Investigation Traces Malicious Scripts Across Four Web Services

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Summary

Hudson Rock and Ohey link poisoned scripts across Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. Optimizely confirmed a signup-flow vulnerability; access paths for the other services and total visitor impact remain unresolved.

Key points

  • Optimizely confirmed that an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects; it says it patched the path and removed the injected code.
  • Evidence links poisoned responses across Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, with archived observations dating to November 13. How the responses reached the other three services remains unresolved.
  • Hudson Rock recovered eight poisoned Optimizely assets and one minute-ly asset. Historical body analysis for Kissmetrics and StorifyMe is attributed to researcher Kirk of Ohey.
  • Later BBC and HSBC UAE files contained an embedded 24,392-byte financial-theft payload that could run if the remote payload failed. Blocking 1688360[.]cc alone would not remove code already embedded in an affected script.
  • Recovered code could replace cryptocurrency destinations and collect accessible card details under specified conditions; the investigation does not establish successful theft from visitors.
  • Ohey reports later DarkSword stages designed to collect device data, but successful exploitation of a real iPhone has not been demonstrated.
  • Report URI reported about $7,040 in wallet receipts, which Hudson Rock could not link to affected visitors; no campaign-wide total of stolen data, compromised devices or losses is established.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Optimizely confirmed an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. The vulnerability’s code-level mechanics were not disclosed.
  • Poisoned responses associated with Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly delivered malicious scripts through snippets and loaders included by websites. The access paths for Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly remain unresolved.
  • Some later Optimizely files contained an embedded financial-theft payload intended to run if the remote payload failed or did not arrive promptly.
  • Kirk reports that later DarkSword stages describe device registration and uploading keychain-2.db and other databases. Successful device exploitation was not demonstrated.
Defensive Notes
  • Optimizely reported patching the vulnerable path, removing injected code, ending sessions, revoking tokens and resetting access for affected accounts.
  • Blocking the external malware host alone may not remove an embedded payload. Website operators should verify project code, historical script versions and cached copies.
  • Review requests to collection destinations and determine which sensitive pages loaded affected assets. Removing a script does not reverse code already running in an open page or recover data already collected.
  • Do not treat website-script exposure as proof of compromise to the website operator’s backend systems or as evidence that every visitor was affected.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuRouter C2 reference reported in Kirk’s analysis.
SHA2560f2f2a27d19112e5800541daecc91eb6c77e49f9b43ed23c890b876631978533SHA-256 of the recovered poisoned minute-ly loader.
SHA256305d0b00a7bafae9f240dbaf5bfdbb19648e38e509e8992112fcb7866c2e37dcSHA-256 of the later BBC file directly recovered by Hudson Rock.
SHA25645e42f5fa7520f6e7c048587f025549b31f0f24be8be058c7037d1da37e37b67SHA-256 of the earlier BBC archive file; the article distinguishes it from the later fallback-bearing file.
SHA25694d174abe1e3b12b000f2bc8cbd8e9344290f4b5a8661c8d700cdc5675675fbaSHA-256 of the recorded poisoned StorifyMe response.
SHA256a87a2eaea9cfb74aae7283d15fbdb499b5a8ebc3fab4c453df7d62e503996240SHA-256 of the recovered poisoned Optimizely JavaScript asset, matching the historical record.
SHA256c154f3b644cd51f2446483c7ffd2ae4f178c4b0cb54846cfb5b83215367349cfSHA-256 of the recorded poisoned Kissmetrics response.
SHA256c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162SHA-256 of the decoded fallback financial payload found embedded in later BBC and HSBC UAE files.
SHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256 of the directly recovered track.js financial-theft payload.

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