Investigation Traces Malicious Scripts Across Four Web Services

Summary
Hudson Rock and Ohey link poisoned scripts across Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. Optimizely confirmed a signup-flow vulnerability; access paths for the other services and total visitor impact remain unresolved.
Key points
- Optimizely confirmed that an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects; it says it patched the path and removed the injected code.
- Evidence links poisoned responses across Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, with archived observations dating to November 13. How the responses reached the other three services remains unresolved.
- Hudson Rock recovered eight poisoned Optimizely assets and one minute-ly asset. Historical body analysis for Kissmetrics and StorifyMe is attributed to researcher Kirk of Ohey.
- Later BBC and HSBC UAE files contained an embedded 24,392-byte financial-theft payload that could run if the remote payload failed. Blocking 1688360[.]cc alone would not remove code already embedded in an affected script.
- Recovered code could replace cryptocurrency destinations and collect accessible card details under specified conditions; the investigation does not establish successful theft from visitors.
- Ohey reports later DarkSword stages designed to collect device data, but successful exploitation of a real iPhone has not been demonstrated.
- Report URI reported about $7,040 in wallet receipts, which Hudson Rock could not link to affected visitors; no campaign-wide total of stolen data, compromised devices or losses is established.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Optimizely confirmed an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. The vulnerability’s code-level mechanics were not disclosed.
- Poisoned responses associated with Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly delivered malicious scripts through snippets and loaders included by websites. The access paths for Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly remain unresolved.
- Some later Optimizely files contained an embedded financial-theft payload intended to run if the remote payload failed or did not arrive promptly.
- Kirk reports that later DarkSword stages describe device registration and uploading keychain-2.db and other databases. Successful device exploitation was not demonstrated.
- Defensive Notes
- Optimizely reported patching the vulnerable path, removing injected code, ending sessions, revoking tokens and resetting access for affected accounts.
- Blocking the external malware host alone may not remove an embedded payload. Website operators should verify project code, historical script versions and cached copies.
- Review requests to collection destinations and determine which sensitive pages loaded affected assets. Removing a script does not reverse code already running in an open page or recover data already collected.
- Do not treat website-script exposure as proof of compromise to the website operator’s backend systems or as evidence that every visitor was affected.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu | Router C2 reference reported in Kirk’s analysis. |
| SHA256 | 0f2f2a27d19112e5800541daecc91eb6c77e49f9b43ed23c890b876631978533 | SHA-256 of the recovered poisoned minute-ly loader. |
| SHA256 | 305d0b00a7bafae9f240dbaf5bfdbb19648e38e509e8992112fcb7866c2e37dc | SHA-256 of the later BBC file directly recovered by Hudson Rock. |
| SHA256 | 45e42f5fa7520f6e7c048587f025549b31f0f24be8be058c7037d1da37e37b67 | SHA-256 of the earlier BBC archive file; the article distinguishes it from the later fallback-bearing file. |
| SHA256 | 94d174abe1e3b12b000f2bc8cbd8e9344290f4b5a8661c8d700cdc5675675fba | SHA-256 of the recorded poisoned StorifyMe response. |
| SHA256 | a87a2eaea9cfb74aae7283d15fbdb499b5a8ebc3fab4c453df7d62e503996240 | SHA-256 of the recovered poisoned Optimizely JavaScript asset, matching the historical record. |
| SHA256 | c154f3b644cd51f2446483c7ffd2ae4f178c4b0cb54846cfb5b83215367349cf | SHA-256 of the recorded poisoned Kissmetrics response. |
| SHA256 | c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162 | SHA-256 of the decoded fallback financial payload found embedded in later BBC and HSBC UAE files. |
| SHA256 | f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 | SHA-256 of the directly recovered track.js financial-theft payload. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1005 · Data from Local SystemKirk reports that later DarkSword stages describe collecting keychain-2.db and other device databases.T1027.009 · Embedded PayloadsLater Optimizely files contained an embedded fallback financial payload within the trusted script response.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelKirk reports that later DarkSword stages describe uploading keychain-2.db and other databases; successful collection or transfer was not independently reproduced.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe injected and recovered payloads were JavaScript executed in visitors’ browsers.T1189 · Drive-by CompromisePoisoned scripts delivered through website snippets and loaders were loaded by websites and brought attacker code into visitors’ browsers.T1657 · Financial TheftThe recovered track.js replaced cryptocurrency destinations and watched for accessible payment-card details, behaviors the article describes as financial theft.
People
Malware
Vendors
Kissmetricswith Kirk of Ohey documents a wider delivery picture: poisoned scripts served through Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, with archived vendor activity recorded on November 13, before the November 16minute-lya wider delivery picture: poisoned scripts served through Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, with archived vendor activity recorded on November 13, before the November 16 Optimizely wave.OptimizelyBeyond Optimizely: Malicious Scripts Traced Across Four Web ServicesStorifyMeof Ohey documents a wider delivery picture: poisoned scripts served through Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, with archived vendor activity recorded on November 13, before the November 16 Optimizely
