Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack Delivered Crypto Clippers, Card Skimmers and iOS Exploit Kits

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers found malicious code in 188 Optimizely snippets across 178 organizations, enabling crypto-address swaps, card theft and iOS exploit-page delivery. Optimizely says it fixed the exploited vulnerability; successful iPhone compromises remain unconfirmed.

Key points

  • A vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation allowed an unauthorized party to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects; researchers found 188 infected snippets across 178 organizations.
  • The payload swapped cryptocurrency addresses, collected payment-card details from site forms and uploaded some cookies and page screenshots; researchers traced about $7,150 in cryptocurrency receipts.
  • The iOS stage delivered Coruna exploit pages to iOS 13–17 and DarkSword pages to iOS 18; researchers confirmed delivery, not successful device compromise.
  • Affected-site code was cleaned by November 16, and Optimizely said it fixed the vulnerability, secured affected accounts and added protections.
  • In tests of 256 affected-organization hosts, only 24 blocked the payload, while 68 had no CSP; restrictive script-src and connect-src policies limited some activity.
  • The researchers recommend reviewing Optimizely project code and access, rotating credentials, tightening CSP settings and checking exposure of card data entered into first-party forms.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects’ Project JavaScript settings. The injected code was delivered through otherwise normal Optimizely snippets, including customer self-hosted copies built from the same project data.
  • The JavaScript loader fetched a shared payload, used an inline fallback when the C2 domain was blocked, and included a Base64-encoded C2 address decoded at runtime.
  • The payload replaced cryptocurrency addresses, skimmed payment-card data from first-party forms and POST requests, and sent collected data and page screenshots to attacker infrastructure.
  • Visitors using iPhones and iPads were routed through hidden iframes to iOS exploit pages matched to device versions. Researchers confirmed delivery of exploit pages, but no successful device compromise from this campaign has been publicly confirmed.
  • The earlier injector was also observed in scripts from other third-party providers and had previously appeared on Turkish websites through an SEO backlink panel script.
Defensive Notes
  • Optimizely reported that it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code from affected projects, secured affected user accounts, and added protections against unauthorized code delivery.
  • Optimizely customers should inspect Project JavaScript and experiment code for unexpected scripts, indicators, or atob() calls; review change history; confirm whether projects were modified; and rotate Optimizely credentials, API tokens, and integrations.
  • Treat card data entered into first-party forms during the exposure window and secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies as potentially exposed.
  • Restrict CSP script-src and connect-src directives, enable reporting, and remove strict-dynamic and unsafe-eval where feasible. Keep third-party tags off payment pages.
  • Visitors to affected sites should update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, verify cryptocurrency payment addresses, and review card statements.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN1688360[.]ccAttacker-controlled C2 and data-collection domain serving track.js, card.php, hit.php, and html2canvas.min.js.
DOMAIN1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuDomain listed as sharing certificates and IP addresses with the exploit kit infrastructure.
DOMAIN5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuAttacker-controlled iOS router domain serving boot.js.
DOMAINeil786npto9u5bq[.]icuAttacker-controlled iOS router domain hosting Coruna and iOS 26 pages.
DOMAINgm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuDomain listed as sharing certificates and IP addresses with the exploit kit infrastructure.
DOMAINios-hack[.]icuFallback C2 domain hard-coded in boot.js.
DOMAINje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuFallback C2 domain hard-coded in boot.js.
DOMAINl7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuAttacker-controlled Coruna telemetry domain used for POST /api/iptj.
DOMAINlinkforge[.]ccAttacker-controlled SEO panel script domain that carried the injector.
DOMAINp55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuDomain listed as sharing certificates and IP addresses with the exploit kit infrastructure.
DOMAINq1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icuFallback C2 domain hard-coded in boot.js.
DOMAINwebshell[.]lolAttacker-controlled injector domain serving get.js in the earlier wave.
IPV4136[.]113[.]106[.]136IP address hosting the attacker-controlled C2 domain 1688360[.]cc.
IPV434[.]87[.]36[.]58IP address hosting the attacker-controlled iOS router domain eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu.
IPV434[.]96[.]213[.]201IP address hosting the attacker-controlled iOS router domain 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu.
SHA256814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0fSHA-256 hash of a track.js payload build observed at 17:13 UTC.
SHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256 hash of the latest reported track.js payload build, observed at 17:57 UTC.
URLhxxps[:]//1688360[.]cc/track.jsMalicious payload URL fetched by the injected loader.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationOne loader variant Base64-encoded the C2 address and decoded it at runtime with atob(), which the article says defeats simple keyword searches.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe payload sent collected card data, cookies, page URLs, wallet-address details, and screenshots to attacker endpoints on the C2 server.T1059.007 · JavaScriptInjected JavaScript executed in visitors’ browsers, including code that loaded the payload and carried out address swapping and data collection.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe payload used html2canvas to capture a screenshot of the page and upload it to the attacker’s server.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseVisitors to affected websites received the injected script and, on iOS devices, were routed to exploit pages through hidden iframes.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainThe attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, turning the vendor’s snippet delivery into a malware-delivery channel.T1203 · Exploitation for Client ExecutionThe iOS routing script selected exploit chains for device versions, including Coruna for iOS 13–17 and DarkSword for iOS 18; successful compromise in this campaign was not confirmed.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieWhen address swaps occurred near payment or wallet wording, the payload uploaded readable non-HttpOnly cookies to the attacker’s server.T1565.002 · Transmitted Data ManipulationThe cryptocurrency clipper replaced valid wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses in page content, copied text, and outbound requests.

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