Fake AI Tools Use Malicious Installers, Command-Pasting Lures, and Fake Sign-Ins to Target Businesses

Summary
ANY.RUN analyzed 1,258 fake-AI campaign sandbox sessions from April to October 2026. Attackers used counterfeit installers, command-pasting lures, and fake sign-ins to deliver stealers, RATs, and steal browser sessions and business credentials.
Key points
- Claude and ChatGPT impersonation accounted for 81% of the analyzed sessions; 45% involved victims pasting commands into a shell or Run dialog.
- Lures appeared in search results, ads, shared AI chats, and fake download pages, sometimes hosted on trusted platforms or legitimate AI services.
- Observed chains used PowerShell, curl, mshta.exe, trojanized installers, and scheduled tasks to deliver infostealers, RATs, or credential-phishing pages.
- One installer campaign launched headless Edge to collect browser cookies and extension data, potentially allowing access to active sessions without a new password or MFA prompt.
- The US ranked second among submitter countries overall and first in the analyzed fake Claude download and ChatGPT-themed campaign groups; these figures track sandbox submissions, not confirmed victims.
- Lure domains rotated, while command patterns, backend paths, scheduled-task names, and post-execution behavior remained useful hunting signals.
- The article recommends approved software catalogs, restricting risky execution tools for standard users, and behavior-based investigation and detection.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Fake AI download pages and install documentation lure users into pasting attacker-supplied commands into PowerShell, Terminal, or the Windows Run dialog.
- ClickFix pages instruct users to run commands that invoke mshta.exe and encoded PowerShell to retrieve and execute later stages.
- Trojanized installers pose as AI software; one observed chain installs a genuine Claude installer as a decoy while a scheduled task launches headless Edge to collect browser cookies, extension data, and keystrokes.
- Shared AI chats, custom GPTs, and artifacts direct users to attacker-controlled domains or command-based payload delivery.
- Fake advertising invitations use browser-in-the-browser windows that imitate Google sign-in to phish business credentials.
- Fake AI-named files were reported carrying Aura Stealer, AsyncRAT, and Quasar RAT.
- Defensive Notes
- Publish an approved AI software catalog with official download sources and distribute software through managed installation channels.
- Restrict mshta.exe, wscript.exe, and unsigned PowerShell for standard users using controls such as AppLocker, WDAC, and attack surface reduction rules.
- Train users to verify installation commands against vendors’ official documentation rather than copying them from search results, advertisements, shared chats, or unfamiliar pages.
- Hunt for behavioral indicators such as pasted-command execution, recurring staging paths and backend APIs, scheduled tasks, and headless browsers with remote debugging enabled.
- Use behavioral analysis and current threat intelligence to investigate suspicious files, URLs, and activity as lure domains rotate.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | beta-manus[.]com | Fake Manus advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | budgetforge[.]ai | Fake AI budgeting-tool lure associated with the installer kit’s registration call. |
| DOMAIN | cladesktop-apps[.]com | Fake Claude download-page domain used in the ClickFix campaign. |
| DOMAIN | claubecode[.]co[.]com | Typosquatted redirector used to lead users to an InstallFix lure. |
| DOMAIN | claude-advertisement[.]com | Fake Claude advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | claude-ai[.]us | Fake Claude download page distributing a trojanized installer. |
| DOMAIN | claude-setup[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating Claude installation material. |
| DOMAIN | claudecode[.]us[.]com | Fake Claude Code installation-guide domain used as an InstallFix lure. |
| DOMAIN | claudedev[.]net | Fake Claude page using a Cloudflare-check lure to lead to a loader chain. |
| DOMAIN | claudgodic[.]com | Fake Claude download-page domain used as a campaign lure. |
| DOMAIN | code-desktop[.]com | Fake AI download-page domain used as a campaign lure. |
| DOMAIN | code-setup[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating an AI coding-tool installation source. |
| DOMAIN | codex-console[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating Codex. |
| DOMAIN | copilotcli[.]co[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating GitHub Copilot CLI. |
| DOMAIN | gemini-beta-invitations[.]com | Fake Gemini advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | gemini-beta-invites[.]com | Fake Gemini advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | install-copilot[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating GitHub Copilot CLI. |
| DOMAIN | kafeprog7[.]com | InstallFix staging domain serving further payload stages. |
| DOMAIN | last-version[.]install-2026[.]com | Attacker-controlled HTA staging host used by fake Claude download pages. |
| DOMAIN | meta-claude[.]com | Fake Claude advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | monday-brief-claude[.]com | Fake Claude advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | nucleflowers[.]xyz | Cookie-exfiltration host receiving stolen browser cookies and related data. |
| DOMAIN | openai-backup[.]one | Attacker-controlled fake backup domain linked from a shared ChatGPT chat. |
| DOMAIN | openclaw-setup[.]net | InstallFix lure domain impersonating OpenClaw. |
| DOMAIN | openclow[.]co[.]com | Typosquatted redirector used to lead users to an InstallFix lure. |
| DOMAIN | paripassuventures[.]com | Compromised-site host serving the MacSync Stealer payload through a curl path. |
| DOMAIN | perplexity-beta-ads[.]com | Fake Perplexity advertising invitation used in browser-in-the-browser credential phishing. |
