GrayCharlie Uses Compromised WordPress Sites to Deliver NetSupport RAT

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Summary

Recorded Future details GrayCharlie’s WordPress-based delivery of NetSupport RAT through fake updates and ClickFix. Researchers observed at least 15 US law firm sites loading shared malicious JavaScript, but the suspected supply-chain link remains unconfirmed.

Key points

  • GrayCharlie, which overlaps with SmartApeSG and has been active since mid-2023, injects malicious JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites to redirect visitors to malware lures.
  • Two observed delivery chains use fake browser updates or ClickFix prompts to get users to run scripts or commands that install NetSupport RAT.
  • The report links some infections to follow-on Stealc and SectopRAT deployments; in a controlled test, operators used NetSupport RAT for file handling and domain and account reconnaissance.
  • Researchers identified two main NetSupport RAT C2 clusters, connecting servers through recurring TLS certificate patterns, license keys, serial numbers, and activity timing.
  • At least 15 US law firm websites were observed loading the same malicious JavaScript. A supply-chain compromise involving SMB Team or shared WordPress components is suspected, not confirmed.
  • Recorded Future recommends investigating the listed indicators, using its YARA, Snort, and Sigma detection rules, and monitoring for connections to malicious infrastructure and possible data exfiltration.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • GrayCharlie injects externally hosted JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites, redirecting visitors to fake browser-update pages or ClickFix lures.
  • In the fake-update chain, victims manually run a downloaded JavaScript file; it launches WScript and PowerShell to retrieve staged instructions and a NetSupport RAT payload.
  • In the ClickFix chain, a fake CAPTCHA copies a command to the clipboard and instructs the victim to paste it into the Windows Run dialog; the command retrieves a batch file and NetSupport RAT archive.
  • The report says phishing emails, malicious PDFs, and links on gaming sites can direct users to compromised WordPress pages.
  • The initial access vector is unknown. Insikt Group assesses that actors may purchase access or exploit vulnerable WordPress plugins. A possible supply-chain compromise involving at least 15 US law firm websites is suspected, with SMB Team or a shared plugin among the possible avenues.
Defensive Notes
  • Block validated GrayCharlie C2 IP addresses and domains, and investigate the report’s IoCs for past or ongoing infections.
  • Flag and consider blocking connections to compromised websites; deploy updated YARA, Snort, and Sigma detection rules for NetSupport RAT.
  • Use email filtering and monitor for data exfiltration to known malicious infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINfilmlerzltyazilimsx[.]shopDomain associated with GrayCharlie Type 2 staging infrastructure and linked in WHOIS to the reported actor-registration email.
DOMAINfoolowme[.]comDomain listed as part of GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
DOMAINpomofight[.]comDomain listed as part of GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
DOMAINvimsltd[.]comDomain the report says TAG-124 used in its compromise of bianchilawgroup[.]com.
DOMAINyungask[.]comDomain listed as part of GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
IPV4185[.]163[.]45[.]30NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1.
IPV4185[.]80[.]53[.]79IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
IPV4194[.]180[.]191[.]51NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1.
IPV45[.]181[.]156[.]234NetSupport RAT C2 server linked to GrayCharlie; used in the report’s controlled detonation.
IPV45[.]181[.]159[.]112NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 2.
IPV45[.]181[.]159[.]29Additional NetSupport RAT C2 server linked to GrayCharlie.
IPV45[.]181[.]159[.]60NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1.
IPV45[.]252[.]178[.]123NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1.
IPV477[.]83[.]199[.]162IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
IPV477[.]83[.]199[.]3IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 1 staging infrastructure.
IPV479[.]141[.]162[.]135IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
IPV479[.]141[.]163[.]169IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 2 staging infrastructure.
IPV485[.]158[.]111[.]29IP address listed for GrayCharlie-associated Type 1 staging infrastructure.
IPV494[.]158[.]245[.]66NetSupport RAT C2 server listed in GrayCharlie’s Cluster 1.
SHA25631804c48f9294c9fa7c165c89e487bfbebeda6daf3244ad30b93122bf933c79cNetSupport RAT sample detonated by Insikt Group; the report links its C2 activity to GrayCharlie.
SHA25659e7e7698d77531bfbfea4739d29c14e188b5d3109f63881b9bcc87c72e9de78Sectop RAT DLL identified in the report’s observed sideloading activity.
SHA2565f1bd92ad6edea67762c7101cb810dc28fd861f7b8c62e6459226b7ea54e1428Hash of the executable identified as “Merge XML Files” that sideloaded a Sectop RAT DLL.
URLhxxps[:]//joiner[.]best/work/original[.]jsExternally hosted JavaScript URL used in GrayCharlie’s WordPress compromise activity.
URLhxxps[:]//persistancejs[.]store/work/original[.]jsMalicious JavaScript URL observed on at least 15 US law firm websites.
URLhxxps[:]//signaturepl[.]com/work/index[.]php?abje2LAwEndpoint URL used by injected scripts on compromised WordPress sites.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1021.004 · SSHThe report says GrayCharlie administers staging infrastructure primarily over SSH.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationPowerShell retrieves an obfuscated JavaScript file containing encoded tasking.T1059.005 · Visual BasicThe JavaScript launches WScript, which spawns PowerShell to retrieve and decode staged instructions and payloads.T1059.007 · JavaScriptGrayCharlie injects JavaScript into compromised WordPress sites; JavaScript also acts as a loader in the fake-update chain.T1069.002 · Domain GroupsAfter connecting to C2, the operator ran a domain group reconnaissance command, including `net group /domain "Domain COmputers"`.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe report describes GrayCharlie’s NetSupport RAT C2 connectivity over TCP port 443.T1090 · ProxyInsikt Group assesses that GrayCharlie relies extensively on proxy services to administer its infrastructure.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferPowerShell or a ClickFix-delivered command retrieves ZIP archives containing NetSupport RAT and supporting files.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationThe initial access vector is unknown; Insikt Group says actors may have exploited vulnerable WordPress plugins, while also noting they may have purchased access.T1204 · User ExecutionFake browser updates prompt victims to run a script, while ClickFix lures instruct them to paste a copied command into Windows Run.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderThe attack chains create a Windows Run registry key to relaunch client32.exe at logon.T1566 · PhishingThe report says phishing emails can direct users to compromised WordPress pages hosting the malicious JavaScript.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingThe report says an executable sideloaded a DLL identified as Sectop RAT.

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