ClickFix Campaign Uses Spectrum-Themed Sites to Deliver AMOS to macOS Users

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Summary

Researchers detail a ClickFix campaign using Spectrum lookalike sites to steal macOS passwords and deliver AMOS. The campaign later shifted to malvertising fake Homebrew repositories.

Key points

  • The sites used user-agent checks to deliver different commands; the macOS command downloaded and immediately ran a shell script.
  • The script repeatedly prompted for the system password, validated it with dscl, saved it to /tmp/.pass, and used it to remove quarantine before running the payload.
  • The downloaded malware was identified as an Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) variant.
  • After disclosure, the operators shifted to malicious ads for counterfeit Homebrew repositories; repository changes replaced older command-and-control infrastructure.
  • Russian-language source-code comments suggest Russian-speaking operators, while inconsistent platform instructions indicate poorly assembled delivery infrastructure.
  • The researchers recommend user awareness training, restricting unsigned scripts with Gatekeeper or MDM policies, and hunting for password-prompt abuse and unusual sudo activity.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ClickFix delivery pages impersonating Spectrum used a clipboard-based command and instructions to persuade victims to execute it.
  • The delivery sites returned different commands based on the visitor's user agent: PowerShell for non-macOS users and a Bash command for macOS users.
  • The macOS script repeatedly prompted for the system password, validated it with dscl, saved it to /tmp/.pass, downloaded an AMOS payload, removed its quarantine attribute, and executed it.
  • The article reports that malicious advertisements for counterfeit Homebrew repositories were used to redirect developers to the attack.
Defensive Notes
  • Train users to recognize password-stealing tactics disguised as system verification prompts.
  • Enforce macOS endpoint hardening, including system integrity protections and restrictions on unsigned scripts through Gatekeeper and MDM policies.
  • Hunt for password-prompt abuse, unusual sudo activity, and the reported AMOS indicators.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINapplemacios[.]comCommand-and-control domain identified in the IOC table; hosted the reported macOS script and payload.
DOMAINbrewory[.]comCommand-and-control domain identified in the IOC table.
DOMAINcf-verifi[.]pages[.]devCommand-and-control domain identified in the IOC table; also served the reported Windows script.
DOMAINhomebrewrp[.]comCommand-and-control domain identified in the IOC table.
DOMAINpanel-spectrum[.]netClickFix delivery domain identified in the IOC table.
DOMAINrugme[.]catListed as a ClickFix indicator of a future attack.
DOMAINspectrum-ticket[.]netClickFix delivery domain identified in the IOC table.
MD56fd092d86235d7ae35c557523f493674MD5 hash identified as an AMOS variant.
MD5eaedee8fc9fe336bcde021bf243e332aMD5 hash identified as an AMOS variant.
URLhxxps[:]//applemacios[.]com/getrur/install[.]shMalicious script URL used to deliver the macOS infection sequence.
URLhxxps[:]//applemacios[.]com/getrur/updatePayload URL used by the macOS script to download the AMOS variant.
URLhxxps[:]//cf-verifi[.]pages[.]dev/i[.]txtScript download URL associated with the reported Windows delivery command.

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