Censys Details Supply-Chain Script Campaign Delivering iOS Exploits and Crypto Theft

Summary
Censys traced scripts injected into major sites that delivered Caishen iOS exploits to mobile visitors and card skimming, crypto-address replacement and page-data theft to desktops. Optimizely said it fixed the exploited vulnerability and removed the injected code.
Key points
- Censys said referrers confirmed that reported impacted sites included BBC, Zoom, CNN, DoorDash, Zillow, Fox News and GitLab.
- The injected track.js script was observed on at least 30 sites by November 16 and arrived through third-party scripts.
- The script collected payment-card details, replaced copied cryptocurrency addresses with attacker-controlled wallets, and sent page URLs, up to 8,000 characters of cookies and page screenshots to its operators.
- Mobile visitors were routed to an iOS exploit chain involving Caishen and payloads related to Coruna and DarkSword; desktop visitors received the skimmer, clipper and page-data theft functionality.
- Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to inject JavaScript into some customer projects; it reported fixing the vulnerability, removing the code and securing affected accounts. Censys and other reporting also linked the loader route to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly.
- Censys linked campaign infrastructure to MCH control panels, a Caishen backend and cryptocurrency energy-rental storefronts. It cautioned that the shared channel code is a kit default and does not identify a specific operator.
- The staging hosts and implant C2 went offline after disclosure, but Censys observed five new MCH panel hosts within about a day, and the kit vendor re-listed DarkSword-27.1 packages.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Malicious JavaScript was injected into customer projects through third-party scripts, including an Optimizely Experimentation project; reporting and Censys data also tied the loader route to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.
- The injected track.js script captured payment-form card details, replaced copied cryptocurrency addresses with attacker wallets, and sent page URLs, cookies, and browser-rendered screenshots to /hit.php.
- On iPhone, iPad, and touch-screen Mac user agents, the script loaded boot.js from payload domains and, on iOS 18.6 and earlier, an iframe from an additional domain to continue the exploitation chain.
- A separate get.js loader route added a script that fetched boot.js without checking the visitor's device type.
- Defensive Notes
- Optimizely stated that it fixed the Experimentation vulnerability, removed injected code, and secured affected accounts. Its containment guidance was to remove the injected project code.
- Hunt for the MCH 管控平台 and 财神iOS漏洞后台 page titles, the strings patch_domains and 引流配置, the default channel code 02111110, and randomly generated 15-character .icu domains serving boot.js.
- Do not treat channel code 02111110 alone as identifying a specific operator; the article says it is a hard-coded default used across more than a hundred deployments.
- Hudson Rock reported an embedded fallback payload that runs when the delivery host is blocked, so blocking that host alone may not remove the injected code.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | 0q0nf736x5lcbf3[.]icu | Generated domain resolving to the second service host. |
| DOMAIN | 1688360[.]cc | Campaign delivery domain serving track.js and hosting the /card.php and /hit.php collection endpoints. |
| DOMAIN | 3601688[.]cc | Listed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server. |
| DOMAIN | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu | Payload domain that served the iOS stage loader. |
| DOMAIN | 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu | Listed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server. |
| DOMAIN | admin[.]o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icu | Administrative-interface hostname resolving to the second service host. |
| DOMAIN | api[.]o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icu | Payload host named in the second deployment's injector block and serving boot.js. |
| DOMAIN | c2[.]jndft28[.]xyz | Hostname resolving to the second service host and identified by its label as command-and-control infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu | Payload domain loaded in a hidden iframe as part of the iOS staging flow. |
| DOMAIN | hhflwcie7xif2vo[.]icu | Generated domain listed on the TLS certificate of the second service deployment. |
| DOMAIN | hrufvf7xb3ntctm[.]icu | Listed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server. |
| DOMAIN | je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu | Campaign-associated domain serving the MCH control panel under the campaign certificate. |
