Fake AI Tools Use Malicious Installers, Command-Pasting Lures, and Fake Sign-Ins to Target Businesses

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Summary

ANY.RUN analyzed 1,258 fake-AI campaign sandbox sessions from April to October 2026. Attackers used counterfeit installers, command-pasting lures, and fake sign-ins to deliver stealers, RATs, and steal browser sessions and business credentials.

Key points

  • Claude and ChatGPT impersonation accounted for 81% of the analyzed sessions; 45% involved victims pasting commands into a shell or Run dialog.
  • Lures appeared in search results, ads, shared AI chats, and fake download pages, sometimes hosted on trusted platforms or legitimate AI services.
  • Observed chains used PowerShell, curl, mshta.exe, trojanized installers, and scheduled tasks to deliver infostealers, RATs, or credential-phishing pages.
  • One installer campaign launched headless Edge to collect browser cookies and extension data, potentially allowing access to active sessions without a new password or MFA prompt.
  • The US ranked second among submitter countries overall and first in the analyzed fake Claude download and ChatGPT-themed campaign groups; these figures track sandbox submissions, not confirmed victims.
  • Lure domains rotated, while command patterns, backend paths, scheduled-task names, and post-execution behavior remained useful hunting signals.
  • The article recommends approved software catalogs, restricting risky execution tools for standard users, and behavior-based investigation and detection.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Fake AI download pages and install documentation lure users into pasting attacker-supplied commands into PowerShell, Terminal, or the Windows Run dialog.
  • ClickFix pages instruct users to run commands that invoke mshta.exe and encoded PowerShell to retrieve and execute later stages.
  • Trojanized installers pose as AI software; one observed chain installs a genuine Claude installer as a decoy while a scheduled task launches headless Edge to collect browser cookies, extension data, and keystrokes.
  • Shared AI chats, custom GPTs, and artifacts direct users to attacker-controlled domains or command-based payload delivery.
  • Fake advertising invitations use browser-in-the-browser windows that imitate Google sign-in to phish business credentials.
  • Fake AI-named files were reported carrying Aura Stealer, AsyncRAT, and Quasar RAT.
Defensive Notes
  • Publish an approved AI software catalog with official download sources and distribute software through managed installation channels.
  • Restrict mshta.exe, wscript.exe, and unsigned PowerShell for standard users using controls such as AppLocker, WDAC, and attack surface reduction rules.
  • Train users to verify installation commands against vendors’ official documentation rather than copying them from search results, advertisements, shared chats, or unfamiliar pages.
  • Hunt for behavioral indicators such as pasted-command execution, recurring staging paths and backend APIs, scheduled tasks, and headless browsers with remote debugging enabled.
  • Use behavioral analysis and current threat intelligence to investigate suspicious files, URLs, and activity as lure domains rotate.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINbeta-manus[.]comFake Manus advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINbudgetforge[.]aiFake AI budgeting-tool lure associated with the installer kit’s registration call.
DOMAINcladesktop-apps[.]comFake Claude download-page domain used in the ClickFix campaign.
DOMAINclaubecode[.]co[.]comTyposquatted redirector used to lead users to an InstallFix lure.
DOMAINclaude-advertisement[.]comFake Claude advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINclaude-ai[.]usFake Claude download page distributing a trojanized installer.
DOMAINclaude-setup[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating Claude installation material.
DOMAINclaudecode[.]us[.]comFake Claude Code installation-guide domain used as an InstallFix lure.
DOMAINclaudedev[.]netFake Claude page using a Cloudflare-check lure to lead to a loader chain.
DOMAINclaudgodic[.]comFake Claude download-page domain used as a campaign lure.
DOMAINcode-desktop[.]comFake AI download-page domain used as a campaign lure.
DOMAINcode-setup[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating an AI coding-tool installation source.
DOMAINcodex-console[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating Codex.
DOMAINcopilotcli[.]co[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating GitHub Copilot CLI.
DOMAINgemini-beta-invitations[.]comFake Gemini advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINgemini-beta-invites[.]comFake Gemini advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINinstall-copilot[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating GitHub Copilot CLI.
DOMAINkafeprog7[.]comInstallFix staging domain serving further payload stages.
DOMAINlast-version[.]install-2026[.]comAttacker-controlled HTA staging host used by fake Claude download pages.
DOMAINmeta-claude[.]comFake Claude advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINmonday-brief-claude[.]comFake Claude advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINnucleflowers[.]xyzCookie-exfiltration host receiving stolen browser cookies and related data.
DOMAINopenai-backup[.]oneAttacker-controlled fake backup domain linked from a shared ChatGPT chat.
DOMAINopenclaw-setup[.]netInstallFix lure domain impersonating OpenClaw.
DOMAINopenclow[.]co[.]comTyposquatted redirector used to lead users to an InstallFix lure.
DOMAINparipassuventures[.]comCompromised-site host serving the MacSync Stealer payload through a curl path.
DOMAINperplexity-beta-ads[.]comFake Perplexity advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing.
DOMAINrefract3[.]comInstallFix staging domain serving a follow-on command and further payload stages.
DOMAINsetup-code[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating an AI coding-tool installation source.
DOMAINsetup-ollama[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating Ollama.
DOMAINstat30ffooo[.]xyzStager registration and command server for the trojanized-installer activity.
DOMAINsys-tools[.]cfdAura Stealer command-and-control and data-exfiltration domain.
DOMAINuse-code[.]comInstallFix lure domain impersonating an AI coding-tool installation source.
HOSTNAMEclaudeadsback-production-67c1[.]up[.]railway[.]appBackend host for the fake AI advertising-invitation kit, hosted on an abused platform.
HOSTNAMEhelp[.]xenngypt[.]comInstallFix staging host serving further payload stages.
HOSTNAMEmbackend-mdye[.]onrender[.]comBackend host for the fake AI advertising-invitation kit, hosted on an abused platform.
SHA256882b1aa5432509df9b1ac29b6f987a5dd70c8f46009237de956275a58536f470Hash of the trojanized Claude_x64-setup.exe installer from a GitHub release.
SHA256e86f7ba0413a3a4b1d7e1a275b3d1ef62345c9d3fd761635ff188119b8122c85Hash of claude-code.exe, identified as Aura Stealer posing as Claude Code.
URLhxxps[:]//chatgpt[.]com/s/t_6a80bc61c434819190c3eae5932307e8Specific shared ChatGPT chat identified as a lure linking to an attacker-controlled fake backup domain.
URLhxxps[:]//last-version[.]install-2026[.]com/appHTA URL fetched by mshta.exe in the fake Claude download-page attack chain.

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