Fake Claude App Promoted in Bing Ads Delivers SectopRAT Malware

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Summary

Huntress says a Bing malvertising campaign used a fake Claude desktop installer to deliver SectopRAT, compromising at least 29 organizations. The chain used DLL sideloading and anti-analysis checks; the malware retrieves C2 addresses via Ethereum transactions.

Key points

  • Huntress reports that the FakeAgent campaign compromised at least 29 organizations between July 21 and 22; it did not attribute the campaign to a known threat cluster.
  • Bing ads led users to a malicious Claude Artifact hosted on the legitimate Claude[.]ai domain. Huntress says it was downloaded 7,100 times before Anthropic removed it.
  • A fake ClaudeDesktop.exe installer used a legitimate JetBrains Chromium component to sideload a malicious libcef.dll and deliver SectopRAT.
  • A separate DockerDesktop.exe executable installed a scheduled task for persistence.
  • Loaders and staging components used anti-analysis measures including VMProtect packing, shader timing checks, GPU and VRAM checks, and virtual-machine detection.
  • SectopRAT, also known as ArechClient2, can steal credentials and other user data and provides hidden remote-access functionality. It retrieves C2 addresses through Ethereum BNB Smart Chain transactions.
  • Analysis of the decrypted .NET payload supported attribution to SectopRAT operations or a closely related fork; Huntress found related infrastructure but said evidence was insufficient to identify a known threat cluster.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Bing ads promoted a fake Claude desktop app installer, which was delivered through a malicious Claude Artifact hosted on the legitimate Claude.ai domain.
  • A legitimate JetBrains Chromium component sideloaded a malicious DLL to deliver SectopRAT.
  • Another executable, DockerDesktop.exe, installed a scheduled task for persistence.
  • Loaders and staging components used VMProtect packing, shader timing checks, GPU and VRAM checks, and virtual-machine detection.
  • SectopRAT retrieved a working command-and-control address from Ethereum BNB Smart Chain transactions.
Defensive Notes
  • Download software from official websites and download portals rather than search results, especially sponsored results.

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