AmnesiaStealer Uses ClickFix to Steal macOS Data and Hijack Browser Sessions

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Summary

Jamf Threat Labs analyzed AmnesiaStealer, a three-stage macOS infostealer spread through ClickFix. It collects credentials and data, while a second module enables hidden, operator-controlled browser sessions; several attempted macOS bypasses failed in testing.

Key points

  • A counterfeit GitHub download page uses ClickFix to trick visitors into pasting a command into Terminal, which downloads and launches the malware.
  • The Rust-based first stage targets keychains, Chromium browser data, Apple Notes, Telegram sessions, documents and wallet-extension data; it also installs a LaunchDaemon for persistence.
  • The malware prompts for the user's login password and validates it locally. Jamf observed it using the password to unlock keychains and collect protected data.
  • On macOS 26, attempted Safari-cookie and TCC database bypasses failed. The researchers also found the malware's destructive Chrome Safe Storage key rewrite is conditional and can make previously saved browser data undecryptable.
  • A remotely launched second stage clones a browser profile and provides hidden, live browser control through the Chrome DevTools Protocol. In lab testing, it exported plaintext cookies through the browser.
  • The researchers found the second stage waits for operator commands and does not persist independently; several older macOS bypass techniques in the malware were ineffective in their testing.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ClickFix lure on a counterfeit GitHub download page instructs macOS users to paste a command into Terminal; the command downloads and launches the first-stage payload.
  • The first-stage payload collects credentials and files, stages them locally, and uploads the archive to the C2 infrastructure.
  • A task from the panel triggers retrieval and execution of a second-stage module, which clones the victim's Chromium profile and enables hidden, operator-controlled browser sessions.
Defensive Notes
  • Jamf recommends configuring Jamf for Mac threat prevention, advanced threat controls, and web protection to Block and Report to help prevent similar threats.
  • The article identifies browser Safe Storage entries being deleted and rewritten through the security command-line tool as a high-value detection opportunity.
  • The observed sample's APFS snapshot and TCC database bypass attempts failed on macOS 26; the article reports that the sample's debug strings record those failures.
  • Monitor for suspicious LaunchDaemon installation, collection and archiving of browser and user data, and uploads to the identified C2 infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINdebug[.]allllowef[.]spaceC2 host serving the Amnesia Panel, bot API, payload archive, and upload endpoint.
SHA256de5748aac4a4d4cb48cf050652679e6bc49eda33d9ffaa0d280b578122fab55aSHA-256 hash of the AmnesiaStealer Stage 1 payload analyzed in the article.
SHA256e853748ca8f9a5a9168263617409a9039ab09f4ffc7d860374c1e3b0b67b31a5SHA-256 hash of the AmnesiaStealer Stage 2 stream module analyzed in the article.
URLhxxps[:]//github[.]aoitour[.]comCounterfeit GitHub download page used to deliver the ClickFix lure.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemThe malware collects local browser data, notes, Telegram session data, documents, and keychain files.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe malware uploads collected data to its C2 endpoint.T1056.002 · GUI Input CaptureThe malware presents a native Installer-style password prompt and validates the entered password locally.T1059.002 · AppleScriptThe embedded AppleScript collects Apple Notes, Telegram data, Safari data, and keychain files.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe first-stage shell script downloads and launches the payload; the malware also runs shell commands during collection and cleanup.T1074.001 · Local Data StagingCollected data is placed in a staging directory under /tmp before being archived and uploaded.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe payload gathers the macOS version, hardware identifiers, serial number, and system information.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferStage 1 fetches and launches the Stage 2 stream module from the C2 infrastructure when commanded.T1185 · Browser Session HijackingThe Stage 2 module clones the victim's browser profile and gives the operator hidden, interactive control of the logged-in browser session.T1204.004 · Malicious Copy and PasteThe ClickFix lure instructs victims to paste a supplied command into Terminal and run it.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieThe Stage 2 module exports browser cookies, including decrypted cookie values obtained through the Chrome DevTools Protocol.T1543.004 · Launch DaemonThe malware installs a root LaunchDaemon configured with KeepAlive and RunAtLoad for persistence.T1555.001 · KeychainThe malware unlocks and copies macOS login and data-protection keychain files.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersThe malware collects Chromium credential databases and browser profile data, including saved-login data.T1560.001 · Archive via UtilityThe malware archives its staging directory using ditto before exfiltration.

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