Netskope Traces Fake CAPTCHA PDFs to Malware and Scam Funnels

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Summary

Netskope traced more than 12,700 similar FakeCaptcha PDFs on Webflow’s CDN to a traffic-distribution network that routes visitors to malware, reseller infrastructure, or scams. Its analysis describes the gate’s filters and more durable detection signals.

Key points

  • A TLSH fingerprint search found more than 12,700 structurally similar PDFs; a tighter vhash pivot identified about 2,480 files in two clusters analyzed by Netskope, with the earliest submitted in May 2025.
  • The PDFs pose as upgrade guides and use fake CAPTCHA panels to direct visitors into a traffic-distribution system. Google accounted for about 98% of observed referrers.
  • The custom Elixir/Phoenix gate applies IP and autonomous-system checks, Cloudflare Turnstile and JWT checks, then geographic and device filtering. Non-qualifying visitors may be sent to search-arbitrage ads.
  • Netskope observed routing to a Legion Loader distribution hub and a reseller gate. It also found a premium-SMS subscription scam targeting Spanish-speaking users, though the link between that scam and this campaign’s TDS is inferred.
  • In a previously documented Legion Loader branch, a fake CAPTCHA prompts victims to use Win+R and paste a command to install an MSI. Netskope reports independently confirming routing to that hub through telemetry.
  • Netskope says the PDF structure and ww80/wwNN router pattern persisted across infrastructure rotation, while lure domains changed over time; it recommends focusing detection on these more stable signals.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • FakeCaptcha PDFs presented in Google search results as ordinary upgrade guides direct users to a traffic-distribution system (TDS).
  • Clicking the fake CAPTCHA in a PDF sends the visitor to a ww80/wwNN router, which applies IP/ASN, geo, and device filtering before routing qualified traffic.
  • One branch leads to berapt-medii[.]com, where a fake CAPTCHA reportedly prompts victims to press Win+R and paste a command to install an MSI that drops Legion Loader.
  • A TDS reseller branch uses yfdpco domains and sk-park[.]php; the article says the destination for qualifying visitors is not pinned.
  • A premium-SMS scam flow uses a QR-based fake CAPTCHA to route Spanish-speaking users through several pages to a phone-number collection page and an SMS subscription prompt.
Defensive Notes
  • Netskope recommends detection based on the stable PDF structural fingerprint, the wwNN router subdomain pattern, and rotating lure domains.
  • The article says blocking Webflow's shared CDN is not practical; it recommends blocking listed malicious domains and infrastructure at the gate rather than merely alerting.
  • Netskope describes inline signatures for known malicious PDFs, sandbox analysis for patient-zero samples and variants, threat-intelligence blocking for lure and TDS infrastructure, and payload coverage for Legion Loader.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINberapt-medii[.]comLegion Loader distribution hub; the article reports fake-CAPTCHA delivery activity at this domain.
DOMAINbinonelola[.]comListed as a 2026 lure domain and observed as payload infrastructure contacted by a dropper sample.
DOMAINbovetewa[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINchromovira[.]orgRouting domain in the premium-SMS scam flow, adding another FakeCaptcha step.
DOMAINdutabuz[.]com2025 FakeCaptcha lure domain used as front-door infrastructure.
DOMAINgodoxevez[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINgowixese[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINjufewine[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINmaxudijuz[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINnurepikis[.]com2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain; also used in the ww19 traffic-router hostname.
DOMAINpofezaf[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINriwitamo[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINscorenetsystems[.]proScam landing-page domain used in the premium-SMS subscription flow.
DOMAINsolidlinkpro[.]infoPhone-number-harvesting page in the premium-SMS subscription scam flow.
DOMAINtugoduzak[.]com2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain; also used in the ww80 traffic-router hostname.
DOMAINvimemug[.]comListed 2026 FakeCaptcha lure domain.
DOMAINyfdpco1[.]comTDS reseller gate domain identified as shared routing infrastructure.
DOMAINyfdpco2[.]comListed as a stage-2 TDS gate domain.
DOMAINyfdpco4[.]comTDS reseller gate domain identified as shared routing infrastructure.
DOMAINzuwufag[.]com2025 FakeCaptcha lure domain used as front-door infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEww19[.]nurepikis[.]comTraffic-router hostname used to direct visitors through the TDS.
HOSTNAMEww80[.]tugoduzak[.]comTraffic-router hostname used to direct visitors through the TDS.
IPV4185[.]53[.]179[.]200Identified as the IP address of a ww80 traffic router.
IPV4188[.]72[.]236[.]249Identified as the IP address of the berapt-medii[.]com Legion Loader hub.
IPV4208[.]91[.]196[.]46Identified as the yfdpco gate backend IP address.
IPV4212[.]92[.]104[.]119Identified as a TDS entry-gate IP address.
SHA25687b8b76762eac941c562c6c8eefb8402f48fc70fcfe360a274b12e75dd5726e2Hash of the Documentos[.]pdf.exe dropper sample; the article reports a generic Trojan.Win32.Injuke verdict and describes it as fitting the malware-distribution branch.

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