Using EVENmonitor to Detect Active Directory Attacks in Real Time

Summary
A hands-on guide shows how EVENmonitor streams Domain Controller Security logs over MS-EVEN6 and maps Windows event IDs and forensic fields to detect common Active Directory attacks, from DCSync and credential attacks to account and group changes.
Key points
- EVENmonitor uses the MS-EVEN6 RPC interface to stream Domain Controller Security events agentlessly in real time, requiring credentials with Security log read access.
- The guide maps Event ID 4662 to DCSync detection, highlighting the DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUID and the actor’s SubjectUserName.
- It identifies Event ID 4768 with PreAuthType 0 as an AS-REP Roasting indicator, and clustered Event ID 4625 failures across usernames as a password-spraying pattern.
- For Pass-the-Hash detection, it recommends correlating Events 4624 and 4776; for Kerberoasting, it highlights Event 4769 and TicketEncryptionType 0x17.
- Other examples cover account creation and deletion, password resets, account status changes, privileged group membership changes, and computer account creation and deletion.
- The guide shows EVENmonitor installation through pipx and hash-based authentication, and presents the tool for incident response and purple-team exercises.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Agentless, real-time monitoring of Domain Controller Security logs through EVENmonitor and MS-EVEN6 to detect Active Directory attacks and account changes.
- Detection Methods
- Monitor Event ID 4662 for DCSync; investigate non-Domain-Controller accounts exercising the DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All right.
- Monitor Event ID 4768 for AS-REP Roasting; check for PreAuthType 0.
- Monitor Event ID 4625 for password spraying; correlate multiple TargetUserName values, a shared source IpAddress, Logon Type 3, and Status 0xC000006D.
- Correlate Events 4624 and 4776 for Pass-the-Hash; inspect LmPackageName, LogonType, and remote IpAddress.
- Monitor Event ID 4769 for Kerberoasting and Pass-the-Ticket; examine TicketEncryptionType, TargetUserName, source workstation, and LogonGuid.
- Monitor Events 4720, 4726, 4722, 4725, and 4724 for account creation, deletion, enablement, disablement, and password resets; correlate SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, and SubjectLogonId.
- Monitor Events 4728 and 4729 for changes to privileged group membership; inspect MemberName, TargetUserName, and SubjectUserName.
- Monitor Events 4741 and 4743 for computer account creation and deletion; review creator, ServicePrincipalNames, and subsequent attribute modifications.
- Data Sources
- Domain Controller Windows Security logs streamed through the MS-EVEN6 RPC interface
- Event fields including SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, PreAuthType, TicketEncryptionType, LogonType, IpAddress, LmPackageName, LogonGuid, SubjectLogonId, MemberName, and ServicePrincipalNames
- Rule Types
- Windows Security event-ID filters
- Event-field correlation and anomaly checks
- Platforms
- EVENmonitor
- Windows Domain Controllers
- Defensive Actions
- Use an account with Security log read access to stream Domain Controller events through MS-EVEN6.
- Investigate non-Domain-Controller accounts exercising the DCSync replication right.
- Correlate event fields and related logon events before distinguishing suspicious activity from normal authentication or administration.
- Review unauthorized account, password, group-membership, and computer-account changes; correlate actions through SubjectLogonId.
- Investigate short-lived computer accounts and computer-account changes involving msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1003.006 · DCSyncThe article demonstrates DCSync requests that retrieve domain password hashes, including the krbtgt hash, and identifies Event ID 4662 and the replication-right GUID as detection evidence.T1098 · Account ManipulationThe article describes resetting another user's password to seize the account and re-enabling disabled accounts to revive credentials or backdoor identities.T1098.007 · Additional Local or Domain GroupsThe article demonstrates adding an account to a privileged domain group and monitoring Event ID 4728 for the membership change.T1110.003 · Password SprayingThe article demonstrates trying one password against multiple usernames and detecting the resulting clustered failed logons in Event ID 4625.T1136.002 · Domain AccountThe article demonstrates remotely creating domain user and computer accounts and identifies Events 4720 and 4741 for detecting those creations.T1531 · Account Access RemovalThe article describes deleting accounts or disabling legitimate accounts to remove access or obstruct incident responders, with Events 4726 and 4725 used for detection.T1550.002 · Pass the HashThe article demonstrates authenticating over SMB with an NTLM hash and detecting the activity through Events 4624 and 4776.T1550.003 · Pass the TicketThe article describes replaying a stolen Kerberos ticket and correlating Event ID 4769 with source workstation and logon records.T1558.003 · KerberoastingThe article describes requesting service tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names and cracking the encrypted ticket material offline; Event ID 4769 and RC4-HMAC are cited as detection evidence.T1558.004 · AS-REP RoastingThe article describes requesting a ticket for an account without Kerberos pre-authentication and detecting it through Event ID 4768 with PreAuthType 0.
Products
Microsoft Active DirectoryEVENmonitor streams Domain Controller Security logs in real time and decodes Windows events to reveal Active Directory attacks the moment they occur.Microsoft WindowsEVENmonitor streams Domain Controller Security logs in real time and decodes Windows events to reveal Active Directory attacks the moment they occur.
Tools
bloodyadThe bloodyAD utility provisions a new account remotely without ever touching the Domain Controller console by using the following command:EVENmonitorEVENmonitor streams Domain Controller Security logs in real time and decodes Windows events to reveal Active Directory attacks the moment they occur.ImpacketImpacket’s getTGT requests a Ticket Granting Ticket using only an NTLM hash, after which psexec consumes the cached ticket through the -k -no-pass flags and for all this, we will use the combination of the followingldap_shellThe ldap_shell utility provides a convenient interactive interface for the deletion.NetExecNetExec performs the synchronisation through the SMB protocol and dumps the entire NTDS.dit hash database.
