Poisoned Scripts on Major Websites Linked to Browser Theft and iPhone Exploit-Kit Delivery

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers verified poisoned third-party scripts across 21 named web properties, finding code for cryptocurrency-address substitution, card skimming and iOS exploit-stage delivery linked to Coruna and DarkSword. Successful theft or iPhone exploitation was not confirmed

Key points

  • Hudson Rock recovered nine malicious vendor files and corroborated hashes for 16 poisoned responses across 15 archived website captures; the combined evidence covers 21 named web properties.
  • Poisoned responses involved Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. The initial access mechanism remains unknown, and the evidence does not establish compromise of the named websites’ backend systems.
  • Recovered code can replace cryptocurrency addresses and inspect accessible payment-form data for card details. These capabilities do not establish that funds were diverted or card data was successfully collected.
  • A conditional routine can send readable cookies and a page image; JavaScript-readable cookies exclude HttpOnly values.
  • The mobile branch routes to Coruna-associated A8 and DarkSword-labelled D11 stages. The observed scans used Chrome with iOS user-agent strings, so they show delivery responses, not successful iPhone exploitation.
  • Some poisoned Optimizely files contain an embedded fallback payload, meaning blocking the external attacker domain alone may not stop the code from running.
  • Researchers recommend removing injected code, preserving response bytes and hashes, and separately investigating financial-theft and mobile-stage exposure.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Malicious JavaScript was served inside third-party script and widget responses, including Optimizely project files, Kissmetrics and StorifyMe responses, and a minute-ly loader.
  • The recovered track.js payload replaces cryptocurrency addresses in page content and clipboard-related operations, and can inspect payment form submissions for card details.
  • The payload conditionally sends page URLs, JavaScript-readable cookies, recorded address matches, and an optional page image to attacker infrastructure; successful collection was not demonstrated.
  • iOS-directed loading routes to Coruna-associated and DarkSword-labelled stages. The recorded user-agent scans show delivery responses, not successful exploitation of an iPhone.
  • BBC and HSBC UAE project files contain a Base64-embedded fallback payload that the loader attempts to execute if the remote request fails or times out.
Defensive Notes
  • Preserve response bytes, hashes, headers, timestamps, and project revisions before removing or disabling affected third-party code; verify the bytes actually served after remediation.
  • Blocking attacker domains alone may leave the embedded fallback payload executable. Remove the injected project code and verify the trusted script response itself.
  • Block both the financial-theft and mobile-delivery paths, including the attacker hosts identified in the article.
  • Preserve network traces as well as page DOM: the minute-ly specimen can remove script elements after three seconds.
  • Investigate card.php and hit.php POST attempts separately from boot, entry-stage, and telemetry requests; a request or result label does not establish successful exploitation or theft.
  • Scope exposure by specific page, time, and device, especially payment and account pages. User-agent-based scan responses do not establish real-device exploit compatibility.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuDomain decoded from boot.js as c2Base; a completed communication to it was not established.
SHA2560f2f2a27d19112e5800541daecc91eb6c77e49f9b43ed23c890b876631978533SHA-256 of the directly recovered malicious minute-ly loader, matching the Fox Sports archive response.
SHA256123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737SHA-256 of the archived webshell[.]lol/get.js loader response.
SHA25619b1f83f333424326aaceaa4e84dac2a378684b4d2475c73b272b2e4b409e415SHA-256 of the malicious Virgin Media O2 Optimizely asset.
SHA256295f2ff6b934e7be8c07d501b0561a9a7da29e0fa775b742613a6edb0d0b6069SHA-256 of the poisoned HSBC UAE Optimizely asset.
SHA256305d0b00a7bafae9f240dbaf5bfdbb19648e38e509e8992112fcb7866c2e37dcSHA-256 of the malicious BBC Optimizely asset.
SHA2563fa37e49fbf39434d03a6078d2d6cffcd4451fa0d4eccdea8c48b7462c780dd4SHA-256 of the poisoned Optimizely asset associated with Hootsuite and referenced by Talkwalker.
SHA256435987c1d7f4da3d4a6d3175538d32751d1a6d55a38dcc9d39c24399a8eaa6faSHA-256 of the archived JIUJIU888/index.js mobile-stage response.
SHA2567175872c4fff6eba2bb98f5a86093f80178baac85b0973a344a4720aab806b92SHA-256 recorded for the packed Coruna-associated A8 dispatcher response.
SHA256792deb03483ce9b212df6f46319a78ea6fc39bfc5b2719c7e8b87d084524437dSHA-256 recorded for the DarkSword-labelled D11/b.html response.
SHA2568d69f32fff37208e52dc573111e8db99f031f4913845a24fb2e14755747ac860SHA-256 recorded for the 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js response.
SHA2569039ebbdd6abe36ad8ac48097dae6813d4a49315e1403c9ae7ebab539601cde6SHA-256 recorded for the Coruna-associated A8/a.html response.
SHA2569cab90c80b9a668cbf3ba2489671e7870885273ceb7c0e56ae478fceb14ffc34SHA-256 of the poisoned Zoom Optimizely asset, matching the archived response.
SHA256a87a2eaea9cfb74aae7283d15fbdb499b5a8ebc3fab4c453df7d62e503996240SHA-256 of the poisoned GitLab marketing-site Optimizely asset.
SHA256aa0706634eecc9d833c8a0b353099c26083f22bd742ccf81d8942ed6b1798b75SHA-256 of the malicious Stamps.com Optimizely asset.
SHA256c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162SHA-256 of the embedded malicious fallback payload decoded from the BBC and HSBC UAE specimens.
SHA256d3f01f57103b8bcf07b6f18551f29885ffd61de190e2184249f824d2c268e09fSHA-256 of the malicious Tricentis Optimizely asset.
SHA256e410b6509f33defce16ad7896cbe2fb3cc689f2cc53d87c87d75efba6b57e290SHA-256 recorded for the eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js response.
SHA256f286c965982bee4225c4edda261ce8685a55721dd997ddedf106666101118c07SHA-256 of the archived JIUJIU888/weifile.html mobile-stage response.
SHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256 of the directly recovered live track.js payload.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1027.009 · Embedded PayloadsBBC and HSBC UAE project files embed a complete Base64-encoded malicious fallback payload.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe code prepares card and conditional page-data submissions to attacker endpoints; the article does not establish successful victim data transmission.T1056.003 · Web Portal CaptureThe card-skimming module inspects form submissions and POST bodies for card numbers, expiry dates, and security codes.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe recovered payload uses JavaScript in the browser to substitute wallet addresses, inspect payment data, and load additional stages.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe loader and mobile router retrieve remote JavaScript and entry-stage resources from the reported delivery hosts.T1115 · Clipboard DataThe payload monitors copy events and clipboard API calls while replacing cryptocurrency addresses.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseVisitors to affected websites could load poisoned third-party JavaScript through ordinary page visits; successful exploitation or impact for any visitor was not established.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainMalicious code was confirmed inside responses from third-party script and widget providers; the initial access mechanism was not determined.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieA conditional collection routine includes JavaScript-readable cookies, which could include readable session cookies; HttpOnly cookies remain inaccessible to that API.T1565.003 · Runtime Data ManipulationThe payload alters wallet-address strings in page content and clipboard-related operations at runtime.

People

Vendors

Products

Tools

Countries

Industries

Related Articles