Five Malicious NuGet Packages Target Developers with Credential and Crypto Wallet Stealer

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Summary

Socket researchers found five malicious NuGet packages impersonating Chinese .NET libraries. The packages deliver an infostealer targeting browser credentials, crypto wallets, SSH keys, and files; about 65,000 downloads are reported, and the packages remain available.

Key points

  • The packages, published by NuGet account bmrxntfj, are IR.DantUI, IR.Infrastructure.Core, IR.Infrastructure.DataService.Core, IR.iplus32, and IR.OscarUI.
  • Each package combines a .NET Reactor-protected stealer with library code; its module initializer activates payload code when the DLL is loaded.
  • Researchers report 224 versions across the five package IDs, including 219 unlisted but fetchable versions, with frequent version rotation that can invalidate hash-based detections.
  • The stealer targets saved data from 12 browsers, five browser wallet extensions, eight desktop crypto wallets, as well as SSH keys, Outlook profiles, Steam credentials, and files in common user folders.
  • The reported C2 is dns-providersa2[.]com, with data staged at C:\ProgramData\Microsoft OneDrive\keys.dat before exfiltration.
  • The packages had accumulated about 64,784 downloads, potentially exposing developer workstations and CI/build systems that restored and loaded them.
  • Socket says all five packages remained available at publication and that it submitted takedown requests; it recommends checking dependency graphs, treating affected machines as compromised, and rotating accessible credentials.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Five malicious NuGet packages impersonated Chinese .NET UI and infrastructure libraries and included .NET Reactor-protected infostealer payloads.
  • Loading a package DLL triggered its module initializer automatically, which used a JIT hook to decrypt method bodies and execute the payload.
  • The packages harvested browser credentials, cookies, session tokens, wallet data, SSH keys, Outlook profiles, Steam session data, and files from user directories, then sent collected data to the C2.
  • The payload used process injection capabilities and staged harvested material at C:\ProgramData\Microsoft OneDrive\keys.dat.
  • The publisher rotated package versions and hid most prior versions from public search while keeping them fetchable via direct, version-pinned installs.
Defensive Notes
  • Check project files and packages.lock.json for IR.DantUI, IR.Infrastructure.Core, IR.Infrastructure.DataService.Core, IR.iplus32, and IR.OscarUI at any version; treat machines that restored and loaded them as compromised.
  • Rotate credentials accessible from affected machines, including browser passwords, API keys, SSH keys, cryptocurrency wallet seeds, and cloud provider credentials.
  • Block or alert on DNS resolution of dns-providersa2[.]com and outbound connections to 62[.]84[.]102[.]85.
  • Alert on creation of C:\ProgramData\Microsoft OneDrive\keys.dat, suspicious Edge IElevator interface requests, and outbound requests with randomly generated X- plus three-letter headers from build or developer machines.
  • Search dependency registries for the shared Git commit hash efb675de4b3af3dac3c9cae91075fd7cc2f4f98e, the Iplusus NuGet tag, and git[.]justdotrip[.]com.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN1-you[.]njalla[.]noNameserver listed for the primary C2 domain.
DOMAIN2-can[.]njalla[.]inNameserver listed for the primary C2 domain.
DOMAIN3-get[.]njalla[.]foNameserver listed for the primary C2 domain.
DOMAINdns-providersa2[.]comPrimary C2 domain used for beaconing and exfiltration.
DOMAINgit[.]justdotrip[.]comOperator development infrastructure listed in package metadata; not observed as active C2.
DOMAINjustdotrip[.]comParent domain associated with the operator development infrastructure.
IPV447[.]100[.]60[.]237IP address resolving from the operator development infrastructure domain.
IPV462[.]84[.]102[.]85C2 server IP address; outbound connections are recommended for alerting.
SHA256019e6c2cf58386039133981f3377b085fbd70c98ae8613c7c6a4f10a9f2d9824SHA-256 hash of the encrypted stage-2 resource in IR.iplus32 version 2.1.55.
SHA25634e2d63b5db7e24c808711c2ca0c0a42afde97a0086d7d81609110c002d18d7cSHA-256 hash of the encrypted stage-2 resource in IR.DantUI version 2.1.55.
SHA256596c453c9dbb7240f1ce05cc025496524ce7c538c23a9b2171174bf32b5691a1SHA-256 hash of the encrypted stage-2 resource in IR.OscarUI version 2.1.55.
SHA2568f7aa15c77bde94087bb74dfc072e25212797b313731b4cad0ded3e152268dcfSHA-256 hash of we4ftg.exe, the analyzed infostealer assembly.
SHA256b8543b2a1ad8862ebfef18924cf5444d2adfee996939963f4fc2748c582cf9a9SHA-256 hash of the encrypted stage-2 resource in IR.Infrastructure.Core version 2.1.55.
SHA256b8fa1b2fade45304c003909e375d2519ea447b498b7d93fe7c50db014d30f4faSHA-256 hash of the encrypted stage-2 resource in IR.Infrastructure.DataService.Core version 2.1.55.
SHA256e1869d6571894f058dd4ab2b66f060628dc364ee8e29afbd2323c95e5002fb8eSHA-256 hash of s4.exe, a memory dump containing a live stealer execution from the campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//dns-providersa2[.]com/checkC2 beacon and operator-validation endpoint.
URLhxxps[:]//dns-providersa2[.]com/uploadEndpoint used to upload exfiltrated data.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemThe stealer collected browser data, wallet files, SSH keys, Outlook and Steam data, and files from user directories.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or Information.NET Reactor encrypted method bodies and the payload used string-split API names to hinder static analysis.T1055.013 · Process DoppelgängingThe article lists this technique and describes SharpInjector and architecture-matched injection into long-lived processes; it does not describe process doppelgänging specifically.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe stealer used HTTP POST requests to C2 endpoints for beaconing and exfiltration.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe payload enumerated hostnames and usernames, including a test victim identity recovered from the memory dump.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryThe stealer walked wallet directories and harvested files under Documents, Desktop, and Downloads.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainMalicious NuGet packages impersonated legitimate libraries and delivered the infostealer through dependency installation and DLL loading.T1497.001 · System ChecksThe payload contained an internal blocklist of SHA-256 values, but the article says the blocked items were not identified and only suggests possible HWIDs, wallet addresses, or analyst-binary hashes.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieThe payload harvested browser cookies and session tokens.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesThe stealer collected SSH private keys and wallet seed files from local files.T1560 · Archive Collected DataThe article describes harvested material being staged as an archive before it was POSTed to the C2.

