Optimizely Flaw Enabled Malware Injection Across 178 Organizations’ Websites

Summary
An attacker exploited an Optimizely Web Experimentation signup-flow flaw to inject malicious scripts into 188 snippets associated with 178 organizations. Static analysis found a cryptocurrency wallet clipper and an iOS loader; Optimizely patched the flaw and cleaned the
Key points
- Scott Helme identified 188 infected Optimizely snippets associated with 178 organizations, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, IKEA, and HSBC.
- Optimizely confirmed an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow by injecting code into the optional Project JavaScript field.
- The compromised snippets were served through Optimizely’s infrastructure; affected organizations did not need to have their own servers or websites compromised.
- Static analysis of a captured sample found encoded modules for a cryptocurrency wallet clipper and an iOS loader. The sample was not executed.
- The clipper scanned page content and intercepted copy events to replace matching cryptocurrency addresses; the iOS loader fetched boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu.
- The analyzed sample did not contain the card-skimming module described in later versions, and the relationship between its capture and 26 reported builds remains unconfirmed.
- Optimizely says it patched the flaw, removed injected code, revoked tokens, reset affected account access, and notified organizations. Report URI observed that all identified infected snippets had been cleaned by November 16.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- The attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Web Experimentation account signup flow and inserted malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript field, causing it to be served through Optimizely's infrastructure to visitors of affected customer websites.
- The injected JavaScript could load track.js from an attacker-controlled domain; an iOS-specific module loaded boot.js from a separate attacker-controlled domain.
- The wallet-clipper module scanned page text, inputs, and textareas, and intercepted copy events to replace recognized cryptocurrency addresses with hard-coded addresses.
- Defensive Notes
- Optimizely reported that it patched the signup-flow vulnerability, removed the injected code, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts, and notified the organizations involved.
- Report URI confirmed that all infected snippets in its observed set had been cleaned by November 16, 2026, at 23:11 UTC.
- Organizations should reconsider whether experimentation and personalization scripts need to run across entire sites, especially on payment, account, and other sensitive pages.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | 1688360[.]cc | Attacker-controlled domain serving the malicious track.js payload. |
| DOMAIN | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu | Attacker-controlled domain used by the iOS loader to load boot.js. |
| SHA256 | 1ec4245b3b303304ea24a89b3b2351b0f0c085087050f517d23dcba9694c165a | SHA-256 of the captured track.js sample; the article notes that other builds may have different hashes and behavior. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe sample stored module code as reversed base64 strings that its wrapper reversed and decoded at runtime.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe payload decoded JavaScript modules and executed decoded text using new Function(); the iOS loader also created a script element to load boot.js.T1115 · Clipboard DataThe wallet clipper intercepted copy events and modified copied text containing cryptocurrency addresses.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseVisitors to affected websites could receive malicious code through injected JavaScript served in the websites' Optimizely snippets.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainThe attacker compromised Optimizely's Web Experimentation signup flow and used the service to distribute malicious JavaScript through customer website snippets.
