Infoblox Links Sable Squirrel’s Expired Domains to Streaming, Gambling and RAT C2

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Summary

Infoblox reports that Sable Squirrel controls over 10,000 domains and estimates it spent more than $7 million acquiring expired domains. Its investigation links 405 domains to malware C2 and over 31,000 samples, but does not confirm ransomware execution.

Key points

  • Infoblox attributes more than 10,000 domains to Sable Squirrel and estimates its expired-domain purchases exceed $7 million; it priced roughly 160 purchases at over $430,000.
  • The investigation links 405 domains to malware C2, with more than 31,000 samples connecting to the actor’s domains.
  • Infoblox identified Quasar RAT, AsyncRAT, DCRat, NanoCore, Remcos and njRAT samples; some samples carried HiddenTear ransomware signatures.
  • Executable metadata in multiple samples contained Sable Squirrel brand names, and the samples shared configuration artifacts that Infoblox used to support its clustering.
  • Some domains served streaming sites while also acting as malware C2. Infoblox says a coordinated C2 configuration wave began in November 2025 and expanded in December.
  • Infoblox says Vietnamese enforcement actions in February and March 2026 did not stop the operation’s domain activity; it assesses a link to the prosecuted Xoi Lac TV network as highly likely, but not confirmed.
  • Sandbox analysis of the examined HiddenTear-signature samples did not show file encryption; Infoblox does not claim confirmed ransomware execution in the wild.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Sable Squirrel acquires expired domains and registers brand lookalikes, then uses the domains in its streaming, gambling, redirection, and malware infrastructure.
  • From November 2025, Sable Squirrel repurposed existing streaming domains as malware C2; Infoblox identified 405 such domains and reports that December accounted for 86% of the wave.
  • More than 31,000 malware samples were observed connecting to Sable Squirrel domains, including RAT families such as AsyncRAT, DCRat, and Quasar RAT. A representative Quasar sample included the actor’s streaming and betting brands in its Windows PE metadata and installed under a startup key named `xoilac`.
  • Actor-controlled redirection and cloaking domains route real viewers to betting platforms while directing automated visitors and people outside the target audience to dead ends.
  • ColaScore and VSBet mobile apps were published through developer accounts that Infoblox says appear to have been compromised.
  • In a separate incident, Balada Injector compromised the Sable Squirrel streaming site xemlaibongda[.]net and injected code that redirected visitors to a Balada TDS URL and then to BroPush.
Defensive Notes
  • Do not treat an aged domain’s history, backlinks, or residual traffic as reliable evidence of safety: Sable Squirrel puts many acquired domains into service quickly.
  • Infoblox reports a distinctive DNS fingerprint on domains it confirmed as Sable Squirrel malware infrastructure and uses it to identify related queries.
  • The streaming fleet’s stock WordPress sites have been compromised by an unrelated criminal operation, which the article identifies as an exposure in the operation’s infrastructure.
  • Expect domain churn and continued registration after enforcement actions; Infoblox observed new malware C2 domains appearing after the arrests.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN6789x[.]siteActor-controlled redirection and cloaking domain used to route viewers to betting platforms.
DOMAIN90phutyy[.]ioListed in the article’s Sable Squirrel infrastructure-domain set.
DOMAINapi-score[.]comSable Squirrel-controlled service providing live scores and odds to its streaming sites.
DOMAINcel-robox[.]comSable Squirrel-controlled domain used both for an illegal streaming site and as a Quasar RAT controller.
DOMAINchatboxn[.]comShared live-chat backend domain used by Sable Squirrel streaming sites.
DOMAINcolascore[.]comDomain for a betting platform that Infoblox assesses Sable Squirrel owns or controls.
DOMAINcolatv88xb[.]ccSable Squirrel C2 domain that accounted for nearly 70% of exposed customer networks in the reported set.
DOMAINgvapi[.]ccSable Squirrel proxy content-delivery domain used to mirror sports imagery and match-result content.
DOMAINimgts[.]comSable Squirrel server domain used to deliver images and page assets across streaming brands.
DOMAINkoepgd[.]appDomain in the dedicated streaming-server pool serving video for Sable Squirrel sites.
DOMAINlfastcdn[.]comSable Squirrel server domain used to deliver images and page assets across streaming brands.
DOMAINmeung[.]appDomain in the dedicated streaming-server pool serving video for Sable Squirrel sites.
DOMAINmsdht[.]appDomain in the dedicated streaming-server pool serving video for Sable Squirrel sites.
DOMAINmsrktz[.]appDomain in the dedicated streaming-server pool serving video for Sable Squirrel sites.
DOMAINrefvsb[.]comListed in the article’s Sable Squirrel infrastructure-domain set.
DOMAINsocoliveku[.]ccListed in the article’s Sable Squirrel infrastructure-domain set.
DOMAINsportliveapiz[.]comSable Squirrel-controlled sports-data feed used across its streaming brands.
DOMAINtrackervsb[.]liveListed as Sable Squirrel infrastructure; the article describes actor-controlled tracker domains across the operation.
DOMAINvsbet276[.]comDomain for a betting platform that Infoblox assesses Sable Squirrel owns or controls.
DOMAINws-xyz[.]comWebSocket service domain used by the streaming sites’ live chat.
DOMAINxemlaibongda[.]netCompromised Sable Squirrel streaming site where Balada Injector injected code that redirected visitors to its TDS.
DOMAINxoilacxys[.]topDomain reported to have hosted a financial scam targeting Russian-speaking users; the article suspects a registrar-account compromise and says it no longer resolves.
DOMAINxoilacz[.]comSable Squirrel streaming domain; the article says it shares the operation’s common streaming backend.
SHA2560464caa1c45cb753db25a95a30ce0b6814650b6f839a07cf8c2afdc143de7216Representative Quasar RAT sample associated with Sable Squirrel in the article’s indicators list.
URLhxxps[:]//bind[.]bestresulttostart[.]com/xf4mKQBalada Injector TDS URL reached through code injected into the compromised xemlaibongda[.]net site.

MITRE ATT&CK

Threat Actors

Malware

Vendors

Products

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Countries

Industries

BankingEducation made up the largest share, roughly one in five, followed by information technology and consulting at about one in seven, and then government, healthcare, and banking.ConsultingEducation made up the largest share, roughly one in five, followed by information technology and consulting at about one in seven, and then government, healthcare, and banking.EducationEducation made up the largest share, roughly one in five, followed by information technology and consulting at about one in seven, and then government, healthcare, and banking.GamblingSable Squirrel spends millions on expired domains to deliver illegal gambling, streaming, RAT malware, and ransomware in a massive cybercriminal enterprise.GovernmentSable Squirrel has acquired domains previously owned by real organizations that range from press outlets, charities, government and civic campaigns, well-known brands, and academic institutions.HealthcareEducation made up the largest share, roughly one in five, followed by information technology and consulting at about one in seven, and then government, healthcare, and banking.Information TechnologyEducation made up the largest share, roughly one in five, followed by information technology and consulting at about one in seven, and then government, healthcare, and banking.Sports streamingdomain history into its own criminal infrastructure, then using that infrastructure to run illegal sports streaming, online gambling promotion, and malware command-and-control (C2) side by side.

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