CloudSEK Finds ‘Party’ Panel Renting Android Banking Trojans to Target Indian Institutions

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Summary

CloudSEK analyzed a multi-tenant service that builds bank-branded Android lures and trojans. Static analysis found the malware can steal card details, SMS and photos, forward calls, and send data through C2 and Telegram.

Key points

  • The panel API was accessible without login and exposed 50 tenants; 34 had approved paid licences, targeting customers of six Indian financial institutions and users of government services.
  • Fake Play Store pages collected card details and streamed keystrokes to the panel, then guided victims to sideload a branded APK.
  • The dropper disguises a second APK installation as a Play Store install, disables Google Play Protect verification, and uses a dead local VPN tunnel to disrupt Play Store traffic.
  • The hidden payload can forward SMS, including bank OTPs, upload inbox contents and gallery photos, send SMS, and activate call forwarding.
  • The investigation identified Firebase messaging and storage, 13 Telegram bots, and a WebSocket C2; CloudSEK assessed with medium confidence that the operator is based in India.
  • CloudSEK said it analyzed both APK stages statically without running them and did not access victim records; some lures and APKs were still live on November 14, 2026.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Bank-branded fake Play Store pages collect card details and stream keystrokes to the panel, including from forms that are abandoned before submission.
  • The pages guide victims to sideload a dropper APK, which decrypts and installs a second APK while posing as the Play Store.
  • The payload receives commands through Firebase Cloud Messaging, forwards SMS messages, uploads SMS and gallery data, and enables call forwarding.
Defensive Notes
  • Install banking apps only from official app stores and verify the developer; do not install APKs from links, SMS, or WhatsApp.
  • Banks and security teams should monitor call-forwarding activation and new-device OTP use around card-not-present transactions.
  • Block the reported indicators at network, email, and mobile threat-defence layers, and report hosting, Firebase, and Telegram abuse.
  • For an infected device, the article advises cancelling call forwarding with ##002#, blocking the card through official channels, uninstalling the app, and reporting the incident.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINsanaminfotech[.]onlinenode3[.]sanaminfotech[.]onlineOperator domain used for a WebSocket node; reported as being on clientHold.
IPV4103[.]129[.]96[.]11Payload C2 host; the article assesses that it is most likely compromised or misused.
IPV4103[.]151[.]199[.]22Host serving the bank-branded lure pages, panel API, and APKs.
SHA1927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9SHA-1 certificate fingerprint of the signer used for both APK stages.
SHA2565fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ffHash of the com.userdb.customer Stage 2 payload, identified as an SMS stealer.
SHA25666b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7Hash of the bank-branded credit-card APK identified as the Stage 1 dropper.

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