Poisoned Scripts on Major Websites Linked to Browser Theft and iPhone Exploit-Kit Delivery

Summary
Researchers verified poisoned third-party scripts across 21 named web properties, finding code for cryptocurrency-address substitution, card skimming and iOS exploit-stage delivery linked to Coruna and DarkSword. Successful theft or iPhone exploitation was not confirmed
Key points
- Hudson Rock recovered nine malicious vendor files and corroborated hashes for 16 poisoned responses across 15 archived website captures; the combined evidence covers 21 named web properties.
- Poisoned responses involved Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. The initial access mechanism remains unknown, and the evidence does not establish compromise of the named websites’ backend systems.
- Recovered code can replace cryptocurrency addresses and inspect accessible payment-form data for card details. These capabilities do not establish that funds were diverted or card data was successfully collected.
- A conditional routine can send readable cookies and a page image; JavaScript-readable cookies exclude HttpOnly values.
- The mobile branch routes to Coruna-associated A8 and DarkSword-labelled D11 stages. The observed scans used Chrome with iOS user-agent strings, so they show delivery responses, not successful iPhone exploitation.
- Some poisoned Optimizely files contain an embedded fallback payload, meaning blocking the external attacker domain alone may not stop the code from running.
- Researchers recommend removing injected code, preserving response bytes and hashes, and separately investigating financial-theft and mobile-stage exposure.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Malicious JavaScript was served inside third-party script and widget responses, including Optimizely project files, Kissmetrics and StorifyMe responses, and a minute-ly loader.
- The recovered track.js payload replaces cryptocurrency addresses in page content and clipboard-related operations, and can inspect payment form submissions for card details.
- The payload conditionally sends page URLs, JavaScript-readable cookies, recorded address matches, and an optional page image to attacker infrastructure; successful collection was not demonstrated.
- iOS-directed loading routes to Coruna-associated and DarkSword-labelled stages. The recorded user-agent scans show delivery responses, not successful exploitation of an iPhone.
- BBC and HSBC UAE project files contain a Base64-embedded fallback payload that the loader attempts to execute if the remote request fails or times out.
- Defensive Notes
- Preserve response bytes, hashes, headers, timestamps, and project revisions before removing or disabling affected third-party code; verify the bytes actually served after remediation.
- Blocking attacker domains alone may leave the embedded fallback payload executable. Remove the injected project code and verify the trusted script response itself.
- Block both the financial-theft and mobile-delivery paths, including the attacker hosts identified in the article.
- Preserve network traces as well as page DOM: the minute-ly specimen can remove script elements after three seconds.
- Investigate card.php and hit.php POST attempts separately from boot, entry-stage, and telemetry requests; a request or result label does not establish successful exploitation or theft.
- Scope exposure by specific page, time, and device, especially payment and account pages. User-agent-based scan responses do not establish real-device exploit compatibility.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu | Domain decoded from boot.js as c2Base; a completed communication to it was not established. |
| SHA256 | 0f2f2a27d19112e5800541daecc91eb6c77e49f9b43ed23c890b876631978533 | SHA-256 of the directly recovered malicious minute-ly loader, matching the Fox Sports archive response. |
| SHA256 | 123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737 | SHA-256 of the archived webshell[.]lol/get.js loader response. |
| SHA256 | 19b1f83f333424326aaceaa4e84dac2a378684b4d2475c73b272b2e4b409e415 | SHA-256 of the malicious Virgin Media O2 Optimizely asset. |
| SHA256 | 295f2ff6b934e7be8c07d501b0561a9a7da29e0fa775b742613a6edb0d0b6069 | SHA-256 of the poisoned HSBC UAE Optimizely asset. |
| SHA256 | 305d0b00a7bafae9f240dbaf5bfdbb19648e38e509e8992112fcb7866c2e37dc | SHA-256 of the malicious BBC Optimizely asset. |
| SHA256 | 3fa37e49fbf39434d03a6078d2d6cffcd4451fa0d4eccdea8c48b7462c780dd4 | SHA-256 of the poisoned Optimizely asset associated with Hootsuite and referenced by Talkwalker. |
| SHA256 | 435987c1d7f4da3d4a6d3175538d32751d1a6d55a38dcc9d39c24399a8eaa6fa | SHA-256 of the archived JIUJIU888/index.js mobile-stage response. |
| SHA256 | 7175872c4fff6eba2bb98f5a86093f80178baac85b0973a344a4720aab806b92 | SHA-256 recorded for the packed Coruna-associated A8 dispatcher response. |
| SHA256 | 792deb03483ce9b212df6f46319a78ea6fc39bfc5b2719c7e8b87d084524437d | SHA-256 recorded for the DarkSword-labelled D11/b.html response. |
| SHA256 | 8d69f32fff37208e52dc573111e8db99f031f4913845a24fb2e14755747ac860 | SHA-256 recorded for the 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js response. |
| SHA256 | 9039ebbdd6abe36ad8ac48097dae6813d4a49315e1403c9ae7ebab539601cde6 | SHA-256 recorded for the Coruna-associated A8/a.html response. |
