GrayCharlie Uses Compromised WordPress Sites to Deliver NetSupport RAT

Summary
Recorded Future details GrayCharlie’s WordPress-based delivery of NetSupport RAT through fake updates and ClickFix. Researchers observed at least 15 US law firm sites loading shared malicious JavaScript, but the suspected supply-chain link remains unconfirmed.
Key points
- GrayCharlie, which overlaps with SmartApeSG and has been active since mid-2023, injects malicious JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites to redirect visitors to malware lures.
- Two observed delivery chains use fake browser updates or ClickFix prompts to get users to run scripts or commands that install NetSupport RAT.
- The report links some infections to follow-on Stealc and SectopRAT deployments; in a controlled test, operators used NetSupport RAT for file handling and domain and account reconnaissance.
- Researchers identified two main NetSupport RAT C2 clusters, connecting servers through recurring TLS certificate patterns, license keys, serial numbers, and activity timing.
- At least 15 US law firm websites were observed loading the same malicious JavaScript. A supply-chain compromise involving SMB Team or shared WordPress components is suspected, not confirmed.
- Recorded Future recommends investigating the listed indicators, using its YARA, Snort, and Sigma detection rules, and monitoring for connections to malicious infrastructure and possible data exfiltration.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- GrayCharlie injects externally hosted JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites, redirecting visitors to fake browser-update pages or ClickFix lures.
- In the fake-update chain, victims manually run a downloaded JavaScript file; it launches WScript and PowerShell to retrieve staged instructions and a NetSupport RAT payload.
- In the ClickFix chain, a fake CAPTCHA copies a command to the clipboard and instructs the victim to paste it into the Windows Run dialog; the command retrieves a batch file and NetSupport RAT archive.
- The report says phishing emails, malicious PDFs, and links on gaming sites can direct users to compromised WordPress pages.
- The initial access vector is unknown. Insikt Group assesses that actors may purchase access or exploit vulnerable WordPress plugins. A possible supply-chain compromise involving at least 15 US law firm websites is suspected, with SMB Team or a shared plugin among the possible avenues.
- Defensive Notes
- Block validated GrayCharlie C2 IP addresses and domains, and investigate the report’s IoCs for past or ongoing infections.
- Flag and consider blocking connections to compromised websites; deploy updated YARA, Snort, and Sigma detection rules for NetSupport RAT.
- Use email filtering and monitor for data exfiltration to known malicious infrastructure.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | filmlerzltyazilimsx[.]shop | Domain associated with GrayCharlie Type 2 staging infrastructure and linked in WHOIS to the reported actor-registration email. |
| DOMAIN | foolowme[.]com | Domain listed as part of GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | pomofight[.]com | Domain listed as part of GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | vimsltd[.]com | Domain the report says TAG-124 used in its compromise of bianchilawgroup[.]com. |
| DOMAIN | yungask[.]com | Domain listed as part of GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]163[.]45[.]30 | NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]80[.]53[.]79 | IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 194[.]180[.]191[.]51 | NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1. |
| IPV4 | 5[.]181[.]156[.]234 | NetSupport RAT C2 server linked to GrayCharlie; used in the report’s controlled detonation. |
| IPV4 | 5[.]181[.]159[.]112 | NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 2. |
| IPV4 | 5[.]181[.]159[.]29 | Additional NetSupport RAT C2 server linked to GrayCharlie. |
| IPV4 | 5[.]181[.]159[.]60 | NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1. |
| IPV4 | 5[.]252[.]178[.]123 | NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1. |
| IPV4 | 77[.]83[.]199[.]162 | IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 77[.]83[.]199[.]3 | IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 1 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 79[.]141[.]162[.]135 | IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 79[.]141[.]163[.]169 | IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 85[.]158[.]111[.]29 | IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 1 staging infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 94[.]158[.]245[.]66 | NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1. |
| SHA256 | 31804c48f9294c9fa7c165c89e487bfbebeda6daf3244ad30b93122bf933c79c | NetSupport RAT sample detonated by Insikt Group; the report links its C2 activity to GrayCharlie. |
| SHA256 | 59e7e7698d77531bfbfea4739d29c14e188b5d3109f63881b9bcc87c72e9de78 | Sectop RAT DLL identified in the report’s observed sideloading activity. |
| SHA256 | 5f1bd92ad6edea67762c7101cb810dc28fd861f7b8c62e6459226b7ea54e1428 | Hash of the executable identified as “Merge XML Files” that sideloaded a Sectop RAT DLL. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//joiner[.]best/work/original[.]js | Externally hosted JavaScript URL used in GrayCharlie’s WordPress compromise activity. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//persistancejs[.]store/work/original[.]js | Malicious JavaScript URL observed on at least 15 US law firm websites. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//signaturepl[.]com/work/index[.]php?abje2LAw | Endpoint URL used by injected scripts on compromised WordPress sites. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1021.004 · SSHThe report says GrayCharlie administers staging infrastructure primarily over SSH.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationPowerShell retrieves an obfuscated JavaScript file containing encoded tasking.T1059.005 · Visual BasicThe JavaScript launches WScript, which spawns PowerShell to retrieve and decode staged instructions and payloads.T1059.007 · JavaScriptGrayCharlie injects JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites; JavaScript also acts as a loader in the fake-update chain.T1069.002 · Domain GroupsAfter connecting to C2, the operator ran a domain group reconnaissance command, including `net group /domain "Domain COmputers"`.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe report describes GrayCharlie’s NetSupport RAT C2 connectivity over TCP port 443.T1090 · ProxyInsikt Group assesses that GrayCharlie relies extensively on proxy services to administer its infrastructure.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferPowerShell or a ClickFix-delivered command retrieves ZIP archives containing NetSupport RAT and supporting files.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationThe initial access vector is unknown; Insikt Group says actors may have exploited vulnerable WordPress plugins, while also noting they may have purchased access.T1204 · User ExecutionFake browser updates prompt victims to run a script, while ClickFix lures instruct them to paste a copied command into Windows Run.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderThe attack chains create a Windows Run registry key to relaunch client32.exe at logon.T1566 · PhishingThe report says phishing emails can direct users to compromised WordPress pages hosting the malicious JavaScript.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingThe report says an executable sideloaded a DLL identified as Sectop RAT.
