Hirudo Android Banking Trojan Replaces Apps to Bypass Built-In Security Checks

· Original article ↗

Summary

ThreatFabric says Hirudo replaces eight Indonesian banking apps with tampered copies that bypass in-app security checks, while stealing credentials and enabling remote control. It is delivered through fake update prompts in dropper apps.

Key points

  • Hirudo is delivered by shopping, adult-video, and entertainment dropper apps that prompt users to install it as a separate app.
  • Fake storefronts, video catalogues, and other lure content make the droppers appear legitimate; distribution pages reportedly impersonate Google Play Store listings.
  • The malware targets credentials across Indonesia, China, India, Mexico, Morocco, and Thailand; it can also capture payment PINs, screens, camera input, and SMS.
  • For eight Indonesian banking apps, Hirudo prompts users to uninstall the genuine app and installs a bank-specific, tampered replacement.
  • The replacements use a hooking engine to manipulate signing-certificate, accessibility, screen-capture, and Play Integrity checks.
  • The operation’s backend manages device control, campaigns, and stolen data, including lock-screen history and financial profiles.
  • ThreatFabric says the technique can make app-generated integrity signals attacker-influenced; it recommends verifying them server-side.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Dropper apps posing as shopping, adult-video, entertainment, short-drama, and football apps serve Hirudo as a separate package through a fake in-app update.
  • Fake web pages resembling Google Play Store landing pages distribute the dropper apps; users are reported to be directed to them through ads on Meta-owned social media platforms.
  • Hirudo prompts users to uninstall genuine banking apps and downloads bank-specific patched replacements that return attacker-supplied responses to security checks.
  • The malware uses fake payment-PIN, bank-login, lock-screen pattern, and PIN screens to capture credentials, and enables remote device control, screen and camera capture, and SMS theft.
  • A deliberately non-functional VPN connection is configured before payload installation to block internet access and reduce the effectiveness of online reputation and code-analysis checks.
Defensive Notes
  • Treat local app signals—including signing certificates, accessibility-service lists, and integrity verdicts—as potentially attacker-influenced when an app may have been replaced; verify them server-side.
  • A valid Play Integrity response alone is not evidence that an app is untampered when the request has been relayed rather than genuinely produced.
  • The article notes that the VPN-based blocking mechanism does not completely disable Play Protect because it can also detect known potentially harmful applications offline.

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