CloudSEK Finds ‘Party’ Panel Renting Android Banking Trojans to Target Indian Institutions

Summary
CloudSEK analyzed a multi-tenant service that builds bank-branded Android lures and trojans. Static analysis found the malware can steal card details, SMS and photos, forward calls, and send data through C2 and Telegram.
Key points
- The panel API was accessible without login and exposed 50 tenants; 34 had approved paid licences, targeting customers of six Indian financial institutions and users of government services.
- Fake Play Store pages collected card details and streamed keystrokes to the panel, then guided victims to sideload a branded APK.
- The dropper disguises a second APK installation as a Play Store install, disables Google Play Protect verification, and uses a dead local VPN tunnel to disrupt Play Store traffic.
- The hidden payload can forward SMS, including bank OTPs, upload inbox contents and gallery photos, send SMS, and activate call forwarding.
- The investigation identified Firebase messaging and storage, 13 Telegram bots, and a WebSocket C2; CloudSEK assessed with medium confidence that the operator is based in India.
- CloudSEK said it analyzed both APK stages statically without running them and did not access victim records; some lures and APKs were still live on November 14, 2026.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Bank-branded fake Play Store pages collect card details and stream keystrokes to the panel, including from forms that are abandoned before submission.
- The pages guide victims to sideload a dropper APK, which decrypts and installs a second APK while posing as the Play Store.
- The payload receives commands through Firebase Cloud Messaging, forwards SMS messages, uploads SMS and gallery data, and enables call forwarding.
- Defensive Notes
- Install banking apps only from official app stores and verify the developer; do not install APKs from links, SMS, or WhatsApp.
- Banks and security teams should monitor call-forwarding activation and new-device OTP use around card-not-present transactions.
- Block the reported indicators at network, email, and mobile threat-defence layers, and report hosting, Firebase, and Telegram abuse.
- For an infected device, the article advises cancelling call forwarding with ##002#, blocking the card through official channels, uninstalling the app, and reporting the incident.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | sanaminfotech[.]onlinenode3[.]sanaminfotech[.]online | Operator domain used for a WebSocket node; reported as being on clientHold. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]129[.]96[.]11 | Payload C2 host; the article assesses that it is most likely compromised or misused. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]151[.]199[.]22 | Host serving the bank-branded lure pages, panel API, and APKs. |
| SHA1 | 927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9 | SHA-1 certificate fingerprint of the signer used for both APK stages. |
| SHA256 | 5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff | Hash of the com.userdb.customer Stage 2 payload, identified as an SMS stealer. |
| SHA256 | 66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7 | Hash of the bank-branded credit-card APK identified as the Stage 1 dropper. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1406The dropper uses XOR to decrypt an embedded asset into the second APK.T1417.001The fake-page script captures and streams each keystroke entered into the card-data form.T1437.001The payload uses a WebSocket C2 connection, and the article also reports command delivery through Firebase Cloud Messaging.T1476The fake bank-branded pages direct victims to download and sideload the malicious APK.T1622 · Debugger EvasionThe malware checks for emulator, Frida, Xposed, and Magisk environments to frustrate analysis.T1624.001The payload restarts on boot and power events, consistent with execution triggered by broadcast receivers.T1629.001The dropper disables the Google Play Protect verifier.T1636.004The payload forwards incoming SMS messages, including bank OTPs, and uploads the SMS inbox.T1646The payload uploads SMS and gallery data to the C2 and Telegram.
Vendors
Products
Androiduncovered a rent-a-trojan service that lets fraudsters spin up fake Google Play pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers in minutes. A fake credit-card "app" page impersonatingBeVigilUse BeVigil to analyse suspicious APKs that carry your brand and to audit your official apps for exposed secrets.Firebase Cloud MessagingOn commands delivered through Firebase Cloud Messaging it forwards every incoming SMS, including bank OTPs, to the C2, to Telegram and to an operator phone number; uploads the SMS inbox and gallery photos, which oftenGoogle PlayAI digital risk platform, XVigil, uncovered a rent-a-trojan service that lets fraudsters spin up fake Google Play pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers in minutes. A fakeGoogle Play ProtectThe APK is a dropper that fakes a Play Store install to slip past Android 13+ Restricted Settings, switches off Google Play Protect and installs a hidden SMS stealer.XvigilCloudSEK's contextual AI digital risk platform, XVigil, uncovered a rent-a-trojan service that lets fraudsters spin up fake Google Play pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers in
Tools
Fridaand starts a local VPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel. Emulator, Frida, Xposed and Magisk checks frustrate analysis.MagiskVPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel. Emulator, Frida, Xposed and Magisk checks frustrate analysis.Xposedstarts a local VPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel. Emulator, Frida, Xposed and Magisk checks frustrate analysis.
