BubbleLoader Uses Patched Software and PNGs to Deliver Malware

Summary
ReversingLabs analyzes a BubbleLoader variant that patches legitimate software and uses two PNGs to decrypt and reflectively load a variable final payload. The report describes recent activity clusters and recommends allowlisting and code-signing verification.
Key points
- ReversingLabs reports two BubbleLoader activity clusters in mid-September and early October, with early examples dating to February 2026.
- BubbleLoader patches the entry point of legitimate host software, including WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs.
- The loader adds two PNGs; one serves as a rolling XOR key, while the other contains shellcode and an XOR-encrypted third stage.
- The third stage decrypts a final payload PE and reflectively loads it; the final payload varies by the malware family being distributed.
- Runtime polymorphism changes the payload’s in-memory image hash on each execution, according to the analysis.
- ReversingLabs recommends strict allowlisting and code-signing verification among its defensive controls.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- BubbleLoader patches the entry point of benign host software and adds two PNGs, turning the executable into a delivery mechanism for malicious payloads.
- The entry-point patch allocates memory and copies the PNGs into it. Shellcode in the second PNG uses the first PNG as a rolling XOR key to decrypt a third stage.
- The third stage decrypts a final payload PE and reflectively loads it; the final payload varies by sample.
- Defensive Notes
- ReversingLabs recommends strict allowlisting and code-signing verification.
- BubbleLoader uses runtime polymorphism so the in-memory image hash of its payload changes with each execution; a fixed hash may therefore not identify every execution.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe third stage is XOR-encrypted, and the final payload PE is decrypted before loading.T1027.014 · Polymorphic CodeBubbleLoader uses runtime polymorphism so the in-memory image hash of its payload changes for every execution.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationBubbleLoader's shellcode uses the first PNG as a rolling XOR key to decrypt the third stage, which then decrypts the final payload PE.T1554 · Compromise Host Software BinaryBubbleLoader patches the entry point of benign software to turn it into a malicious payload delivery mechanism.T1620 · Reflective Code LoadingAfter decrypting the final payload PE, BubbleLoader performs reflective loading.
Malware
Products
Firefox Launchermechanism. It targets common software as its host such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs. The patch is a series of instructions that are applied at the exact address of thevirtiofstargets common software as its host such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs. The patch is a series of instructions that are applied at the exact address of the host PE’s entryWindows Media Playerpayload delivery mechanism. It targets common software as its host such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs. The patch is a series of instructions that are applied at theWinRARany executable to a malicious payload delivery mechanism. It targets common software as its host such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs. The patch is a series of instructions thatx64dbgto a malicious payload delivery mechanism. It targets common software as its host such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs. The patch is a series of instructions that are
