Censys Details Supply-Chain Script Campaign Delivering iOS Exploits and Crypto Theft

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Summary

Censys traced scripts injected into major sites that delivered Caishen iOS exploits to mobile visitors and card skimming, crypto-address replacement and page-data theft to desktops. Optimizely said it fixed the exploited vulnerability and removed the injected code.

Key points

  • Censys said referrers confirmed that reported impacted sites included BBC, Zoom, CNN, DoorDash, Zillow, Fox News and GitLab.
  • The injected track.js script was observed on at least 30 sites by November 16 and arrived through third-party scripts.
  • The script collected payment-card details, replaced copied cryptocurrency addresses with attacker-controlled wallets, and sent page URLs, up to 8,000 characters of cookies and page screenshots to its operators.
  • Mobile visitors were routed to an iOS exploit chain involving Caishen and payloads related to Coruna and DarkSword; desktop visitors received the skimmer, clipper and page-data theft functionality.
  • Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to inject JavaScript into some customer projects; it reported fixing the vulnerability, removing the code and securing affected accounts. Censys and other reporting also linked the loader route to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly.
  • Censys linked campaign infrastructure to MCH control panels, a Caishen backend and cryptocurrency energy-rental storefronts. It cautioned that the shared channel code is a kit default and does not identify a specific operator.
  • The staging hosts and implant C2 went offline after disclosure, but Censys observed five new MCH panel hosts within about a day, and the kit vendor re-listed DarkSword-27.1 packages.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Malicious JavaScript was injected into customer projects through third-party scripts, including an Optimizely Experimentation project; reporting and Censys data also tied the loader route to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.
  • The injected track.js script captured payment-form card details, replaced copied cryptocurrency addresses with attacker wallets, and sent page URLs, cookies, and browser-rendered screenshots to /hit.php.
  • On iPhone, iPad, and touch-screen Mac user agents, the script loaded boot.js from payload domains and, on iOS 18.6 and earlier, an iframe from an additional domain to continue the exploitation chain.
  • A separate get.js loader route added a script that fetched boot.js without checking the visitor's device type.
Defensive Notes
  • Optimizely stated that it fixed the Experimentation vulnerability, removed injected code, and secured affected accounts. Its containment guidance was to remove the injected project code.
  • Hunt for the MCH 管控平台 and 财神iOS漏洞后台 page titles, the strings patch_domains and 引流配置, the default channel code 02111110, and randomly generated 15-character .icu domains serving boot.js.
  • Do not treat channel code 02111110 alone as identifying a specific operator; the article says it is a hard-coded default used across more than a hundred deployments.
  • Hudson Rock reported an embedded fallback payload that runs when the delivery host is blocked, so blocking that host alone may not remove the injected code.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN0q0nf736x5lcbf3[.]icuGenerated domain resolving to the second service host.
DOMAIN1688360[.]ccCampaign delivery domain serving track.js and hosting the /card.php and /hit.php collection endpoints.
DOMAIN3601688[.]ccListed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server.
DOMAIN5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuPayload domain that served the iOS stage loader.
DOMAIN6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icuListed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server.
DOMAINadmin[.]o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icuAdministrative-interface hostname resolving to the second service host.
DOMAINapi[.]o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icuPayload host named in the second deployment's injector block and serving boot.js.
DOMAINc2[.]jndft28[.]xyzHostname resolving to the second service host and identified by its label as command-and-control infrastructure.
DOMAINeil786npto9u5bq[.]icuPayload domain loaded in a hidden iframe as part of the iOS staging flow.
DOMAINhhflwcie7xif2vo[.]icuGenerated domain listed on the TLS certificate of the second service deployment.
DOMAINhrufvf7xb3ntctm[.]icuListed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server.
DOMAINje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuCampaign-associated domain serving the MCH control panel under the campaign certificate.
DOMAINland[.]jndft28[.]xyzLanding-page hostname resolving to the second service host.
DOMAINmch[.]jndft28[.]xyzAttacker-deployment hostname resolving to the second service host; its label corresponds to the MCH panel.
DOMAINnamv99cyrwjsd1q[.]icuGenerated domain listed on the TLS certificate of the second service deployment.
DOMAINp55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuThird domain listed on the campaign server's certificate.
DOMAINryf3e5p7rf8slv8[.]icuListed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server.
DOMAINsl6zirn8wu7kggn[.]icuListed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server.
DOMAINso23nhowskohk67[.]icuListed as a sibling domain on the second campaign staging server.
DOMAINwebshell[.]lolLoader-vendor domain that hosted get.js, the script used to direct browsers to the iOS stage loader.
IPV4136[.]113[.]106[.]136Host associated with the campaign delivery domain and its malicious JavaScript and collection endpoints.
IPV434[.]124[.]226[.]157Second campaign staging server, observed with domains matching the first server's random-character naming pattern.
IPV434[.]96[.]213[.]201First staging server for the campaign; it served the iOS loader domain and campaign-associated MCH panel.
IPV464[.]83[.]19[.]114Service host tied to the campaign by matching kit configuration; it exposed the MCH panel, Caishen backend, storefronts, and stage loader.
IPV48[.]208[.]35[.]123Host for a second service deployment, serving the energy-rental landing page and generated injector block.
SHA256123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737SHA-256 hash of the malicious loader's get.js file.
SHA2562feaff817ad1214f0de69b6b25595e2a92320c77325eecdeed0ad87a675e71a7SHA-256 fingerprint of the delivery domain's certificate.
SHA2565698e9c039ab875e195b0b39ed57b9c10d200b341ab98f6bc489407cf03f8ecaSHA-256 fingerprint of the campaign's payload certificate.
SHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256 hash of the campaign's track.js payload, captured twice on November 16.

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