eSentire Traces ROMULUS ClickFix Intrusion to Warden Loader

Summary
eSentire's TRU details a ROMULUS ClickFix intrusion that used a clipboard-pasted command and malicious MSI to stage PowerShell and shellcode, deploy LegionLoader, and inject Warden Loader, a precursor to Warden Stealer; the affected host was isolated.
Key points
- The ROMULUS ClickFix lure instructed the victim to paste a clipboard-copied command that downloaded a malicious MSI and launched it with msiexec.exe.
- The MSI ran embedded VBScript and obfuscated PowerShell that decrypted payloads and used msi.dll APIs to extract MSI streams; embedded C# code reflectively loaded a PE payload.
- A Work Object Loader abused a threadpool work callback to execute shellcode, which checked display-adapter strings and an IP reputation service for sandbox-evasion signals before loading LegionLoader.
- LegionLoader used CRC32-based module and API hashing and RC4-encrypted JSON C2 communications, including registration through nfront.php and task-result reporting through nback.php.
- LegionLoader downloaded Warden Loader and injected it through process hollowing into ilasm.exe; Warden Loader is described as a precursor to Warden Stealer.
- eSentire says its SOC isolated the affected host and assisted with remediation; the article also outlines detection opportunities and defensive recommendations.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- A ROMULUS ClickFix lure copied a command to the victim’s clipboard and instructed them to open Command Prompt through the Windows Run Prompt and paste it. The command downloaded and silently launched a malicious MSI.
- The MSI ran an embedded VBScript that wrote an obfuscated PowerShell stage. PowerShell extracted encrypted MSI streams, decrypted an embedded payload, and reflectively loaded the next stage.
- The Work Object Loader decrypted shellcode and executed it through a threadpool work-object callback. The shellcode checked display-adapter names and queried IPInfo to detect hosting-associated external IP addresses before loading LegionLoader.
- LegionLoader registered with its C2 over HTTP POST using RC4-encrypted, Base64-encoded data, retrieved tasking, and downloaded Warden Loader.
- Warden Loader used process hollowing to replace the image in a suspended ilasm.exe process with its payload.
- Defensive Notes
- Monitor suspicious use of msi.dll APIs originating from high-risk processes such as PowerShell, MSI Binary-stream extraction, and AES-decrypted embedded payloads.
- Hunt for work-object callback abuse, anti-sandbox checks involving display adapters or hosting-associated IP checks, LegionLoader HTTP C2 traffic using nfront.php and nback.php, and process hollowing into ilasm.exe.
- The article recommends disabling the Windows Run Prompt through Group Policy and providing phishing and security awareness training.
- The article recommends 24/7 MDR; at minimum, it recommends using NGAV or EDR to detect and contain threats.
- eSentire’s Threat Response Unit reports that it isolated the affected host, assisted with remediation, and is monitoring LegionLoader and Warden Loader campaigns while developing detection content.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | apapg[.]com | Listed as a LegionLoader download domain. |
| DOMAIN | benderoflight[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | domae-trs[.]club | Identified in the article’s IOC table as a Warden Stealer C2 domain. |
| DOMAIN | feidaindy[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | gemscocl[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | hflubfg[.]com | Identified in the article’s IOC table as a LegionLoader C2 domain. |
| DOMAIN | nsgggg[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | redjaxfire[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | ruthaiv[.]com | Listed as a LegionLoader download domain. |
| DOMAIN | scridea[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | shoeshowshoes[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | smashshape[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | totebagsforwork[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | uoverlazyt[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | yugernaut[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| DOMAIN | zgrongbo[.]com | LegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified. |
| IPV4 | 23[.]94[.]252[.]153 | Dropper C2 host identified as hosting the S758.msi payload. |
| SHA256 | 22dea422c8056e58e315f926da1d131619c2638da9a550b31cb1d24242c689e4 | SHA-256 of the LegionLoader payload. |
| SHA256 | 2dc20037fe0ec71307740dee1f58734cdab7ff7bcff3259f862b2d2a6eca2a04 | SHA-256 of the Work Object Loader PE. |
| SHA256 | 38e8f4c4432cca420a9a52f8b97fd533736665d51fe06030f40e1bbdf3067643 | SHA-256 of the encrypted Work Object Loader stream in the MSI stream ArrayImg2000. |
