BubbleLoader Uses Patched Software and PNGs to Deliver Malware

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Summary

ReversingLabs analyzes a BubbleLoader variant that patches legitimate software and uses two PNGs to decrypt and reflectively load a variable final payload. The report describes recent activity clusters and recommends allowlisting and code-signing verification.

Key points

  • ReversingLabs reports two BubbleLoader activity clusters in mid-September and early October, with early examples dating to February 2026.
  • BubbleLoader patches the entry point of legitimate host software, including WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs.
  • The loader adds two PNGs; one serves as a rolling XOR key, while the other contains shellcode and an XOR-encrypted third stage.
  • The third stage decrypts a final payload PE and reflectively loads it; the final payload varies by the malware family being distributed.
  • Runtime polymorphism changes the payload’s in-memory image hash on each execution, according to the analysis.
  • ReversingLabs recommends strict allowlisting and code-signing verification among its defensive controls.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • BubbleLoader patches the entry point of benign host software and adds two PNGs, turning the executable into a delivery mechanism for malicious payloads.
  • The entry-point patch allocates memory and copies the PNGs into it. Shellcode in the second PNG uses the first PNG as a rolling XOR key to decrypt a third stage.
  • The third stage decrypts a final payload PE and reflectively loads it; the final payload varies by sample.
Defensive Notes
  • ReversingLabs recommends strict allowlisting and code-signing verification.
  • BubbleLoader uses runtime polymorphism so the in-memory image hash of its payload changes with each execution; a fixed hash may therefore not identify every execution.

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