Using EVENmonitor to Detect Active Directory Attacks in Real Time

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Summary

A hands-on guide shows how EVENmonitor streams Domain Controller Security logs over MS-EVEN6 and maps Windows event IDs and forensic fields to detect common Active Directory attacks, from DCSync and credential attacks to account and group changes.

Key points

  • EVENmonitor uses the MS-EVEN6 RPC interface to stream Domain Controller Security events agentlessly in real time, requiring credentials with Security log read access.
  • The guide maps Event ID 4662 to DCSync detection, highlighting the DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUID and the actor’s SubjectUserName.
  • It identifies Event ID 4768 with PreAuthType 0 as an AS-REP Roasting indicator, and clustered Event ID 4625 failures across usernames as a password-spraying pattern.
  • For Pass-the-Hash detection, it recommends correlating Events 4624 and 4776; for Kerberoasting, it highlights Event 4769 and TicketEncryptionType 0x17.
  • Other examples cover account creation and deletion, password resets, account status changes, privileged group membership changes, and computer account creation and deletion.
  • The guide shows EVENmonitor installation through pipx and hash-based authentication, and presents the tool for incident response and purple-team exercises.

Article Details

Defense Focus
Agentless, real-time monitoring of Domain Controller Security logs through EVENmonitor and MS-EVEN6 to detect Active Directory attacks and account changes.
Detection Methods
  • Monitor Event ID 4662 for DCSync; investigate non-Domain-Controller accounts exercising the DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All right.
  • Monitor Event ID 4768 for AS-REP Roasting; check for PreAuthType 0.
  • Monitor Event ID 4625 for password spraying; correlate multiple TargetUserName values, a shared source IpAddress, Logon Type 3, and Status 0xC000006D.
  • Correlate Events 4624 and 4776 for Pass-the-Hash; inspect LmPackageName, LogonType, and remote IpAddress.
  • Monitor Event ID 4769 for Kerberoasting and Pass-the-Ticket; examine TicketEncryptionType, TargetUserName, source workstation, and LogonGuid.
  • Monitor Events 4720, 4726, 4722, 4725, and 4724 for account creation, deletion, enablement, disablement, and password resets; correlate SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, and SubjectLogonId.
  • Monitor Events 4728 and 4729 for changes to privileged group membership; inspect MemberName, TargetUserName, and SubjectUserName.
  • Monitor Events 4741 and 4743 for computer account creation and deletion; review creator, ServicePrincipalNames, and subsequent attribute modifications.
Data Sources
  • Domain Controller Windows Security logs streamed through the MS-EVEN6 RPC interface
  • Event fields including SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, PreAuthType, TicketEncryptionType, LogonType, IpAddress, LmPackageName, LogonGuid, SubjectLogonId, MemberName, and ServicePrincipalNames
Rule Types
  • Windows Security event-ID filters
  • Event-field correlation and anomaly checks
Platforms
  • EVENmonitor
  • Windows Domain Controllers
Defensive Actions
  • Use an account with Security log read access to stream Domain Controller events through MS-EVEN6.
  • Investigate non-Domain-Controller accounts exercising the DCSync replication right.
  • Correlate event fields and related logon events before distinguishing suspicious activity from normal authentication or administration.
  • Review unauthorized account, password, group-membership, and computer-account changes; correlate actions through SubjectLogonId.
  • Investigate short-lived computer accounts and computer-account changes involving msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.006 · DCSyncThe article demonstrates DCSync requests that retrieve domain password hashes, including the krbtgt hash, and identifies Event ID 4662 and the replication-right GUID as detection evidence.T1098 · Account ManipulationThe article describes resetting another user's password to seize the account and re-enabling disabled accounts to revive credentials or backdoor identities.T1098.007 · Additional Local or Domain GroupsThe article demonstrates adding an account to a privileged domain group and monitoring Event ID 4728 for the membership change.T1110.003 · Password SprayingThe article demonstrates trying one password against multiple usernames and detecting the resulting clustered failed logons in Event ID 4625.T1136.002 · Domain AccountThe article demonstrates remotely creating domain user and computer accounts and identifies Events 4720 and 4741 for detecting those creations.T1531 · Account Access RemovalThe article describes deleting accounts or disabling legitimate accounts to remove access or obstruct incident responders, with Events 4726 and 4725 used for detection.T1550.002 · Pass the HashThe article demonstrates authenticating over SMB with an NTLM hash and detecting the activity through Events 4624 and 4776.T1550.003 · Pass the TicketThe article describes replaying a stolen Kerberos ticket and correlating Event ID 4769 with source workstation and logon records.T1558.003 · KerberoastingThe article describes requesting service tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names and cracking the encrypted ticket material offline; Event ID 4769 and RC4-HMAC are cited as detection evidence.T1558.004 · AS-REP RoastingThe article describes requesting a ticket for an account without Kerberos pre-authentication and detecting it through Event ID 4768 with PreAuthType 0.

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