Linux mini_agent Backdoor Hides in Memory and Mimics Microsoft Graph

· Original article ↗

Summary

An analysis describes mini_agent, a Linux backdoor that runs from a deleted memfd, mimics Microsoft Graph HTTPS traffic and uses AdaptixC2-compatible messaging. It reports nine builds and identifies TLS and process artifacts defenders can hunt; the delivery method is un

Key points

  • The 64-bit Linux backdoor copies itself into a memfd, deletes its original file and runs under names resembling system processes; sandbox analysis observed this behavior.
  • Its AdaptixC2-compatible commands support program execution, file operations, screenshots and network tunnels.
  • The agent sends Graph API-style HTTPS requests to non-Microsoft hosts behind Cloudflare, disguising check-ins in request headers.
  • Its custom TLS client produced a JA3 fingerprint of 5e2df0c3adc551a34e46a9ecb0d7cb66; sandbox ClientHello messages also began with four zero bytes in the random field.
  • The analysis identified nine builds from mid-October to mid-November 2026 with the same internal AdaptixC2 agent ID. Related Windows agents used the same server addresses, paths and keys; the authors could not prove the same operators deployed an associated clipboard wallet-swapping DLL.
  • The authors did not determine how the Linux backdoor is delivered or identify the C2 origin server. They found no built-in reboot persistence and observed no commands during the sandbox run.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The Linux backdoor runs from an in-memory memfd, deletes its original file, and uses names resembling system processes.
  • It sends HTTPS command-and-control traffic to attacker-controlled hosts while imitating Microsoft Graph paths, headers, and user-agent strings.
  • Through AdaptixC2, the operator can run programs, browse and manipulate files, transfer files, capture screenshots, and open network tunnels or reverse port-forwards.
  • Related Windows samples reportedly use launchers for the standard AdaptixC2 agent and share server addresses, paths, and keys with the Linux builds.
  • A cryptocurrency clipper DLL was observed alongside the same servers during the same week; the article says it cannot prove the same operators deployed it.
Defensive Notes
  • Investigate Linux processes with kernel-thread-like names when their executable points to a deleted memfd, such as /memfd:… (deleted).
  • Alert when Graph-style paths or the MicrosoftGraph/1.0 user-agent are sent to hosts that are not Microsoft.
  • Hunt for the reported JA3 fingerprint 5e2df0c3adc551a34e46a9ecb0d7cb66 and TLS ClientHello random fields beginning with four zero bytes.
  • Look for tunnel requests with an X- header followed by eight hexadecimal characters and value 1, with a server response of TUOK.
  • The article reports no built-in reboot persistence; rebooting removes the agent from memory, but affected systems should still be treated as compromised and investigated for how access was gained.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN04c2f3c0[.]netutilsblog[.]comC2 subdomain used by an agent build on a reused domain.
DOMAIN1a993dc0[.]ccjszl[.]comC2 subdomain used by an agent build on a reused domain.
DOMAIN8ted50-dl[.]viispaww[.]vipC2 domain identified for the mini_agent builds.
DOMAINcdn-6piob[.]viispaww[.]ccC2 domain contacted by mini_agent in the sandbox.
DOMAINcdn-httptest[.]saisa[.]vipC2 domain used by a test build.
DOMAINdb69f5ff[.]cjkingentertainment[.]comC2 subdomain used by an agent build on a reused domain.
DOMAINdxdzhu-api[.]viispaww[.]ccC2 domain identified for the mini_agent builds.
DOMAINedge-hm1na[.]viispaww[.]vipC2 domain identified for the mini_agent builds.
DOMAINleidanwmo[.]topC2 domain used by November builds of the agent.
DOMAINmtc-factura[.]topC2 domain contacted by mid-October builds of the agent.
DOMAINqshuimusic[.]topC2 domain contacted by mid-October builds of the agent.
DOMAINsat-boleto[.]topC2 domain contacted by mid-October builds of the agent.
DOMAINsat-servir[.]topC2 domain used by November builds of the agent.
DOMAINstatic-eo9jo[.]viispaww[.]ccC2 domain identified for the mini_agent builds.
SHA2561d3535d5a782488ca1e8c140877bbf7e8a2c8ba7716ef5ac329dde1c47798dc7SHA-256 hash of a Windows launcher for the AdaptixC2 agent.
SHA2563faf495eaf1d057505fd0ed5f69d7ec554c6988b0b0e1ea7129b39d7a2f757f6SHA-256 hash of a 32-bit Windows AdaptixC2 agent.
SHA25658bfff115cfe2c4a5088f4bbf5fa2e86bbecf118f71090da15c9dd6650cb6d27SHA-256 hash of a sibling procmgrd build.
SHA2565cdc55446a63ac08326e1785da344743f9608d64cadccc59110a873527aea705SHA-256 hash of the c2_memfd_implant test build.
SHA256626620ecdeba3a257dd328bc6921b137a162b4c06d9db4f2c1d05d382f75266fSHA-256 hash of a Windows launcher for the AdaptixC2 agent.
SHA25684a7c586f6c920596d9c7be66a56b8ad6810d86aa085ad3ac6b6350c3aad70ccSHA-256 hash of a sibling mgx.bin build.
SHA256a5a6c3c4779f1e14e7c2dd82f9e1d516590195e4ac5f41f6c3b107ae38723868SHA-256 hash of the mini_agent ELF x64 backdoor.
SHA256ae21c47b45e3e7a819d8050e01b6718dd5fa4995e25add992ab325be27a156abSHA-256 hash of a sibling agent build.
SHA256bc8cdd337b47637c0193714f3a82b1e6e8992f75cacc28618d93d6c2e19dd3b5SHA-256 hash of the cryptocurrency clipper DLL observed alongside the C2 servers.
SHA256c5b55958b4e829c01345b0d74958cbe7473b74ccda92e3ea6788dbc49fcdea49SHA-256 hash of a sibling mgx.bin build.
SHA256dbce2dd297dd9689cbc6b4267931c16c990538036d6872f552aca2d0b885477eSHA-256 hash of a sibling fsmonitord build.
SHA256e04c19e6be1f43bcc49098d2167171838c8980d258f4594091b868912941ee57SHA-256 hash of a Windows launcher for the AdaptixC2 agent.
SHA256eea28da56c06a32849dfaa0832b2ad9c7397974e3ab1365b66537e03b42331e9SHA-256 hash of a sibling mgx3.bin build.
SHA256fb29c836a1fb49db4dbc86d104279b27547756081eacbe387085c6fe38b38172SHA-256 hash of a sibling build reported as coming from a live host.

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