TAG-195 Evolves Its Malware-as-a-Service Toolkit with Four New Malware Families

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Summary

Recorded Future details four new TAG-195 malware families, including a modular ChonkyChicken variant that loads capabilities on demand. The tools support credential theft, surveillance, reconnaissance and lateral movement, with ClickFix observed for initial access.

Key points

  • The four families are TinyEgg, ChonkyChicken, modularized ChonkyChicken, and ChromEggscalator, a modified Chrome encryption-bypass helper.
  • TAG-127 was observed using ClickFix-style fake verification pages to get victims to execute commands that download and install TinyEgg through a legitimate Windows utility.
  • TinyEgg serves as an initial-access implant; it can download ChonkyChicken, which adds browser credential theft, live browser-session control, network reconnaissance, lateral movement and surveillance.
  • Modular ChonkyChicken uses a controller that requests and loads capability plugins on demand; researchers identified at least 14 modules.
  • The families share traits including filename-based execution checks, OCX packaging, string obfuscation, WebSocket command-and-control, and Run-key persistence.
  • The report recommends detecting ClickFix clipboard execution, suspicious use of legitimate utilities and startup persistence, browsers launched with remote debugging, and unusual outbound connections.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • TAG-127 used ClickFix lure pages that prompted victims to paste and execute commands, downloading OCX payloads from attacker-controlled staging infrastructure.
  • TinyEgg payloads were executed through regsvr32.exe, then could download and execute ChonkyChicken as a second-stage implant.
  • ChonkyChicken used a staged helper to extract browser credentials and supported live browser-session control through Chrome DevTools Protocol.
  • ChonkyChicken supported credential- and token-backed remote execution, network reconnaissance, and persistent collection of keystrokes, clipboard contents, audio, and screen captures.
  • Modular ChonkyChicken requested capability modules from C2, decoded them, wrote them to temporary files, and loaded them into memory.
Defensive Notes
  • Prioritize detection of ClickFix-style clipboard execution chains and misuse of regsvr32.exe to load payloads from user-writable directories.
  • Monitor suspicious Run key persistence, including the WinComCtl value, and investigate the associated staged OCX files.
  • Detect Chrome or Edge processes launched with remote debugging enabled and investigate unusual outbound WebSocket communications.
  • Treat %TEMP%\lg.txt and C:\ProgramData\xlog.txt as forensic indicators of ChonkyChicken and ChromEggscalator execution attempts, respectively.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINscreenly[.]camClickFix lure domain leveraged by TAG-127 to distribute malware.
DOMAINxtrafftrck[.]netDedicated attacker-controlled domain used for payload staging and C2.
IPV470[.]34[.]205[.]43Shared IP address used by the four lure domains in TAG-127 malware delivery infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1018 · Remote System DiscoveryChonkyChicken used ARP-based host discovery to identify active hosts on the victim network.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe article reports XOR- or AES-encrypted strings in TAG-195 malware.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelChonkyChicken packaged extracted browser credential material and sent it to the controller.T1046 · Network Service DiscoveryChonkyChicken scanned TCP ports to identify active network services.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskChonkyChicken retained command strings for creating, executing, and deleting remote scheduled tasks.T1056.001 · KeyloggingChonkyChicken recorded keystrokes and associated them with active window titles.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsTinyEgg, ChonkyChicken, and Modular ChonkyChicken used WebSocket communications for tasking and C2.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferTinyEgg downloaded payloads, and Modular ChonkyChicken retrieved capability modules from C2.T1113 · Screen CaptureChonkyChicken captured screen frames and transmitted them over WebSocket.T1115 · Clipboard DataChonkyChicken monitored the clipboard and collected plaintext contents.T1123 · Audio CaptureChonkyChicken captured audio and returned Base64-encoded WAV recordings.T1134 · Access Token ManipulationChonkyChicken supported token-based execution through token_run and used APIs for token manipulation.T1185 · Browser Session HijackingChonkyChicken enabled operators to control live authenticated browser sessions through Chrome DevTools Protocol.T1204.004 · Malicious Copy and PasteClickFix lure pages instructed victims to copy a command to the clipboard and manually paste and execute it.T1218.010 · Regsvr32TAG-195 OCX payloads were executed through the legitimate Windows utility regsvr32.exe.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderTinyEgg and ChonkyChicken created a Run key persistence entry named WinComCtl.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersChonkyChicken used ChromEggscalator in a workflow to extract browser credentials.

Threat Actors

Malware

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