Mirai-Derived Botnets Rebound as Exposed IoT Devices Remain Vulnerable

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Summary

Censys finds Mirai-derived botnets recovering after 2026 takedowns, while exposed ADB services and outdated Boa software persist. The analysis links this resilience to insecure IoT supply chains, weak defaults, and limited consumer ability to update devices.

Key points

  • Mirai’s leaked code popularized attacks that scan for exposed IoT devices and exploit default credentials or outdated services.
  • After a March 2026 takedown, reported Aisuru C2 infrastructure more than doubled against its pre-takedown baseline within four months; the figures come from a community-submitted dataset.
  • Kimwolf reportedly fragmented into more than 20 botnets, while daily active DDoS endpoints rose from about 1 million to 8–9 million.
  • More than 90% of internet-exposed ADB services observed by Censys used default ports; exposed devices returned to roughly year-earlier levels after an initial post-takedown drop.
  • Over 500,000 hosts still ran discontinued Boa software, including more than 19,900 that also presented a Realtek-issued certificate, consistent with Boa being included in chip-level SDKs.
  • The article identifies manufacturer SDKs, limited firmware maintenance, default configurations, and end-of-life devices as factors that keep vulnerable IoT products in circulation.
  • Censys observed more than 17,000 internet-facing IoT devices with UPnP enabled, which can expose additional network ports if a device is compromised.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Mirai and related botnets scan internet-facing IoT devices, including routers, DVRs, and IP cameras, and attempt to gain access using default or commonly reused credentials.
  • Botnets exploit exposed, outdated, or misconfigured services and firmware vulnerabilities; Mirai-derived Aisuru is reported to compromise IoT devices by exploiting new firmware vulnerabilities.
  • Kimwolf targets exposed Android Debug Bridge services, particularly those on default ports 5555 or 5037, and spreads through compromised residential proxy networks to reach internal devices.
  • The article describes credential spraying and dictionary attacks against randomly scanned IP ranges, using default or commonly reused credentials.
  • The article says attackers can use UPnP-opened ports on a compromised, internet-exposed device to pivot into the internal network.
  • Mirai and related botnets use compromised devices to conduct DDoS attacks.
Defensive Notes
  • Change default credentials and configurations during device setup, and keep firmware updated.
  • Disable UPnP on low-level smart devices exposed to the internet; restrict public access to services intended for local networks, including ADB and router login pages.
  • Manufacturers should audit and update underlying SDK components, including inherited and end-of-life software such as Boa; consumers may need to replace devices whose vendors no longer provide firmware updates.
  • The article notes that reachability of an exposed ADB service does not establish whether authentication is disabled.

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