Fortinet Details XWorm Campaign Using CVE-2018-0802 and Process Hollowing

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Summary

FortiGuard Labs analyzed a phishing campaign using Excel attachments to exploit CVE-2018-0802, load a fileless .NET module, and inject XWorm 7.2 into Msbuild.exe; the RAT uses AES-encrypted C2 and modular plugins.

Key points

  • The campaign used multilingual, business-themed phishing emails with malicious Excel add-in attachments; the analyzed messages were flagged and blocked by FortiMail.
  • An embedded OLE object exploited CVE-2018-0802 in EQNEDT32.EXE to execute shellcode and download an HTA file.
  • The HTA ran JScript and PowerShell, which extracted a fileless .NET module from a JPEG and loaded it into memory.
  • The .NET module decoded and downloaded the XWorm payload, then used process hollowing to inject it into a suspended Msbuild.exe process.
  • Fortinet identified XWorm version 7.2 and a C2 server at berlin101[.]com:6000; the RAT encrypts network traffic with AES.
  • XWorm’s control commands and more than 50 plugins support remote system control and capabilities including data collection, DDoS, and ransomware.
  • Fortinet says its email, web-filtering, IPS, antivirus, and content-disarm protections detect or block elements of the campaign.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Multilingual, business-themed phishing emails carried malicious Excel add-in (.XLAM) attachments.
  • An embedded OLE object exploited CVE-2018-0802 in EQNEDT32.EXE to execute shellcode and download an HTA file.
  • The HTA ran JScript that decoded and executed a PowerShell payload; PowerShell retrieved an image containing a fileless .NET module.
  • The .NET module downloaded the XWorm payload and used process hollowing to run it in a newly created Msbuild.exe process.
Defensive Notes
  • FortiMail flagged the phishing emails as “virus detected” and blocked them before delivery.
  • FortiGuard Web Filtering rated the campaign URLs as malicious; FortiGuard Antivirus detects the Excel document, HTA, image file, and XWorm payload.
  • FortiOS and FortiMail CDR can disarm the embedded OLE object.
  • The article recommends phishing awareness and training, including FortiPhish phishing simulations.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINberlin101[.]comXWorm command-and-control server; the article reports port 6000.
SHA2563f4c3c16f63fb90d1fd64b031d8a9803035f3cb18332e198850896881fb42fe5SHA-256 hash of the image file containing the embedded .NET module.
SHA256eacd8e95ead3ffe2c225768ef6f85672c4bfdf61655ed697b97f598203ef2cf6SHA-256 hash of the XWorm RAT payload.
SHA256ee663d016894d44c69b1fdc9d2a5be02f028a56fc22b694ff7c1dacb2bbbcc6dSHA-256 hash of the malicious XLAM sample.
SHA256fd9ba9e6bd4886edc1123d4074d0eac363df61162364530b1303390aa621140bSHA-256 hash associated with the downloaded HTA file.
URLhxxp[:]//pub-3bc1de741f8149f49bdbafa703067f24[.]r2[.]dev/wwa.txtURL used by the .NET module to retrieve the encoded XWorm payload.
URLhxxps[:]//res[.]cloudinary[.]com/dbjtzqp4q/image/upload/v1767455040/optimized_MSI_lpsd9p.jpgSpecific image URL identified as malicious; the image contains the .NET module.
URLhxxps[:]//retrodayaengineering[.]icu/HGG.htaMalicious HTA download location used by the campaign.

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