Cloud Logging Guidance Highlights Control-Plane Logs for Threat Detection

· Original article ↗

Summary

The article recommends prioritizing control-plane logs for cloud threat detection and offers AWS, Azure, GCP and Google Workspace configuration and retention tips, including coverage gaps to consider.

Key points

  • The framework groups cloud logs by identity, data, network, compute and control-plane security use cases; the article focuses on control-plane logs.
  • Control-plane logs can capture sign-ins, resource and user changes, and resource-read activity, helping detect unusual sign-ins, brute force, persistence, enumeration and destructive activity.
  • For AWS, the article recommends an Organization Trail to cover new accounts; one copy of ongoing management events delivered to an S3 bucket is free.
  • For Azure, subscription activity logs are retained for 90 days by default, while Entra audit and sign-in logs range from 7 to 30 days depending on the license. It recommends diagnostic settings for longer retention and notes missing control-plane read visibility.
  • For GCP, Admin Activity logs are enabled by default and retained for 400 days; Data Access ADMIN_READ logs must be enabled to capture control-plane reads.
  • Google Workspace Admin, Login, SAML, OAuth and Groups logs are enabled by default and retained for six months; streaming them to GCP can centralize access.
  • The article recommends combining log-based detection with runtime detectors and regularly reassessing coverage as cloud environments change.

Article Details

Defense Focus
Improve cloud control-plane visibility to detect and investigate suspicious identity, resource-management, and access activity.
Detection Methods
  • Analyze sign-in logs for activity from unusual locations or providers.
  • Monitor for password brute-force activity, unusual resource creation, and creation or modification of users, roles, virtual machines, or functions.
  • Review activity across multiple services for enumeration, including resource listings and metadata access where the relevant logs are available.
  • Monitor S3 data events in CloudTrail to help detect data exfiltration targeting S3 buckets.
  • Combine log-based detections with runtime detectors.
Data Sources
  • AWS CloudTrail management events and S3 data events
  • Azure subscription activity logs, Entra sign-in and audit logs, and resource-level logs
  • Google Cloud Audit Logs, including Admin Activity, Data Access, System Event, and Policy Denied events
  • Google Workspace Admin, Login, SAML, OAuth, and Groups logs
Defensive Actions
  • Use an AWS Organization Trail so newly created accounts are covered by logging.
  • Extend log retention by sending logs to an additional destination; configure Azure diagnostic settings for longer retention.
  • Enable Google Cloud Data Access ADMIN_READ logs across services to capture control-plane read operations.
  • Enable Google Cloud Data Access DATA_WRITE logs where resource-configuration changes need monitoring.
  • Stream Google Workspace logs into GCP audit logs for centralized review.
  • Continuously assess logging coverage as the cloud environment changes and ensure new resources are monitored.

Vendors

Products

Related Articles