Threat Actors

Vendors

Products

.NET Reactorthat typosquat widely used Chinese .NET UI and infrastructure libraries. Each package grafts a .NET Reactor protected infostealer payload onto a decompiled copy of a legitimate open source library. The stealer7Starare: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by user-data path (avgbrowser / avg\\browser)AntdUIEach package claims to wrap a legitimate Chinese .NET library. IR.DantUI and IR.OscarUI wrap AntdUI, an MIT-licensed WinForms component library maintained on Gitee. The name "DantUI" is a one-character anagram ofAtomicDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.AVG Secure BrowserMicrosoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by user-data path (avgbrowser / avg\\browser) rather thanBinanceDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.BraveThe 12 targeted Chromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased byCoinbase Wallethnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad (Coinbase Wallet)CoinomiDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.ComodoChromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by user-data pathElectrumDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.Epic PrivacyThe 12 targeted Chromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased byExodusDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.Google ChromeThe 12 targeted Chromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased byGuardaDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.Iridiumare: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by user-data path (avgbrowser /JaxxDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.LedgerDesktop wallet directories for Exodus, Electrum, Atomic, Guarda, Coinomi, Ledger, Jaxx, and Binance are also walked.MetaMasknkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn (MetaMask)Microsoft Edgedatabases. It unseals the Chromium master key by invoking the Chromium IElevator com inference; the Microsoft Edge IElevator IID {c9c2b807-7731-4f34-81b7-44ff7779522b} was recovered intact from the memory dump. BothMozillarather than handled by generic Chromium profile enumeration, indicating deliberate targeting. Firefox, Mozilla, and Thunderbird are also in scope.Mozilla Firefoxrather than handled by generic Chromium profile enumeration, indicating deliberate targeting. Firefox, Mozilla, and Thunderbird are also in scope.NuGetSocket's Threat Research Team discovered five malicious NuGet packages published under the account bmrxntfj that typosquat widely used Chinese .NET UI and infrastructure libraries. Each package grafts a .NET ReactorOperaThe 12 targeted Chromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased byPhantombfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa (Phantom)Slimjetbrowsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by user-data pathThunderbirdby generic Chromium profile enumeration, indicating deliberate targeting. Firefox, Mozilla, and Thunderbird are also in scope.TorchChromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by user-dataTronLinkibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec (TronLink)Trust Walletegjidjbpglichdcondbcbdnbeeppgdph (Trust Wallet)VivaldiThe 12 targeted Chromium-family browsers are: Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Epic Privacy, Torch, Comodo, Slimjet, Iridium, 7Star, and AVG Secure Browser. AVG Secure Browser is special-cased by

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