Unit 42 Details HTTP/3 RAT Campaign Targeting Southeast Asian Governments

Summary
Unit 42 details TGR-STA-0049’s espionage campaign against Southeast Asian governments, describing PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT RATs, HTTP/3/QUIC C2, exploitation and phishing, lateral movement, credential theft, and attempted data exfiltration.
Key points
- Unit 42 tracks the activity as TGR-STA-0049, also known as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon; it reports the campaign targeting Southeast Asian government entities since at least July 2025.
- Observed initial-access methods include exploiting unpatched Exchange and web servers to deploy web shells, as well as phishing with decoy PDFs and lookalike domains.
- PerfectPioneer is a custom Go RAT that uses HTTP/3 for C2, with HTTP/2 fallback. Its capabilities include file operations, command execution, keylogging, screenshots and process injection.
- The C++ KUKURAT backdoor loads post-exploitation modules from C2 and has HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 variants; its camouflage engine generates decoy network, registry and file activity.
- Unit 42 observed domain log-on scripts used to spread KUKURAT, credential harvesting through LSASS dumping and DCSync, and attempts to exfiltrate documents and access Exchange mailboxes.
- The report recommends monitoring or restricting outbound QUIC, auditing Active Directory log-on scripts and Exchange permissions, and detecting ordinal-based LSASS dumping.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Exploitation of unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers to deploy web shells.
- Phishing with government-lookalike domains and executables disguised as PDF documents.
- DLL side-loading and decoy installers used to execute PerfectPioneer RAT.
- Malicious domain log-on scripts used to distribute KUKURAT to endpoints.
- Defensive Notes
- Log and inspect QUIC traffic or block outbound UDP port 443 to force protocol fallback.
- Audit SYSVOL and Group Policy Objects for unauthorized log-on script changes, and alert on suspicious processes during authentication.
- Detect rundll32.exe interacting with comsvcs.dll, including ordinal-based LSASS dumping.
- Audit Exchange ApplicationImpersonation assignments and alert on automated FullAccess mailbox permission grants.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | ads-edge[.]com | PerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]cloudflacecdn[.]com | KUKURAT C2 domain. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]investigationj6[.]com | Malicious domain used by KUKURAT for C2. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]maui-cocktailbar[.]com | PerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]police[.]gr[.]com | KUKURAT C2 domain. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]thailisting[.]net | PerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]wkuyda[.]com | PerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain. |
| HOSTNAME | www[.]yangon[.]it[.]com | PerfectPioneer RAT C2 domain. |
| IPV4 | 27[.]254[.]164[.]209 | IP address listed among campaign indicators of compromise. |
| IPV4 | 27[.]254[.]164[.]212 | IP address listed among campaign indicators of compromise. |
| SHA256 | 0533365accbba405757de7eb486533c11c8e0510a28d414ee8c5e6b8a41ed97b | PerfectPioneer RAT sample of unknown variant. |
| SHA256 | 0cbde9b7f59dafca80f214121a04eda7804b920da28ce1c06939a4783e6b097f | SharpDPAPI artifact listed among campaign indicators. |
| SHA256 | 2281e754f70e11298db1a0a7c1b527cf2b5eec2056d4c73a46ed572ab873dc6e | PerfectPioneer RAT RatAAkk-tt sample. |
| SHA256 | 34cc9bc4a533b91e7cdb30fecc57ba609dc890780fd13ecfbc253047b3b37b78 | KUKURAT PsExecService.exe remote execution module. |
| SHA256 | 5b7effbf0465c05e8dc9a8fea69b000a78237735ea0b854e8d9baee5b7af8344 | PerfectPioneer RAT newhttp3 core agent. |
| SHA256 | 5f857ff78bfbef2a55a846fc93744e11e07a9b72ee3fc3bc345c32ce9615ddee | Modified host binary used in PerfectPioneer RAT newhttp3 loading. |
| SHA256 | 619b749e1c6634d38f15c51005a4237e9076aaaf36927b562a990e8bc34fdfcb | PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_cc core agent. |
| SHA256 | 61f7e2f4159c566578e88cb05cdf49e4378f45ebddbd332224e97c11df922120 | PerfectPioneer RAT newhttp3 loader DLL. |
| SHA256 | 7225ef57161cf0908560811be798d22e9354c071d576540a43aa7900784c0688 | KUKURAT HTTP/2 variant. |
| SHA256 | 8cfe629fc08ae06c8ba106113ba30bb16fa2fbbf8bd3dd6831d16b031e0ebe70 | PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_cc loader DLL. |
| SHA256 | 92fb9545ea49e2fb4635fce1859ff3f609738be75f85d146614243fc8bc80b67 | PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_ls sample. |
| SHA256 | 99f571c07170250a84f0ae9de4179044df91244855d9b39978729933ea3d438f | Web shell listed among campaign indicators. |
| SHA256 | 9fb0976fcd1f92c4711726a91cff8be9a39944efedc4caf2d80f935327f8f490 | KUKURAT HTTP/3 variant. |
| SHA256 | a214d264c6bb0d2ba89986f73e196ea200307574745a245fc42c32fbef4cc140 | KUKURAT HTTP/2 variant. |
| SHA256 | ab06f540ecdd1d45491aa71bfc04c80852371c8f5cd43b9a6ebb53f1e1b69588 | PerfectPioneer RAT Pioneer decoy installer package. |
| SHA256 | b062b4d8c19baf5c1568e28b3e0a5e2318e9501ea61ddfe804d9755c1bdbf887 | KUKURAT companion watchdog executable. |
