MIMICRAT ClickFix Campaign Uses Compromised Websites to Deliver Custom RAT

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Summary

Elastic Security Labs analyzed a five-stage ClickFix campaign that uses compromised websites to deliver MIMICRAT, a custom RAT with token impersonation, malleable HTTPS C2 profiles and SOCKS5 proxying.

Key points

  • The ClickFix lure was delivered through compromised legitimate websites, including bincheck[.]io and investonline[.]in, and prompted victims to paste a clipboard-copied PowerShell command.
  • The five-stage chain uses an obfuscated PowerShell downloader, ETW and AMSI bypasses, a Lua in-memory loader, Meterpreter-like shellcode, and the MIMICRAT implant.
  • The Lua loader decrypts embedded shellcode and executes it in memory; researchers say the shellcode matched Meterpreter-related signatures.
  • MIMICRAT is a native x64 RAT with 22 commands, including file and process operations, token theft and impersonation, shellcode injection, and SOCKS proxy support.
  • The implant uses malleable HTTPS C2 profiles and layered RC4, RSA and AES encryption; identified infrastructure includes 23.227.202.114 and d15mawx0xveem1[.]cloudfront[.]net.
  • Elastic published a YARA rule for MIMICRAT. The campaign was reported active at the time of publication.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A ClickFix lure on compromised legitimate websites prompts victims to paste and run a PowerShell command copied to the clipboard.
  • An obfuscated PowerShell downloader retrieves a second-stage script, which disables ETW logging and AMSI scanning before extracting and running zbuild.exe.
  • The dropped Lua loader decrypts an embedded script and executes decoded shellcode in memory; the shellcode then reflectively loads MIMICRAT.
  • MIMICRAT communicates with C2 over HTTPS using malleable HTTP profiles and supports token theft and impersonation, file and process operations, shellcode injection, and SOCKS proxying.
Defensive Notes
  • Elastic Security created YARA rules to identify MIMICRAT; the article includes a rule named Windows_Trojan_MimicRat.
  • The investigation began after endpoint telemetry flagged suspicious PowerShell execution with obfuscated command-line arguments.
  • The article provides hashes, delivery and C2 infrastructure, and a malicious script URL for hunting.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINbincheck[.]ioCompromised victim-facing website injected with code that loads the campaign’s malicious script.
DOMAINwexmri[.]ccAlternate Stage 1 domain associated with the payload-delivery infrastructure.
DOMAINwww[.]ndibstersoft[.]comDomain associated with the post-exploitation C2 channel.
DOMAINxmri[.]networkStage 1 C2 and payload-delivery domain, reported to resolve to 45.13.212.250.
HOSTNAMEd15mawx0xveem1[.]cloudfront[.]netCloudFront hostname confirmed in the article as a MIMICRAT C2 relay.
IPV423[.]227[.]202[.]114Post-exploitation C2 infrastructure observed in beacon communications.
IPV445[.]13[.]212[.]250Stage 1 C2 and payload-delivery infrastructure.
IPV445[.]13[.]212[.]251Payload-delivery infrastructure associated with the campaign.
SHA256055336daf2ac9d5bbc329fd52bb539085d00e2302fa75a0c7e9d52f540b28bebSHA-256 of a related MIMICRAT beacon sample.
SHA2565e0a30d8d91d5fd46da73f3e6555936233d870ac789ca7dd64c9d3cc74719f51SHA-256 of the Lua loader.
SHA256a508d0bb583dc6e5f97b6094f8f910b5b6f2b9d5528c04e4dee62c343fce6f4bSHA-256 of the MIMICRAT beacon sample.
SHA256bcc7a0e53ebc62c77b7b6e3585166bfd7164f65a8115e7c8bda568279ab4f6f1SHA-256 of the Stage 1 PowerShell payload.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]investonline[.]in/js/jq.phpMalicious ClickFix JavaScript hosted on a compromised website and used to deliver the lure.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemA MIMICRAT command reads files from disk and sends their contents to C2.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe PowerShell stages use runtime string construction, arithmetic, and mixed-case obfuscation to conceal commands and domains.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelMIMICRAT’s HTTP POST profile is used for data exfiltration, including contents read from files.T1055 · Process InjectionThe shellcode stage reflectively loads MIMICRAT into memory; the article reports that its behavior is consistent with a loader.T1057 · Process DiscoveryMIMICRAT includes a command that enumerates running processes and their associated details.T1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterA statically embedded Lua interpreter runs a decrypted script that decodes and executes shellcode in memory.T1059.001 · PowerShellAn obfuscated PowerShell one-liner and second-stage PowerShell script perform downloading and defense evasion.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsMIMICRAT communicates with C2 over HTTPS using HTTP profiles designed to resemble legitimate analytics traffic.T1090 · ProxyMIMICRAT supports SOCKS proxy configuration and tunneling.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe PowerShell downloader retrieves a second-stage script, and the campaign delivers a payload archive.T1134.001 · Token Impersonation/TheftMIMICRAT duplicates a target process’s security token and can launch a process using a stolen token.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe chain decodes a base64-encoded ZIP archive and decrypts an embedded Lua script and shellcode.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseThe campaign injected malicious JavaScript into compromised legitimate websites used to deliver the ClickFix lure.T1204 · User ExecutionVictims were prompted to paste and run a malicious PowerShell command copied to their clipboard.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsThe second-stage script patches ETW and sets AMSI initialization to failed, disabling logging and scanning.

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