide data export.
- Operators queried security and audit logs and modified or deleted alert notifications to reduce visibility and remove forensic evidence.
- Defensive Notes
- Use phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2/WebAuthn security keys; monitor and restrict passkey and MFA-device registrations, especially for administrative accounts.
- When responding to suspected compromise, reset passwords and revoke active sessions, refresh tokens, OAuth grants, unauthorized passkeys, backup codes, and MFA devices.
- Monitor for MFA fatigue patterns, residential-proxy logons, unusual privileged-account ASN changes, and unexpected OAuth grants to email clients.
- Alert on tenant-wide exports, unusual bulk downloads or external file sharing, directory exports, audit-log queries, and modification or deletion of security alerts.
- Apply cloud-storage DLP policies to detect or restrict sensitive files and mass external sharing; avoid storing credentials and other secrets in cloud storage.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1078.004 · Cloud AccountsCOLD RELIC authenticated with stolen cloud-account credentials and used MFA backup codes for continued access.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryOperators queried administrative security, access, and audit logs to assess defensive visibility.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryCOLD RELIC searched cloud-drive files and directories for credentials, archives, personnel information, and other collection targets.T1087.004 · Cloud AccountCOLD RELIC exported full employee lists from the compromised organization's cloud tenant.T1098.005 · Device RegistrationOperators registered rogue MFA devices and passkeys to retain access to compromised accounts.T1114.002 · Remote Email CollectionCOLD RELIC synchronized victim email to external email clients using OAuth.T1119 · Automated CollectionCOLD RELIC initiated a domain-wide Customer Takeout export and collected large volumes of organizational data.T1528 · Steal Application Access TokenThe phishing links were designed to steal authentication tokens for Entra ID.T1530 · Data from Cloud StorageOperators downloaded files in bulk from compromised users' cloud drives and the victim organization's cloud storage.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesOperators searched for credentials and accessed documents containing credentials stored in cloud files.T1562.008 · Disable or Modify Cloud LogsOperators viewed, modified, and deleted Alert Center notifications and queried security logs to impair visibility and remove evidence.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageCOLD RELIC exfiltrated files by mass-sharing them to an attacker-operated email account.T1621 · Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationThe article reports MFA push-notification fatigue, with repeated requests preceding a victim's approval.
Threat Actors
COLD RELICThe article attributes linked phishing, cloud-account compromises, data theft, and follow-on targeting to this Russian state-sponsored group. The DOJ assessed that it operates within Russia's FSB.Star BlizzardThe article identifies Star Blizzard as another name for COLD RELIC, the group linked to the reported phishing, cloud compromises, and data theft.
Vendors
GoogleWhile Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has tracked and disrupted COLD RELIC phishing campaigns since 2015, recent Mandiant incident response investigations have uncovered critical new insights into the group’sMicrosoftGTIG observed COLD RELIC operators compromise a Microsoft Entra ID user account of a US-based organization that used Entra ID as its federated single sign-on (SSO) identity provider for Google Workspace.
Products
Google DriveCross-Cloud DLP Policies: Deploy Data Loss Prevention (DLP) rules across cloud storage (Google Drive, OneDrive, SharePoint) to alert on documents containing sensitive terms (e.g., passwords, roster, .pst) or to restrictGoogle WorkspaceCOLD RELIC also exported full employee lists and initiated a domain-wide data export via Google Workspace Customer Takeout using Super Admin privileges.Microsoft Entra IDGTIG observed COLD RELIC operators compromise a Microsoft Entra ID user account of a US-based organization that used Entra ID as its federated single sign-on (SSO) identity provider for Google Workspace.
Countries
RussiaCOLD RELIC is a Russian state-sponsored threat group that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has assessed operates within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).United StatesMost recently, Mandiant investigated a 2026 compromise at a US-based organization where COLD RELIC directly weaponized data, the corporate staff directory, and identities stolen during a late-2025 compromise, which
Industries
Defenseit has been highly successful at compromising high-value targets (including government officials, defense contractors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across Europe and North America) while maintainingGovernmentcampaigns with the aim to gain access to information of strategic or political relevance to the Russian government, as well as to leverage compromised access to target compromised individuals’ broader social andNon-governmental organizationsat compromising high-value targets (including government officials, defense contractors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across Europe and North America) while maintaining a consistent operational tempo.