| SHA256 | b8dca1c7e7a74ce82ab4e4cad9b718a458735d2c6c956e4cf3109aac59bfd0e4 | KUKURAT HTTP/3 variant. |
| SHA256 | b975f5932c04b381f8fa58a3303194f1aff950d3c6cd12dcc1d323bb3393718b | Modified host binary used in PerfectPioneer RAT rat_http3_cc loading. |
| SHA256 | bf59f8d7ef79b09a72bbb9c05ca8746466d03226a3779cc1096ba067117ca008 | PerfectPioneer RAT Pioneer core agent. |
| SHA256 | f4c9d5d13c1a09533876a02f6fa04831efbf600b05cfb3ed765a0ebde82b0457 | PerfectPioneer RAT PerfectRAT sample. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1003.001 · LSASS MemoryAttackers dumped LSASS memory using rundll32.exe and an ordinal invocation of comsvcs.dll.T1003.002 · Security Account ManagerAttackers dumped the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives to extract local account hashes.T1003.006 · DCSyncAttackers used DCSync to extract password hashes from a domain controller.T1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin SharesThe actor used PsExec for lateral movement; KUKURAT also supports SMB credential brute-forcing.T1037.001 · Logon Script (Windows)Attackers installed malicious domain log-on scripts that downloaded and executed KUKURAT when users authenticated.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe attackers attempted to exfiltrate documents through the RATs to their C2 infrastructure.T1055 · Process InjectionPerfectPioneer RAT supports process injection using VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.T1059.001 · PowerShellAttackers used PowerShell to inspect Exchange impersonation rights and grant a compromised account broad mailbox access.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsPerfectPioneer RAT and KUKURAT communicated with C2 using HTTP/3, with HTTP/2 used by variants or as a fallback.T1114.002 · Remote Email CollectionAttackers checked Exchange impersonation rights and granted a compromised account FullAccess to mailboxes.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAttackers exploited unpatched Exchange and web servers to establish access and deploy web shells.T1505.003 · Web ShellCustom and publicly available web shells were deployed on compromised servers and used to execute PerfectPioneer RAT.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPerfectPioneer RAT can persist through a Run registry key and a Startup folder shortcut.T1566.002 · Spearphishing LinkPhishing used lookalike government domains to deliver executables disguised as PDF documents.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingA modified legitimate executable loaded a malicious DLL that decrypted and executed the PerfectPioneer payload.
Threat Actors
Earth AluxAnother tracking name for TGR-STA-0049 activity, which Unit 42 associates with government-targeting cyberespionage.Ink DragonAnother tracking name for TGR-STA-0049 activity, which Unit 42 associates with government-targeting cyberespionage.REF7707Another tracking name for TGR-STA-0049 activity, which Unit 42 associates with deploying PerfectPioneer RAT and KUKURAT.
Malware
FinalDraftActivity associated with this group previously included deploying Squidoor (AKA FINALDRAFT) – an advanced backdoor used against high-value global targets since 2023.KUKURATremote access Trojans (RATs): PerfectPioneer RAT (spotted in July 2025) and its modular successor, KUKURAT (deployed in March 2026).PerfectPioneer RATwe observed included deploying two previously undocumented custom remote access Trojans (RATs): PerfectPioneer RAT (spotted in July 2025) and its modular successor, KUKURAT (deployed in March 2026).SQUIDOORActivity associated with this group previously included deploying Squidoor (AKA FINALDRAFT) – an advanced backdoor used against high-value global targets since 2023.
Vendors
MicrosoftServer exploitation is the primary infection vector observed in this campaign — such as the exploitation of vulnerable, unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers and web servers to deploy web shells.Palo Alto NetworksPalo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats described in this article through the following products and services:
Products
Cortex XDRCortex XDR and XSIAMGlobalProtectIn one case, we found that a decoy software installer wrote to disk and executed a GlobalProtect installer.Microsoft ExchangeServer exploitation is the primary infection vector observed in this campaign — such as the exploitation of vulnerable, unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers and web servers to deploy web shells.
Tools
ASPXSpyWe observed a mix of custom and publicly available web shells, including variations of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5.Bysunue.aspxWe observed a mix of custom and publicly available web shells, including variations of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5.GodzillaWe observed a mix of custom and publicly available web shells, including variations of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5.MimikatzMimikatz and ProcDumpProcDumpMimikatz and ProcDumpPsExecLateral movement via PsExecSharpDPAPISharpDPAPI, to decrypt DPAPI credentials and secretssuo5We observed a mix of custom and publicly available web shells, including variations of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5.
