Unit 42 Details HTTP/3 RAT Campaign Targeting Southeast Asian Governments

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Summary

Unit 42 details TGR-STA-0049’s espionage campaign against Southeast Asian governments, describing PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT RATs, HTTP/3/QUIC C2, exploitation and phishing, lateral movement, credential theft, and attempted data exfiltration.

Key points

  • Unit 42 tracks the activity as TGR-STA-0049, also known as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon; it reports the campaign targeting Southeast Asian government entities since at least July 2025.
  • Observed initial-access methods include exploiting unpatched Exchange and web servers to deploy web shells, as well as phishing with decoy PDFs and lookalike domains.
  • PerfectPioneer is a custom Go RAT that uses HTTP/3 for C2, with HTTP/2 fallback. Its capabilities include file operations, command execution, keylogging, screenshots and process injection.
  • The C++ KUKURAT backdoor loads post-exploitation modules from C2 and has HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 variants; its camouflage engine generates decoy network, registry and file activity.
  • Unit 42 observed domain log-on scripts used to spread KUKURAT, credential harvesting through LSASS dumping and DCSync, and attempts to exfiltrate documents and access Exchange mailboxes.
  • The report recommends monitoring or restricting outbound QUIC, auditing Active Directory log-on scripts and Exchange permissions, and detecting ordinal-based LSASS dumping.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Exploitation of unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers to deploy web shells.
  • Phishing with government-lookalike domains and executables disguised as PDF documents.
  • DLL side-loading and decoy installers used to execute PerfectPioneer RAT.
  • Malicious domain log-on scripts used to distribute KUKURAT to endpoints.
Defensive Notes
  • Log and inspect QUIC traffic or block outbound UDP port 443 to force protocol fallback.
  • Audit SYSVOL and Group Policy Objects for unauthorized log-on script changes, and alert on suspicious processes during authentication.
  • Detect rundll32.exe interacting with comsvcs.dll, including ordinal-based LSASS dumping.
  • Audit Exchange ApplicationImpersonation assignments and alert on automated FullAccess mailbox permission grants.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINads-edge[.]comPerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]cloudflacecdn[.]comKUKURAT C2 domain.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]investigationj6[.]comMalicious domain used by KUKURAT for C2.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]maui-cocktailbar[.]comPerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]police[.]gr[.]comKUKURAT C2 domain.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]thailisting[.]netPerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]wkuyda[.]comPerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain.
HOSTNAMEwww[.]yangon[.]it[.]comPerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain.
IPV427[.]254[.]164[.]209IP address listed among campaign indicators of compromise.
IPV427[.]254[.]164[.]212IP address listed among campaign indicators of compromise.
SHA2560533365accbba405757de7eb486533c11c8e0510a28d414ee8c5e6b8a41ed97bPerfectPioneer RAT sample of unknown variant.
SHA2560cbde9b7f59dafca80f214121a04eda7804b920da28ce1c06939a4783e6b097fSharpDPAPI artifact listed among campaign indicators.
SHA2562281e754f70e11298db1a0a7c1b527cf2b5eec2056d4c73a46ed572ab873dc6ePerfectPioneer RAT RatAAkk-tt sample.
SHA25634cc9bc4a533b91e7cdb30fecc57ba609dc890780fd13ecfbc253047b3b37b78KUKURAT PsExecService.exe remote execution module.
SHA2565b7effbf0465c05e8dc9a8fea69b000a78237735ea0b854e8d9baee5b7af8344PerfectPioneer RAT newhttp3 core agent.
SHA2565f857ff78bfbef2a55a846fc93744e11e07a9b72ee3fc3bc345c32ce9615ddeeModified host binary used in PerfectPioneer RAT newhttp3 loading.
SHA256619b749e1c6634d38f15c51005a4237e9076aaaf36927b562a990e8bc34fdfcbPerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_cc core agent.
SHA25661f7e2f4159c566578e88cb05cdf49e4378f45ebddbd332224e97c11df922120PerfectPioneer RAT newhttp3 loader DLL.
SHA2567225ef57161cf0908560811be798d22e9354c071d576540a43aa7900784c0688KUKURAT HTTP/2 variant.
SHA2568cfe629fc08ae06c8ba106113ba30bb16fa2fbbf8bd3dd6831d16b031e0ebe70PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_cc loader DLL.
SHA25692fb9545ea49e2fb4635fce1859ff3f609738be75f85d146614243fc8bc80b67PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_ls sample.
SHA25699f571c07170250a84f0ae9de4179044df91244855d9b39978729933ea3d438fWeb shell listed among campaign indicators.
SHA2569fb0976fcd1f92c4711726a91cff8be9a39944efedc4caf2d80f935327f8f490KUKURAT HTTP/3 variant.
SHA256a214d264c6bb0d2ba89986f73e196ea200307574745a245fc42c32fbef4cc140KUKURAT HTTP/2 variant.
SHA256ab06f540ecdd1d45491aa71bfc04c80852371c8f5cd43b9a6ebb53f1e1b69588PerfectPioneer RAT Pioneer decoy installer package.
SHA256b062b4d8c19baf5c1568e28b3e0a5e2318e9501ea61ddfe804d9755c1bdbf887KUKURAT companion watchdog executable.
SHA256b8dca1c7e7a74ce82ab4e4cad9b718a458735d2c6c956e4cf3109aac59bfd0e4KUKURAT HTTP/3 variant.
SHA256b975f5932c04b381f8fa58a3303194f1aff950d3c6cd12dcc1d323bb3393718bModified host binary used in PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_cc loading.
SHA256bf59f8d7ef79b09a72bbb9c05ca8746466d03226a3779cc1096ba067117ca008PerfectPioneer RAT Pioneer core agent.
SHA256f4c9d5d13c1a09533876a02f6fa04831efbf600b05cfb3ed765a0ebde82b0457PerfectPioneer RAT PerfectRAT sample.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.001 · LSASS MemoryAttackers dumped LSASS memory using rundll32.exe and an ordinal invocation of comsvcs.dll.T1003.002 · Security Account ManagerAttackers dumped the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives to extract local account hashes.T1003.006 · DCSyncAttackers used DCSync to extract password hashes from a domain controller.T1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin SharesThe actor used PsExec for lateral movement; KUKURAT also supports SMB credential brute-forcing.T1037.001 · Logon Script (Windows)Attackers installed malicious domain log-on scripts that downloaded and executed KUKURAT when users authenticated.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe attackers attempted to exfiltrate documents through the RATs to their C2 infrastructure.T1055 · Process InjectionPerfectPioneer RAT supports process injection using VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.T1059.001 · PowerShellAttackers used PowerShell to inspect Exchange impersonation rights and grant a compromised account broad mailbox access.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsPerfectPioneer RAT and KUKURAT communicated with C2 using HTTP/3, with HTTP/2 used by variants or as a fallback.T1114.002 · Remote Email CollectionAttackers checked Exchange impersonation rights and granted a compromised account FullAccess to mailboxes.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAttackers exploited unpatched Exchange and web servers to establish access and deploy web shells.T1505.003 · Web ShellCustom and publicly available web shells were deployed on compromised servers and used to execute PerfectPioneer RAT.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPerfectPioneer RAT can persist through a Run registry key and a Startup folder shortcut.T1566.002 · Spearphishing LinkPhishing used lookalike government domains to deliver executables disguised as PDF documents.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingA modified legitimate executable loaded a malicious DLL that decrypted and executed the PerfectPioneer payload.

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