Threat Actors
GrayCharlieInsikt Group’s designation for a threat activity group that compromises WordPress sites and delivers NetSupport RAT, with observed Stealc and SectopRAT follow-on deployments. The report says its objectives remain uncertain.LandUpdate808The report identifies LandUpdate808 as another name for TAG-124, which it says compromised bianchilawgroup[.]com.SmartApeSGThe report says GrayCharlie overlaps with SmartApeSG and describes GrayCharlie as behind SmartApeSG; the activity includes fake browser-update and ClickFix delivery chains.TAG-124The report says TAG-124 also compromised bianchilawgroup[.]com, using vimsltd[.]com, since at least December 2025.WoodgnatThe report identifies Kongtuke as another name for TAG-124, which it says compromised bianchilawgroup[.]com.ZPHPThe report identifies ZPHP as another name for SmartApeSG, which it associates with the activity overlapping GrayCharlie.
Malware
NetSupport RATcompromises WordPress sites to inject externally hosted JavaScript that redirects visitors to NetSupport RAT payloads delivered via fake browser update pages or ClickFix lures, often resulting in Stealc andSectopRATRAT payloads delivered via fake browser update pages or ClickFix lures, often resulting in Stealc and SectopRAT follow-on deployments.StealCto NetSupport RAT payloads delivered via fake browser update pages or ClickFix lures, often resulting in Stealc and SectopRAT follow-on deployments.
Vendors
HZ Hosting LtdInsikt Group mapped extensive infrastructure tied to MivoCloud and HZ Hosting Ltd, identified multiple NetSupport RAT C2 clusters and staging domains, and observed a likely supplyâchain compromise impacting numerousMivoCloudInsikt Group mapped extensive infrastructure tied to MivoCloud and HZ Hosting Ltd, identified multiple NetSupport RAT C2 clusters and staging domains, and observed a likely supplyâchain compromise impacting numerousSMB Teammalicious JavaScript (persistancejs[.]store), suggesting a possible supplyâchain compromise involving SMB Team or shared hosting/plugin vulnerabilities.
Products
EdgeVisitors to these sites are shown convincing, browser-specific fake update prompts (such as for Chrome, Edge, or Firefox) that encourage them to download what appears to be an update but is actually malware.Google ChromeVisitors to these sites are shown convincing, browser-specific fake update prompts (such as for Chrome, Edge, or Firefox) that encourage them to download what appears to be an update but is actually malware.Microsoft Windows[T1547.001 ] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – Persistence was achieved by creating Windows Run registry keys to autostart client32.exe at logon (‘Registry Run key persistence’).Mozilla FirefoxVisitors to these sites are shown convincing, browser-specific fake update prompts (such as for Chrome, Edge, or Firefox) that encourage them to download what appears to be an update but is actually malware.WordPressGrayCharlie, active since mid-2023 and overlapping with SmartApeSG, compromises WordPress sites to inject externally hosted JavaScript that redirects visitors to NetSupport RAT payloads delivered via fake browser update
Tools
AcunetixThe NetSupport RAT C2 servers typically also host an instance of the vulnerability scanner Acunetix.SigmaMitigations recommended include blocking known C2 IPs/domains, flagging compromised websites, deploying YARA/Snort/Sigma detection rules, email filtering, and monitoring for data exfiltration.SnortMitigations recommended include blocking known C2 IPs/domains, flagging compromised websites, deploying YARA/Snort/Sigma detection rules, email filtering, and monitoring for data exfiltration.YARAMitigations recommended include blocking known C2 IPs/domains, flagging compromised websites, deploying YARA/Snort/Sigma detection rules, email filtering, and monitoring for data exfiltration.