| DOMAIN | land[.]jndft28[.]xyz | Landing-page hostname resolving to the second service host. |
| DOMAIN | mch[.]jndft28[.]xyz | Attacker-deployment hostname resolving to the second service host; its label corresponds to the MCH panel. |
| DOMAIN | namv99cyrwjsd1q[.]icu | Generated domain listed on the TLS certificate of the second service deployment. |
| DOMAIN | p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu | Third domain listed on the campaign server's certificate. |
| DOMAIN | ryf3e5p7rf8slv8[.]icu | Listed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server. |
| DOMAIN | sl6zirn8wu7kggn[.]icu | Listed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server. |
| DOMAIN | so23nhowskohk67[.]icu | Listed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server. |
| DOMAIN | webshell[.]lol | Loader-vendor domain that hosted get.js, the script used to direct browsers to the iOS stage loader. |
| IPV4 | 136[.]113[.]106[.]136 | Host associated with the campaign delivery domain and its malicious JavaScript and collection endpoints. |
| IPV4 | 34[.]124[.]226[.]157 | Second campaign staging server, observed with domains matching the first server's random-character naming pattern. |
| IPV4 | 34[.]96[.]213[.]201 | First staging server for the campaign; it served the iOS loader domain and campaign-associated MCH panel. |
| IPV4 | 64[.]83[.]19[.]114 | Service host tied to the campaign by matching kit configuration; it exposed the MCH panel, Caishen backend, storefronts, and stage loader. |
| IPV4 | 8[.]208[.]35[.]123 | Host for a second service deployment, serving the energy-rental landing page and generated injector block. |
| SHA256 | 123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737 | SHA-256 hash of the malicious loader's get.js file. |
| SHA256 | 2feaff817ad1214f0de69b6b25595e2a92320c77325eecdeed0ad87a675e71a7 | SHA-256 fingerprint of the delivery domain's certificate. |
| SHA256 | 5698e9c039ab875e195b0b39ed57b9c10d200b341ab98f6bc489407cf03f8eca | SHA-256 fingerprint of the campaign's payload certificate. |
| SHA256 | f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 | SHA-256 hash of the campaign's track.js payload, captured twice on November 16. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe script sent page URLs, up to 8,000 characters of cookies, and browser-rendered screenshots to the campaign's /hit.php endpoint.T1056.003 · Web Portal Capturetrack.js hooked payment-form submissions and input fields to collect card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe track.js and get.js payloads were JavaScript executed in visitors' browsers to run the skimmer, clipper, exfiltration, and staging logic.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe browser-side loader fetched boot.js and additional staged content from campaign payload domains.T1115 · Clipboard DataThe script replaced copied cryptocurrency addresses in visitors' clipboards with hardcoded wallet addresses.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseVisitors to affected websites received malicious scripts through embedded third-party libraries, triggering the browser-based attack chain.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainMalicious JavaScript was added to customer projects through third-party scripts; Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to inject code.T1203 · Exploitation for Client ExecutionThe iOS flow used the Caishen exploitation toolkit to deliver a subsequent exploit chain to visitors on phones and tablets.
Malware
CorunaThe malicious code delivered by these sites uses a known iOS exploitation toolkit – Caishen, to deliver subsequent payloads related to Coruna and Darksword.DarkSwordThe malicious code delivered by these sites uses a known iOS exploitation toolkit – Caishen, to deliver subsequent payloads related to Coruna and Darksword.
Vendors
KissmetricsReporting ties the same loader to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.minute-lyReporting ties the same loader to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.OptimizelyOptimizely’s status page states that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and that the vulnerability is fixed, theStorifyMeReporting ties the same loader to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.
Products
Tools
CaishenCensys linked the campaign’s infrastructure to a related cluster: a control panel titled MCH 管控平台, an iOS exploit backend branded 财神 (Caishen), and cryptocurrency “energy rental” storefronts.MCH 管控平台Censys linked the campaign’s infrastructure to a related cluster: a control panel titled MCH 管控平台, an iOS exploit backend branded 财神 (Caishen), and cryptocurrency “energy rental” storefronts.patch_domains.py// 引流配置 – 由 patch_domains.py 生成
