eSentire Traces ROMULUS ClickFix Intrusion to Warden Loader

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Summary

eSentire's TRU details a ROMULUS ClickFix intrusion that used a clipboard-pasted command and malicious MSI to stage PowerShell and shellcode, deploy LegionLoader, and inject Warden Loader, a precursor to Warden Stealer; the affected host was isolated.

Key points

  • The ROMULUS ClickFix lure instructed the victim to paste a clipboard-copied command that downloaded a malicious MSI and launched it with msiexec.exe.
  • The MSI ran embedded VBScript and obfuscated PowerShell that decrypted payloads and used msi.dll APIs to extract MSI streams; embedded C# code reflectively loaded a PE payload.
  • A Work Object Loader abused a threadpool work callback to execute shellcode, which checked display-adapter strings and an IP reputation service for sandbox-evasion signals before loading LegionLoader.
  • LegionLoader used CRC32-based module and API hashing and RC4-encrypted JSON C2 communications, including registration through nfront.php and task-result reporting through nback.php.
  • LegionLoader downloaded Warden Loader and injected it through process hollowing into ilasm.exe; Warden Loader is described as a precursor to Warden Stealer.
  • eSentire says its SOC isolated the affected host and assisted with remediation; the article also outlines detection opportunities and defensive recommendations.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A ROMULUS ClickFix lure copied a command to the victim’s clipboard and instructed them to open Command Prompt through the Windows Run Prompt and paste it. The command downloaded and silently launched a malicious MSI.
  • The MSI ran an embedded VBScript that wrote an obfuscated PowerShell stage. PowerShell extracted encrypted MSI streams, decrypted an embedded payload, and reflectively loaded the next stage.
  • The Work Object Loader decrypted shellcode and executed it through a threadpool work-object callback. The shellcode checked display-adapter names and queried IPInfo to detect hosting-associated external IP addresses before loading LegionLoader.
  • LegionLoader registered with its C2 over HTTP POST using RC4-encrypted, Base64-encoded data, retrieved tasking, and downloaded Warden Loader.
  • Warden Loader used process hollowing to replace the image in a suspended ilasm.exe process with its payload.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor suspicious use of msi.dll APIs originating from high-risk processes such as PowerShell, MSI Binary-stream extraction, and AES-decrypted embedded payloads.
  • Hunt for work-object callback abuse, anti-sandbox checks involving display adapters or hosting-associated IP checks, LegionLoader HTTP C2 traffic using nfront.php and nback.php, and process hollowing into ilasm.exe.
  • The article recommends disabling the Windows Run Prompt through Group Policy and providing phishing and security awareness training.
  • The article recommends 24/7 MDR; at minimum, it recommends using NGAV or EDR to detect and contain threats.
  • eSentire’s Threat Response Unit reports that it isolated the affected host, assisted with remediation, and is monitoring LegionLoader and Warden Loader campaigns while developing detection content.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINapapg[.]comListed as a LegionLoader download domain.
DOMAINbenderoflight[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINdomae-trs[.]clubIdentified in the article’s IOC table as a Warden Stealer C2 domain.
DOMAINfeidaindy[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINgemscocl[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINhflubfg[.]comIdentified in the article’s IOC table as a LegionLoader C2 domain.
DOMAINnsgggg[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINredjaxfire[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINruthaiv[.]comListed as a LegionLoader download domain.
DOMAINscridea[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINshoeshowshoes[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINsmashshape[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINtotebagsforwork[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINuoverlazyt[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINyugernaut[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
DOMAINzgrongbo[.]comLegionLoader-associated domain in the article’s IOC list; its individual C2 or download role is not specified.
IPV423[.]94[.]252[.]153Dropper C2 host identified as hosting the S758.msi payload.
SHA25622dea422c8056e58e315f926da1d131619c2638da9a550b31cb1d24242c689e4SHA-256 of the LegionLoader payload.
SHA2562dc20037fe0ec71307740dee1f58734cdab7ff7bcff3259f862b2d2a6eca2a04SHA-256 of the Work Object Loader PE.
SHA25638e8f4c4432cca420a9a52f8b97fd533736665d51fe06030f40e1bbdf3067643SHA-256 of the encrypted Work Object Loader stream in the MSI stream ArrayImg2000.
SHA2564c12847c105b764161a7455820bb2da157f3c6b06472c359cda86578d966bbbfSHA-256 of the shellcode that loads LegionLoader and performs anti-sandbox checks.
SHA25675a43ad9bb6d28195c0333e5f0fd287a75061816a5c11c7a1c3ef7b3c5b86a9cSHA-256 of the RC4-encrypted Warden Loader payload named 3.bin.
SHA25679094cbf6ee454511610cfe62cc75601fc01c0451ed8211aad54c0e2e6c4ab29SHA-256 of the final deobfuscated PowerShell stage.
SHA2568b90a534c103141c76bb9a35bd23b89393b17660801d1316569ed7b98e2c1900SHA-256 of the PowerShell script embedded in the MSI stream MenuParallel2380.
SHA256b3b75f6802b189de6fdac7d6c786944b95c2f9cf44c74a1f351fd40ac33fd5a2SHA-256 of the VBScript embedded in the MSI stream IntInteger2266.
SHA256c4e12c7790006bd1585b55e546f3cf68e5c066efc03cf51148d29751a486b1c0SHA-256 of the embedded C# MSI stream extractor.
SHA256e1ca462ee6ca141ed4cdba032dc8b2515bc8f5e0c639d3f6f642b94a7053e194SHA-256 of the decrypted Warden Loader payload named 3.bin.
SHA256f11f84b200979d6393850b00fac3ec0d8c26dd227611af750be79a0544236bd2SHA-256 of the embedded C# reflective injector.
SHA256f817a4763ad5469fc436db68ca0fccf337d39fdc30b77341b3600f7f4123fc87SHA-256 of S758.msi, the malicious MSI stager.
URLhxxp[:]//392101017/84719Malicious MSI download URL in the ClickFix command; its decimal-formatted host corresponds to 23.94.252[.]153.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe article describes obfuscated PowerShell and AES-encrypted embedded payloads across multiple stages.T1055.012 · Process HollowingWarden Loader injected its payload by hollowing the suspended ilasm.exe process.T1059.001 · PowerShellAn obfuscated PowerShell stage extracted MSI streams, decrypted payloads, and loaded the next stage.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellThe pasted command used cmd /c to run curl.exe and msiexec.exe.T1059.005 · Visual BasicThe MSI custom action executed an embedded VBScript that extracted and launched the next stage.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsLegionLoader used HTTP POST requests for C2 registration and task results through nfront.php and nback.php.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe ClickFix command downloaded the MSI, and LegionLoader later downloaded Warden Loader.T1132.001 · Standard EncodingLegionLoader RC4-encrypted its C2 registration data and Base64-encoded the result before sending it.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe scripts and loaders decrypted AES-encrypted MSI streams and shellcode to recover executable payloads.T1204.004 · Malicious Copy and PasteThe ROMULUS ClickFix lure copied a command to the victim’s clipboard and instructed them to paste it into Command Prompt.T1218.007 · MsiexecThe victim’s command launched the downloaded malicious MSI using msiexec.exe.T1497.001 · System ChecksThe shellcode checked display-adapter names associated with virtual machines and queried whether the external IP was classified as hosting.T1620 · Reflective Code LoadingThe C# loader mapped and executed a decrypted PE in memory, and the shellcode reflectively loaded LegionLoader.

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