Lotus Wiper Used in Attacks on Venezuelan Energy and Utilities Organizations

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Summary

Kaspersky analyzed Lotus, a previously undocumented wiper reportedly used against Venezuelan energy and utilities organizations. Preparatory scripts disable defenses and hinder recovery before Lotus overwrites disks and removes recovery options.

Key points

  • Kaspersky analyzed Lotus after it was uploaded from a machine in Venezuela in mid-December.
  • The OhSyncNow.bat script disables UI0Detect and coordinates execution across domain-joined systems.
  • The notesreg.bat script can disable accounts and network interfaces, log off sessions, and deactivate cached logins.
  • Preparatory scripts use diskpart, robocopy, and fsutil to overwrite drives and fill free space.
  • Lotus uses IOCTL calls to overwrite physical disk sectors, clears the USN journal, deletes restore points, and removes files.
  • Kaspersky recommends monitoring for NETLOGON share changes, UI0Detect manipulation, mass account changes, disabled network interfaces, and unexpected diskpart, robocopy, or fsutil activity.
  • The article says there is no public evidence that PDVSA’s systems were wiped in a separate reported attack.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers ran OhSyncNow.bat to disable the UI0Detect service and coordinate execution across domain-joined systems.
  • When specified conditions were met, notesreg.bat enumerated users, changed passwords to disable accounts, logged off active sessions, disabled network interfaces, and deactivated cached logins.
  • Preparatory scripts used diskpart clean all, robocopy, and fsutil to overwrite drive contents and fill free space before decrypting and executing the Lotus wiper.
  • Lotus used disk IOCTL calls to overwrite physical sectors, cleared the USN journal, deleted restore points, and zeroed and removed files.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor for NETLOGON share changes, UI0Detect manipulation, mass account changes, and unexpected disabling of network interfaces.
  • Treat unexpected use of diskpart, robocopy, and fsutil as a red flag.
  • Maintain regular offline backups and frequently validate that they can be restored.

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