LeakNet Uses ClickFix and Deno Loader in Ransomware Attacks

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Summary

ReliaQuest reports LeakNet uses ClickFix on compromised websites to deliver commands, followed by a Deno-based in-memory loader and a repeatable chain involving DLL side-loading, PsExec, S3 exfiltration, and encryption.

Key points

  • ReliaQuest reports LeakNet has shifted from relying on initial access brokers to ClickFix delivered through compromised legitimate websites.
  • Fake CAPTCHA pages instruct users to run an msiexec.exe command through Windows Run.
  • LeakNet is assessed to use Deno to execute Base64-encoded JavaScript in memory, fetch additional payloads, and repeatedly retrieve and execute code.
  • The reported post-compromise sequence includes DLL side-loading, PsExec lateral movement, data exfiltration to S3 buckets, and encryption.
  • ReliaQuest says LeakNet uses klist to identify active authentication credentials and assess reachable accounts and services.
  • A separate Microsoft Teams phishing intrusion attempt used a similar Deno-based loader, but ReliaQuest did not attribute it.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • LeakNet uses ClickFix on compromised legitimate websites, where fake CAPTCHA checks trick users into copying and running an msiexec.exe command in the Windows Run dialog.
  • A Deno-based loader executes Base64-encoded JavaScript in memory, fingerprints the system, contacts an external server for next-stage malware, and polls for additional code.
  • LeakNet’s reported post-compromise sequence includes DLL side-loading, lateral movement with PsExec, exfiltration to S3 buckets, and encryption.
  • A separate, unattributed intrusion attempt used Microsoft Teams-based phishing to deliver a payload chain ending in a similar Deno-based loader.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor for fake CAPTCHA-driven instructions that prompt users to copy and run commands, including msiexec.exe, in the Windows Run dialog.
  • Detect Deno execution of Base64-encoded JavaScript, system fingerprinting, outbound requests to retrieve payloads, and repeated polling for additional code.
  • Look for DLL side-loading followed by PsExec use, cmd.exe /c klist execution, and suspicious data transfers to S3 buckets.
  • The article reports that the post-compromise sequence is consistent across the described LeakNet entry paths, offering behaviors defenders can monitor before ransomware deployment.

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