ClickFix Campaign Uses Trojanized Shotcut ZIPs to Deliver REMCOS RAT

· Original article ↗

Summary

Cybereason GSOC reports REMCOS 7.1.0 campaigns using ClickFix lures and trojanized portable Shotcut ZIPs. A DLL loader chain uses callback-based shellcode execution to load the RAT, which can steal credentials and enable surveillance.

Key points

  • Cybereason GSOC reports observing increased REMCOS infections delivered through trojanized portable Shotcut ZIP packages.
  • The described infection chain uses a ClickFix lure, mshta.exe, PowerShell, and a ZIP archive disguised with a .pdf extension.
  • The legitimate Shotcut executable is reportedly unchanged; malicious DLLs, including libmlt-7.dll, load additional components that stage the payload.
  • The analysis describes shellcode execution through callback-style APIs such as EnumSystemCodePagesW, followed by in-memory loading of the final REMCOS payload from across.bin.
  • The observed REMCOS 7.1.0 capabilities include keylogging, browser credential and cookie theft, clipboard capture, screenshots, and microphone or webcam access.
  • The article recommends isolating and investigating affected endpoints, resetting credentials, reimaging systems, verifying software hashes, and blocking identified indicators, including the reported C2 domain pro.ip-api[.]com.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ClickFix social engineering uses a fake CAPTCHA to prompt victims to execute a malicious command.
  • The mshta.exe process downloads remote JavaScript, which spawns PowerShell to download a ZIP archive disguised with a .pdf extension.
  • A trojanized portable Shotcut package replaces the legitimate libmlt-7.dll with a malicious loader that loads additional DLLs and the REMCOS payload.
  • The loader uses callback-based shellcode execution through EnumSystemCodePagesW to run shellcode that loads across.bin into memory.
  • REMCOS communicates persistently with its C2 server and is used for credential theft, keylogging, surveillance, and data exfiltration.
Defensive Notes
  • Download software from official sources and verify package hashes against values published by the official source.
  • Isolate affected endpoints; preserve a forensic image if an investigation will be conducted, or restore the system from a trusted baseline.
  • Reset credentials associated with affected accounts, especially administrative accounts, and investigate potentially exposed data.
  • Block the identified C2 indicator across endpoints, networks, and security appliances.
  • Reimage infected systems to ensure eradication.
  • Educate users about supply-chain compromises and ClickFix/social-engineering lures.
  • Restrict remote-access tool installation to explicitly approved software and audit new installations.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINpro[.]ip-api[.]comIdentified as the C2 and callback domain used by the REMCOS campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//pro[.]ip-api[.]com/line/?key=QPVvv1rHQJD2pd2&fields=25948155C2 URL identified in the article for persistent REMCOS communications.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe loader surrounds the deobfuscated payload with random junk bytes to hinder memory analysis.T1055 · Process InjectionThe loader executes shellcode through a callback-style enumeration API, using the shellcode address as the callback pointer.T1056.001 · KeyloggingThe REMCOS payload captures keystrokes with an online/offline keylogger.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell downloads the second-stage archive disguised as a .pdf and extracts it using TAR.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsREMCOS uses persistent encrypted communications with its C2 server over HTTPS.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe infection downloads remote JavaScript and a second-stage archive from attacker C2 infrastructure.T1112 · Modify RegistryREMCOS modifies the registry, including changing the EnableLUA value.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe article reports that REMCOS captures screenshots and sends them to its operator.T1115 · Clipboard DataREMCOS captures clipboard contents, including copied passwords and other sensitive text.T1123 · Audio CaptureThe article reports REMCOS access to the victim's microphone for surveillance.T1125 · Video CaptureThe article reports REMCOS access to the webcam for surveillance or capture.T1218.005 · Mshtamshta.exe downloads remote JavaScript that spawns the PowerShell stage.T1548.002 · Bypass User Account ControlThe payload sets the EnableLUA registry value to 0 to suppress UAC prompts and enable privileged actions.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersREMCOS extracts stored logins, passwords, cookies, autofill data, and profiles from Chrome and Firefox.T1574.001 · DLLThe attackers replaced Shotcut's legitimate libmlt-7.dll with a malicious DLL that loads additional malicious libraries.

Malware

Products

Related Articles