Fake Claude Code Google Ads Spread Malware to Windows and macOS

· Original article ↗

Summary

Bitdefender researchers describe a malicious Google Ads campaign that led users to fake Claude Code instructions and malware: a Windows stealer and a macOS backdoor capable of remote shell access.

Key points

  • A malicious sponsored ad impersonated Claude Code and directed users to a fake documentation page hosted on a Squarespace subdomain.
  • The ClickFix instructions relied on victims copying and running commands; the campaign did not exploit a software vulnerability.
  • On Windows, the instructions used mshta.exe to download a payload that included stealer components.
  • On macOS, obfuscated Base64 commands downloaded and ran a Mach-O backdoor capable of spawning shells and executing remote commands.
  • Bitdefender says the Windows payloads are detected under several Trojan names, including Trojan.Stealer.GJ and Trojan.Stealer.GK.
  • Researchers believe attackers used a compromised advertiser account associated with a Malaysian company; Google has deactivated the account.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A malicious Google ad impersonated Claude Code and redirected users to a fake documentation page hosted on a Squarespace subdomain.
  • The fake page used ClickFix social engineering to persuade users to copy and run OS-specific installation commands.
  • On Windows, the command used mshta.exe to download and execute a payload containing an HTA file and executable component.
  • On macOS, an obfuscated command decoded and piped content into zsh; a subsequent script downloaded and launched a Mach-O backdoor.
Defensive Notes
  • Avoid sponsored results for software downloads and verify the domain carefully.
  • Do not execute installation commands unless you understand what they do.
  • Use a security solution capable of blocking these attempts.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA2563b4d3a59024f14cf1f07395afd6957be05d125e00ae8fdcea3a5dee1d8ab9dd3Hash listed by the article as an IOC for the campaign.
SHA256505b32ac2b6fffb5fac81d5bdc2e1e8581fc4196dfb01aee852216a3ad6ff47eHash listed by the article as an IOC for the campaign.
SHA256762fb099115d1917b6f673cc5c74a4b61962a64d640673aaf02566ca6a3dbfa4Hash listed by the article as an IOC for the campaign.
SHA25679cd21185c51a5bfe2cfebdc51e14b258d91549fc0e4e09b6939c2a8a1c5ac19Hash listed by the article as an IOC for the campaign.
SHA256a78e487995ab452c5990b4baff6a4fa485ae2798c2ddd13718c17eb641f11646Hash listed by the article as an IOC for the campaign.
SHA256eb4d9a0e4c483dc29ae8c4d31fafcd583c457923d3344745b5c7ab13abed4dc5Hash listed by the article as an IOC for the campaign.
URLhxxp[:]//code[.]claude[.]ai/download/URL displayed in the macOS command as a download lure and listed as a campaign IOC.
URLhxxps[:]//claude-code-cmd[.]squarespace[.]comFake Claude Code documentation page used in the malicious campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//download[.]active-version[.]com/claudeAttacker-used URL from which the Windows command downloads a payload.
URLhxxps[:]//wriconsult[.]com/n8n/updateAttacker-used URL serving the macOS Mach-O backdoor.

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