| DOMAIN | refract3[.]com | InstallFix staging domain serving a follow-on command and further payload stages. |
| DOMAIN | setup-code[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating an AI coding-tool installation source. |
| DOMAIN | setup-ollama[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating Ollama. |
| DOMAIN | stat30ffooo[.]xyz | Stager registration and command server for the trojanized-installer activity. |
| DOMAIN | sys-tools[.]cfd | Aura Stealer command-and-control and data-exfiltration domain. |
| DOMAIN | use-code[.]com | InstallFix lure domain impersonating an AI coding-tool installation source. |
| HOSTNAME | claudeadsback-production-67c1[.]up[.]railway[.]app | Backend host for the fake AI advertising-invitation kit, hosted on an abused platform. |
| HOSTNAME | help[.]xenngypt[.]com | InstallFix staging host serving further payload stages. |
| HOSTNAME | mbackend-mdye[.]onrender[.]com | Backend host for the fake AI advertising-invitation kit, hosted on an abused platform. |
| SHA256 | 882b1aa5432509df9b1ac29b6f987a5dd70c8f46009237de956275a58536f470 | Hash of the trojanized Claude_x64-setup.exe installer from a GitHub release. |
| SHA256 | e86f7ba0413a3a4b1d7e1a275b3d1ef62345c9d3fd761635ff188119b8122c85 | Hash of claude-code.exe, identified as Aura Stealer posing as Claude Code. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//chatgpt[.]com/s/t_6a80bc61c434819190c3eae5932307e8 | Specific shared ChatGPT chat identified as a lure linking to an attacker-controlled fake backup domain. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//last-version[.]install-2026[.]com/app | HTA URL fetched by mshta.exe in the fake Claude download-page attack chain. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskThe trojanized installer creates the mseupdate scheduled task to launch headless Edge at logon.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe chains use irm … | iex commands and an encoded PowerShell stage.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe claude.ai artifact instructs users to run a curl command in Terminal.T1204.002 · Malicious FileA trojanized Claude_x64-setup.exe installer was downloaded from a GitHub release and run by the victim.T1204.004 · Malicious Copy and PasteInstallFix and ClickFix pages instruct victims to paste commands into Run, PowerShell, or Terminal.T1218.005 · Mshtamshta.exe fetches an HTA from the fake Claude campaign’s staging host.T1218.007 · MsiexecThe custom GPT chain silently installs an MSI using msiexec.exe.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieThe trojanized-installer chain posts stolen browser cookies to the attacker’s server.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersThe article reports Aura Stealer exfiltration from a fake claude-code.exe.T1583.008 · MalvertisingThe article reports fake download pages and a claude.ai artifact promoted through Google Ads.T1608.006 · SEO PoisoningA Bing result for “claude code docs” led to the fake claudecode[.]us[.]com installation guide.
Malware
AsyncRATfiles named after Copilot that carried AsyncRAT (8 analyses);AURA Stealera fake claude-code.exe that turned out to be Aura Stealer, which checked in and exfiltrated data to sys-tools[.]cfd;HIJACKLOADERIts PowerShell stage leads to a loader chain likely belonging to HijackLoader: sandbox sessions that share its download host trigger HijackLoader command-and-control detections.MacSync StealerSessions that requested that host between August 24 and September 3, 2026, received a payload detected as MacSync Stealer, in 8 of the 12 analyses.Quasar RATa grok.exe that carried Quasar RAT.
Products
ChatGPTHomeMalware AnalysisFake AI Tools Put US Companies at Risk: Inside Counterfeit Claude, ChatGPT, and CopilotClaudeHomeMalware AnalysisFake AI Tools Put US Companies at Risk: Inside Counterfeit Claude, ChatGPT, and CopilotClaude CodeThe fake pages copy the install documentation of Claude Code, GitHub Copilot CLI, OpenAI Codex, Ollama, and OpenClaw, and swap the vendor’s domain in the one-liner for the attacker’s.CodexTogether they account for 81% of those analyses: Claude 601 (48%) and OpenAI ChatGPT and Codex 418 (33%), making widely adopted AI brands a recurring path into corporate environments.GeminiANY.RUN researchers tracked fake AI tool campaigns that impersonate Claude, ChatGPT, GitHub Copilot, Gemini, and other AI brands to plant infostealers, take over browser sessions, and phish business accounts.GitHub CopilotANY.RUN researchers tracked fake AI tool campaigns that impersonate Claude, ChatGPT, GitHub Copilot, Gemini, and other AI brands to plant infostealers, take over browser sessions, and phish business accounts.ManusClaude, ChatGPT, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Gemini, Ollama, OpenClaw, Perplexity, and Manus OllamaClaude, ChatGPT, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Gemini, Ollama, OpenClaw, Perplexity, and Manus OpenClawClaude, ChatGPT, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Gemini, Ollama, OpenClaw, Perplexity, and Manus PerplexityClaude, ChatGPT, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Gemini, Ollama, OpenClaw, Perplexity, and Manus
Countries
IndiaBetween April 15 and October 5, 2026, 1,258 public sandbox analyses were tied to these campaigns, and the USA was the second-largest source of submissions after India.United StatesBetween April 15 and October 5, 2026, 1,258 public sandbox analyses were tied to these campaigns, and the USA was the second-largest source of submissions after India.
Industries
ConsultingAmong US submitters, consulting stands out in the fake Claude Code installers, education in the ChatGPT-themed chains, and manufacturing across the CLI lures.EducationAmong US submitters, consulting stands out in the fake Claude Code installers, education in the ChatGPT-themed chains, and manufacturing across the CLI lures.ManufacturingAmong US submitters, consulting stands out in the fake Claude Code installers, education in the ChatGPT-themed chains, and manufacturing across the CLI lures.