| SHA256 | 9cab90c80b9a668cbf3ba2489671e7870885273ceb7c0e56ae478fceb14ffc34 | SHA-256 of the poisoned Zoom Optimizely asset, matching the archived response. |
| SHA256 | a87a2eaea9cfb74aae7283d15fbdb499b5a8ebc3fab4c453df7d62e503996240 | SHA-256 of the poisoned GitLab marketing-site Optimizely asset. |
| SHA256 | aa0706634eecc9d833c8a0b353099c26083f22bd742ccf81d8942ed6b1798b75 | SHA-256 of the malicious Stamps.com Optimizely asset. |
| SHA256 | c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162 | SHA-256 of the embedded malicious fallback payload decoded from the BBC and HSBC UAE specimens. |
| SHA256 | d3f01f57103b8bcf07b6f18551f29885ffd61de190e2184249f824d2c268e09f | SHA-256 of the malicious Tricentis Optimizely asset. |
| SHA256 | e410b6509f33defce16ad7896cbe2fb3cc689f2cc53d87c87d75efba6b57e290 | SHA-256 recorded for the eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js response. |
| SHA256 | f286c965982bee4225c4edda261ce8685a55721dd997ddedf106666101118c07 | SHA-256 of the archived JIUJIU888/weifile.html mobile-stage response. |
| SHA256 | f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 | SHA-256 of the directly recovered live track.js payload. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027.009 · Embedded PayloadsBBC and HSBC UAE project files embed a complete Base64-encoded malicious fallback payload.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe code prepares card and conditional page-data submissions to attacker endpoints; the article does not establish successful victim data transmission.T1056.003 · Web Portal CaptureThe card-skimming module inspects form submissions and POST bodies for card numbers, expiry dates, and security codes.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe recovered payload uses JavaScript in the browser to substitute wallet addresses, inspect payment data, and load additional stages.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe loader and mobile router retrieve remote JavaScript and entry-stage resources from the reported delivery hosts.T1115 · Clipboard DataThe payload monitors copy events and clipboard API calls while replacing cryptocurrency addresses.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseVisitors to affected websites could load poisoned third-party JavaScript through ordinary page visits; successful exploitation or impact for any visitor was not established.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainMalicious code was confirmed inside responses from third-party script and widget providers; the initial access mechanism was not determined.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieA conditional collection routine includes JavaScript-readable cookies, which could include readable session cookies; HttpOnly cookies remain inaccessible to that API.T1565.003 · Runtime Data ManipulationThe payload alters wallet-address strings in page content and clipboard-related operations at runtime.
People
Vendors
KissmetricsAdditional evidence supplied by Kirk from Ohey extends the affected delivery infrastructure to Kissmetrics and StorifyMe and links the mobile branch to Coruna and DarkSword.minute-lyHudson Rock recovered malicious Optimizely project files and a minute-ly loader.OptimizelyHudson Rock recovered malicious Optimizely project files and a minute-ly loader.StorifyMeAdditional evidence supplied by Kirk from Ohey extends the affected delivery infrastructure to Kissmetrics and StorifyMe and links the mobile branch to Coruna and DarkSword.
Products
iOSRock’s research team’s attention and for providing the additional archived response verification and iOS-routing analysis incorporated into this report.KissmetricsAdditional evidence supplied by Kirk from Ohey extends the affected delivery infrastructure to Kissmetrics and StorifyMe and links the mobile branch to Coruna and DarkSword.minute-lyHudson Rock recovered malicious Optimizely project files and a minute-ly loader.OptimizelyHudson Rock recovered malicious Optimizely project files and a minute-ly loader.StorifyMeAdditional evidence supplied by Kirk from Ohey extends the affected delivery infrastructure to Kissmetrics and StorifyMe and links the mobile branch to Coruna and DarkSword.
Tools
Caishen iOS C2 V2Related kit lineage Kirk relates these entry paths, dispatcher patterns and visitor markers to the Caishen iOS C2 V2 ecosystem described in Ohey’s earlier research. This supports a kit/delivery relationship, not aCorunaAdditional evidence supplied by Kirk from Ohey extends the affected delivery infrastructure to Kissmetrics and StorifyMe and links the mobile branch to Coruna and DarkSword.DarkSwordAdditional evidence supplied by Kirk from Ohey extends the affected delivery infrastructure to Kissmetrics and StorifyMe and links the mobile branch to Coruna and DarkSword.
Countries
Industries
Financial ServicesFinancial services, telecom, retail and shipping-service visitorsMediaVirgin Media O2www.virginmediao2.co.uk /js/22914960707.js Malicious asset recovered. The independently reported page was /help/identity. [1]RetailFinancial services, telecom, retail and shipping-service visitorsSoftwareThe affected asset associations span news, banking, communications, software and business services.