| SHA256 | 4c12847c105b764161a7455820bb2da157f3c6b06472c359cda86578d966bbbf | SHA-256 of the shellcode that loads LegionLoader and performs anti-sandbox checks. |
| SHA256 | 75a43ad9bb6d28195c0333e5f0fd287a75061816a5c11c7a1c3ef7b3c5b86a9c | SHA-256 of the RC4-encrypted Warden Loader payload named 3.bin. |
| SHA256 | 79094cbf6ee454511610cfe62cc75601fc01c0451ed8211aad54c0e2e6c4ab29 | SHA-256 of the final deobfuscated PowerShell stage. |
| SHA256 | 8b90a534c103141c76bb9a35bd23b89393b17660801d1316569ed7b98e2c1900 | SHA-256 of the PowerShell script embedded in the MSI stream MenuParallel2380. |
| SHA256 | b3b75f6802b189de6fdac7d6c786944b95c2f9cf44c74a1f351fd40ac33fd5a2 | SHA-256 of the VBScript embedded in the MSI stream IntInteger2266. |
| SHA256 | c4e12c7790006bd1585b55e546f3cf68e5c066efc03cf51148d29751a486b1c0 | SHA-256 of the embedded C# MSI stream extractor. |
| SHA256 | e1ca462ee6ca141ed4cdba032dc8b2515bc8f5e0c639d3f6f642b94a7053e194 | SHA-256 of the decrypted Warden Loader payload named 3.bin. |
| SHA256 | f11f84b200979d6393850b00fac3ec0d8c26dd227611af750be79a0544236bd2 | SHA-256 of the embedded C# reflective injector. |
| SHA256 | f817a4763ad5469fc436db68ca0fccf337d39fdc30b77341b3600f7f4123fc87 | SHA-256 of S758.msi, the malicious MSI stager. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//392101017/84719 | Malicious MSI download URL in the ClickFix command; its decimal-formatted host corresponds to 23.94.252[.]153. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe article describes obfuscated PowerShell and AES-encrypted embedded payloads across multiple stages.T1055.012 · Process HollowingWarden Loader injected its payload by hollowing the suspended ilasm.exe process.T1059.001 · PowerShellAn obfuscated PowerShell stage extracted MSI streams, decrypted payloads, and loaded the next stage.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellThe pasted command used cmd /c to run curl.exe and msiexec.exe.T1059.005 · Visual BasicThe MSI custom action executed an embedded VBScript that extracted and launched the next stage.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsLegionLoader used HTTP POST requests for C2 registration and task results through nfront.php and nback.php.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe ClickFix command downloaded the MSI, and LegionLoader later downloaded Warden Loader.T1132.001 · Standard EncodingLegionLoader RC4-encrypted its C2 registration data and Base64-encoded the result before sending it.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe scripts and loaders decrypted AES-encrypted MSI streams and shellcode to recover executable payloads.T1204.004 · Malicious Copy and PasteThe ROMULUS ClickFix lure copied a command to the victim’s clipboard and instructed them to paste it into Command Prompt.T1218.007 · MsiexecThe victim’s command launched the downloaded malicious MSI using msiexec.exe.T1497.001 · System ChecksThe shellcode checked display-adapter names associated with virtual machines and queried whether the external IP was classified as hosting.T1620 · Reflective Code LoadingThe C# loader mapped and executed a decrypted PE in memory, and the shellcode reflectively loaded LegionLoader.
Malware
LegionLoaderstaging, PowerShell and C# payload extraction, work object callback abuse, shellcode execution, LegionLoader deployment, and the eventual delivery of Warden Loader, the precursor to Warden Stealer.Warden Loaderobject callback abuse, shellcode execution, LegionLoader deployment, and the eventual delivery of Warden Loader, the precursor to Warden Stealer.Warden Stealerexecution, LegionLoader deployment, and the eventual delivery of Warden Loader, the precursor to Warden Stealer.
Vendors
Products
Tools
010 EditorCONTEXT buffer after NtGetContextThread and before NtSetContextThread, then parsing it with a custom 010 Editor template, we can compare the thread context before and after modification. This shows that the RcxBinary Ninjathey represent a structure used by the shellcode to decrypt the next-stage LegionLoader payload. Binary Ninja disassembles this region as code due to its linear disassembly behavior. The call instruction pushesCyberChefFigure 10 - Embedded C# program that uses msi.dll for stream extraction from MSIUsing CyberChef, we extracted the AES key and IV, then decrypted the ciphertext to reveal the next-stage PE loader:MalcatIn the Property metadata in Malcat, we can see the MSI registers itself with the manufacturer, "Sare Level Corp", and product name, "SynerIntegration", identically to the ClickFix campaign documented on October 14 bymsitoolsFigure 5 - Listing in Malcat of binary streams in the MSIUsing the free tool msitools, the following commands extract each stream for further analysis:YARAThe following YARA rule detects LegionLoader in memory.
